Re: [Bitcoin-development] Payment protocol for onion URLs.

2013-10-28 Thread John Dillon
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

On Sat, Oct 26, 2013 at 3:31 AM, Gregory Maxwell gmaxw...@gmail.com wrote:
 One limitation of the payment protocol as speced is that there is no
 way for a hidden service site to make use of its full authentication
 capability because they are unable to get SSL certificates issued to
 them.

 Thoughts?

I think this is a great idea and wish to see it done. Here is 1BTC for you,
redeemable when you finish this task. I trust either Jeff Garzik or Peter Todd
to evaluate your finished product, or possibly someone elses:

37NDa6iFLEozbvw8vj38ri5D6SLw5xQujS

22e067d3317e6300a9edda84fd0e24d8bfb86cf91540c3fe7acff45e4dc64dd3:0

redeemScript : 
5241045f4bba15dbfe94a45f362aa13bbaef8bbf21ff84fec1be5b27fa628f4b3acca1a2e5711503c8b8fe2e228229b8b8814f9e33e0f7a314a089d7140269ffd51fe44104d34775baab521d7ba2bd43997312d5f663633484ae1a4d84246866b7088297715a049e2288ae16f168809d36e2da1162f03412bf23aa5f949f235eb2e71417834104f005d39733ec09a1efa0cf8dcf3df50691e22c2374ff9a96d1d9ecb98a1e866c9f558a9fa1ba8ef0bbbad01f396768c0cb2dda9924dc0aaee1481604a8bd9ce453ae

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Making fee estimation better

2013-10-28 Thread John Dillon
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Hash: SHA256

On Sat, Oct 26, 2013 at 12:25 AM, Gavin Andresen
gavinandre...@gmail.com wrote:
 I feel like there is a lot of in the weeds discussion here about
 theoretical, what-if-this-and-that-happens-in-the-future scenarios.

 I would just like to point out (again) that this is not intended to be The
 One True Solution For Transaction Fees And Transaction Prioritization. If
 you've got a better mechanism for estimating fees, fantastic! If it turns
 out estimates are often-enough wrong to be a problem and you've got a
 solution for that, fantastic!

This discussion seems to be a lot of hot air over a simple observation that
estimates are imperfect and always will be. I do not understand you vehement
opposition the notion that a backup is a good thing except in the context that
replacement to change fees is halfway to profit-seeking replacement by fee.


Peter Todd:

You did a fair bit of leg work for replace-by-fee. Seems to me that
replace-for-fee will help prep infrastructure to eventual replace-by-fee usage,
while avoiding some of the politics around zero-conf transactions.

Go dust off your code and make it happen. I want to see a mempool
implementation similar to what you did for me on replace-for-fee, and I
understand much of the code is written in any case. This time I also want to
see a increasetxfee RPC command, and erasewallettx RPC command to deal with
duplicates. (I know touching the wallet code is scary) Having all will enable
usage, and I can imagine getting pools to use this will be easy enough.
(eligius?)

Here is your 4BTC bounty. In the event I am not around Gregory Maxwell can also
adjudicate. If both you and him feel someone else deserves it, by all means
send them the funds

bitcoind decodescript
522102d527466a144aac2030cd16d8be3d91231af26a95c2f8fc345a0ea0e8d53ac3914104d34775baab521d7ba2bd43997312d5f663633484ae1a4d84246866b7088297715a049e2288ae16f168809d36e2da1162f03412bf23aa5f949f235eb2e71417834104f005d39733ec09a1efa0cf8dcf3df50691e22c2374ff9a96d1d9ecb98a1e866c9f558a9fa1ba8ef0bbbad01f396768c0cb2dda9924dc0aaee1481604a8bd9ce453ae
{
asm : 2 
02d527466a144aac2030cd16d8be3d91231af26a95c2f8fc345a0ea0e8d53ac391
04d34775baab521d7ba2bd43997312d5f663633484ae1a4d84246866b7088297715a049e2288ae16f168809d36e2da1162f03412bf23aa5f949f235eb2e7141783
04f005d39733ec09a1efa0cf8dcf3df50691e22c2374ff9a96d1d9ecb98a1e866c9f558a9fa1ba8ef0bbbad01f396768c0cb2dda9924dc0aaee1481604a8bd9ce4
3 OP_CHECKMULTISIG,
reqSigs : 2,
type : multisig,
addresses : [
1L9p6QiWs2nfinyF4CnbqysWijMvvcsnxe,
1FCYd7j4CThTMzts78rh6iQJLBRGPW9fWv,
1GMaxweLLbo8mdXvnnC19Wt2wigiYUKgEB
],
p2sh : 3BST1dPxvgMGL3d9GPCHvTyZNsJ7YKTVPo
}

