Re: [bitcoin-dev] V3 Transactions are still vulnerable to significant tx pinning griefing attacks

2023-12-20 Thread Greg Sanders via bitcoin-dev
Hi Peter, Thanks for taking the time to understand the proposal and give thoughtful feedback. With this kind of "static" approach I think there are fundamental limitations because the user has to commit "up front" how large the CPFP later will have to be. 1kvB is an arbitrary value that is two

Re: [bitcoin-dev] V3 Transactions are still vulnerable to significant tx pinning griefing attacks

2023-12-20 Thread Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev
On Wed, Dec 20, 2023 at 07:13:22PM +, Gloria Zhao wrote: > The "damage" of the pin can quantified by the extra fees Alice has to pay. > > For a v3 transaction, Mallory can attach 1000vB at 80sat/vB. This can > increase the cost of replacement to 80,000sat. > For a non-v3 transaction, Mallory

[bitcoin-dev] V3 Transactions are still vulnerable to significant tx pinning griefing attacks

2023-12-20 Thread Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev
V3 transactions(1) is a set of transaction relay policies intended to aim L2/contracting protocols, namely Lightning. The main aim of V3 transactions is to solve Rule 3 transaction pinning(2), allowing the use of ephemeral anchors(3) that do not contain a signature check; anchor outputs that _do_

Re: [bitcoin-dev] V3 Transactions are still vulnerable to significant tx pinning griefing attacks

2023-12-20 Thread Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev
On Wed, Dec 20, 2023 at 03:16:25PM -0500, Greg Sanders wrote: > Hi Peter, > > Thanks for taking the time to understand the proposal and give thoughtful > feedback. > > With this kind of "static" approach I think there are fundamental > limitations because > the user has to commit "up front" how