(I realized right after my Tor payment protocol bounty that I would need some
bit of uniqueness like a bounty-specific pubkey to disambiguate multiple such
bounties!)
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[Bitcoin-development] 0.8.5 setup.exe is corrupt

2013-10-28 Thread Chris Evans
I downloaded 0.8.5 windows setup .exe and it says it is corrupted even
after i try re-download it  maybe it needs to be rearchived?
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Feedback requested: reject p2p message

2013-10-28 Thread Andreas Schildbach
HTTP also defines success codes (2xx). Are we also talking about ACK
messages now, rather than just REJECT messages?


On 10/28/2013 03:52 AM, kjj wrote:
 Any reason not to use actual HTTP codes?  I'm not aware of any major
 deficiency in them.  Most of them won't apply to us, which is fine, they
 don't seem to apply to HTTP either.  We can extend the scheme on our own
 if we find a good reason to.
 
 That implies 16 bits, or a varint.  I would avoid a string or varstring
 here; we already have a text field.  Varint vs. 16 bits is a minor
 issue, and arguments can be made in both directions.  I flipped a coin
 and got heads, so I'll say varint.
 
 Gavin Andresen wrote:
 RE: use HTTP-like status codes:

 Okey dokey, I'll add a one-byte machine-readable HTTP-like status
 code. Unless y'all want a 32-bit status code.  Or maybe a varint. Or a
 three-character numeric string. I really and truly don't care, but I
 am writing this code right now so whatever you want, decide quickly.

 If anybody has strong feelings about what the reject categories should
 be, then please take the time to write a specific list, I can't read
 your mind


 -- 
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Feedback requested: reject p2p message

2013-10-28 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 2:26 AM, Andreas Schildbach
andr...@schildbach.de wrote:
 HTTP also defines success codes (2xx). Are we also talking about ACK
 messages now, rather than just REJECT messages?

I do not believe we should do that:  It would be a non-trivial
increase the protocol bandwidth requirements.

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Payment protocol for onion URLs.

2013-10-28 Thread Adam Back
I think its a mistake relying directly on X509, its subject to corrpution
attacks, involves ASN.1 and enough openSSL X.500 encoding abiguity (or other
code base) to be a security nightmare.

Why not make the payment messages signed by bitcoin keys.  If someone wants
to associate with X.509 they can put a bitcoin address on their SSL site.

If someone can get into your site deeply enough to modify your SSL served
code and you're trying to run ecommerce you have other problems.

Never the less if they care they can clear sign the bitcoin addr with xmlsig
and their X.509 private key, and/or with PGP and a WoT.

I think its smarter to pollute bitcoin main with X509.  Make a little helper
util if there are not enough xmlsig tools that you cant pick one up
opensource for multiple languages.

This then avoids the binding to Tor - you can publish a bitcoin address
authenticated anyway you like.  Eg tahoe-LAFS auth/integrity, i2p, tor, pgp
- you name it.

Maybe I voice this opinion a bit late in the cycle, but I think it would do
bitcoin a favor otherwise its a camels nose in the tent into the TLAs that
control their own X.509 CAs, or issue NSL letters for CA private keys, or
forged certs.  It's all happening and thanks to Snowden we now have even
more evidence...

Adam

On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 09:06:48PM -0700, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 8:41 PM, Luke-Jr l...@dashjr.org wrote:
 Is there any point to additional encryption over tor (which afaik is already
 encrypted end-to-end)? Is there a safe way to make this work through tor 
 entry
 nodes/gateways?

The x.509 in the payment protocol itself is for authentication and
non-repudiation, not confidentiality.

It's used to sign the payment request so that later there is
cryptographic evidence in the event of a dispute:
He didn't send me my alpaca socks! Thats not the address I told you to pay!
He told me he'd send my 99 red-balloons, not just one!  No way,
that was the price for 1 red-balloon!

Just using SSL or .onion (or whatever else) gets you confidentiality
and authentication.  Neither of these things get you non-repudiation.

 It'd be nice to have a way to support namecoin-provided keys too...

The payment protocol is extensible, so I hope that someday someone
will support namecoin authenticated messages (but note: this requires
namecoin to support trust-free SPV resolvers, otherwise there is no
way to extract a compact proof that can be stuck into a payment
request) and GPG authenticated messages.

But those things will require a fair amount of code (even fixing the
namecoin protocol in the nmc case), and GPG could be done just by
externally signing the actual payment request like you'd sign any
file... and considering the sorry state of their _practical_
usability, I don't think they're worth doing at this time.

By contrast, I _think_ the tor onion support would require only a
relatively few lines of code since it could just be the existing x.509
mechanism with just a simple special validation rule for .onion, plus
a little tool to repack the keys.  I think it would easily be more
widely used than namecoin (though probably both would not really be
used, as gavin notes).

w/ Gavin's comments I'll go check in with the tor folks and see if
anyone has ever though of doing this before and if there is already a
canonical structure for the x.509 certs used in this way.

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Payment protocol for onion URLs.

2013-10-28 Thread Mike Hearn
On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 1:14 PM, Adam Back a...@cypherspace.org wrote:

 Maybe I voice this opinion a bit late in the cycle, but 


A bit late is one way to put it. All these topics and more were discussed
to death a year ago when the payment protocol was first being designed.
Bluntly, I think we're all sick of it. You are welcome to PGP sign your
payment requests if you want to. If not, then please see my FAQ for
discussion:

   https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=300809.msg3225143#msg3225143

tl;dr - the right way to tackle governments getting bogus certs issued is
certificate transparency. All other suggestions tend to boil down to
here's some handwaving that doesn't actually solve the problem.

By the way, the evidence from the Snowden case rather reinforces the
strength of the CA system. Did we see stories about bulk usage of fake
certificates? No. What we read is that the increased usage of SSL was a
major game-changer for intelligence agencies. They solve SSL by compiling
databases of private keys they obtain in various ways. True to form when
the FBI wanted access to LavaBit, they tried to obtain his private keys
rather than just push a convenient give me a fake cert button, and when
it became known that Lavabit had to hand over their key, GoDaddy revoked
their certificate. Industry policies forced their hand and those policies
don't have a get-out clause for the FBI.

It's without a doubt that there are government-issued fake certs floating
about, somewhere, just due to the scale of hacking that's been taking
place. However, demanding perfection in a system that handles security for
over a billion people and tens of millions of operators is unreasonable.
All we can ask for is that it it's being improved, which through
initiatives like cert transparency, it is.

Please, let's call time on these discussions. They long ago ceased to have
any value.
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Feedback requested: reject p2p message

2013-10-28 Thread Gavin Andresen
Thanks for the feedback, everybody, gist updated:
  https://gist.github.com/gavinandresen/7079034

Categories are:

0x01-0x0fProtocol syntax errors0x10-0x1fProtocol semantic errors0x40-0x4fServer
policy rule
https://gist.github.com/gavinandresen/7079034#rejection-codes-common-to-all-message-types

RE: why not a varint:  because we're never ever going to run out of reject
codes.  Eight are defined right now, if we ever defined eight more I'd be
surprised.

RE: why not use HTTP codes directly: because we'd be fitting round pegs
into square holes.

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