Re: [Bitcoin-development] Reducing the block rate instead of increasing the maximum block size
On 11/05/2015 04:25 p.m., Leo Wandersleb wrote: I assume that 1 minute block target will not get any substantial support but just in case only few people speaking up might be taken as careful support of the idea, here's my two cents: In mining, stale shares depend on delay between pool/network and the miner. This varies substantially globally and as Peter Todd/Luke-Jr mentioned, speed of light will always keep those at a disadvantage that are 100 light milli seconds away from the creation of the last block. If anything, this warrants to increase block target, not reduce. (The increase might wait until we have miners on Mars though ;) ) An additional delay of 200 milliseconds means loosing approximately 0.3% of the revenue. Do you really think this is going to be the key factor to prevent a mining pool from being used? There are lot of other factors, such as DoS protections, security, privacy, variance, trust, algorithm to distribute shares, that are much more important than that. And having a 1 minute block actually reduces the payout variance 10x, so miners will be happy for that. And many pool miners may opt to do solo mining, and create new full-nodes. If SPV also becomes 10 times more traffic intensive, I can only urge you to travel to anything but central Europe or the USA. The SPV traffic is minuscule. Bloom-filers are an ugly solution that increases bandwidth and does not provide a real privacy solution. Small improvements in the wire protocol can reduce the traffic two-fold. I want bitcoin to be the currency for the other x billion and thus I oppose any change that moves the balance towards the economically upper billion. Because having a 10 minute rate Bitcoin is a good Internet money. If you have a 1 minute rate, then it can also be a retail payment method, an virtual game trading payment method, a gambling, XXX-video renting (hey, it takes less than 10 minutes to see one of those :), and much more. You can reach more billions by having near instant payments. Don't tell me about the morning caffe, I would like that everyone is buying their coffe with Bitcoin and there are millions of users before we figure out how to do that off-chain. Best regards, Sergio. -- One dashboard for servers and applications across Physical-Virtual-Cloud Widest out-of-the-box monitoring support with 50+ applications Performance metrics, stats and reports that give you Actionable Insights Deep dive visibility with transaction tracing using APM Insight. http://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/290420510;117567292;y___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Reducing the block rate instead of increasing the maximum block size
Yes This! So many people seem hung up on growing the block size! If gaining a higher tps throughput is the main aim, I think that this proposition to speed up block creation has merit! Yes it will lead to an increase in the block chain still due to 1mb ~1 minute instead of ~10 minute, but the change to the protocol is minor, you are only adding in a different difficulty rate starting from hight blah, no new features or anything are being added so there seems to me much less of a security risk! Also that impact if a hard fork should be minimal because there is nothing but absolute incentive for miners to mine at the new easier difficulty! I feel this deserves a great deal of consideration as opposed to blowing out the block through miners voting etc From: Sergio Lernermailto:sergioler...@certimix.com Sent: 11/05/2015 5:05 PM To: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.netmailto:bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net Subject: [Bitcoin-development] Reducing the block rate instead of increasing the maximum block size In this e-mail I'll do my best to argue than if you accept that increasing the transactions/second is a good direction to go, then increasing the maximum block size is not the best way to do it. I argue that the right direction to go is to decrease the block rate to 1 minute, while keeping the block size limit to 1 Megabyte (or increasing it from a lower value such as 100 Kbyte and then have a step function). I'm backing up my claims with many hours of research simulating the Bitcoin network under different conditions [1]. I'll try to convince you by responding to each of the arguments I've heard against it. Arguments against reducing the block interval 1. It will encourage centralization, because participants of mining pools will loose more money because of excessive initial block template latency, which leads to higher stale shares When a new block is solved, that information needs to propagate throughout the Bitcoin network up to the mining pool operator nodes, then a new block header candidate is created, and this header must be propagated to all the mining pool users, ether by a push or a pull model. Generally the mining server pushes new work units to the individual miners. If done other way around, the server would need to handle a high load of continuous work requests that would be difficult to distinguish from a DDoS attack. So if the server pushes new block header candidates to clients, then the problem boils down to increasing bandwidth of the servers to achieve a tenfold increase in work distribution. Or distributing the servers geographically to achieve a lower latency. Propagating blocks does not require additional CPU resources, so mining pools administrators would need to increase moderately their investment in the server infrastructure to achieve lower latency and higher bandwidth, but I guess the investment would be low. 2. It will increase the probability of a block-chain split The convergence of the network relies on the diminishing probability of two honest miners creating simultaneous competing blocks chains. To increase the competition chain, competing blocks must be generated in almost simultaneously (in the same time window approximately bounded by the network average block propagation delay). The probability of a block competition decreases exponentially with the number of blocks. In fact, the probability of a sustained competition on ten 1-minute blocks is one million times lower than the probability of a competition of one 10-minute block. So even if the competition probability of six 1-minute blocks is higher than of six ten-minute blocks, this does not imply reducing the block rate increases this chance, but on the contrary, reduces it. 3, It will reduce the security of the network The security of the network is based on two facts: A- The miners are incentivized to extend the best chain B- The probability of a reversal based on a long block competition decreases as more confirmation blocks are appended. C- Renting or buying hardware to perform a 51% attack is costly. A still holds. B holds for the same amount of confirmation blocks, so 6 confirmation blocks in a 10-minute block-chain is approximately equivalent to 6 confirmation blocks in a 1-minute block-chain. Only C changes, as renting the hashing power for 6 minutes is ten times less expensive as renting it for 1 hour. However, there is no shop where one can find 51% of the hashing power to rent right now, nor probably will ever be if Bitcoin succeeds. Last, you can still have a 1 hour confirmation (60 1-minute blocks) if you wish for high-valued payments, so the security decreases only if participant wish to decrease it. 4. Reducing the block propagation time on the average case is good, but what happen in the worse case? Most methods proposed to reduce the block propagation delay do it only on the average case. Any kind of block compression
[Bitcoin-development] Reducing the block rate instead of increasing the maximum block size
In this e-mail I'll do my best to argue than if you accept that increasing the transactions/second is a good direction to go, then increasing the maximum block size is not the best way to do it. I argue that the right direction to go is to decrease the block rate to 1 minute, while keeping the block size limit to 1 Megabyte (or increasing it from a lower value such as 100 Kbyte and then have a step function). I'm backing up my claims with many hours of research simulating the Bitcoin network under different conditions [1]. I'll try to convince you by responding to each of the arguments I've heard against it. Arguments against reducing the block interval 1. It will encourage centralization, because participants of mining pools will loose more money because of excessive initial block template latency, which leads to higher stale shares When a new block is solved, that information needs to propagate throughout the Bitcoin network up to the mining pool operator nodes, then a new block header candidate is created, and this header must be propagated to all the mining pool users, ether by a push or a pull model. Generally the mining server pushes new work units to the individual miners. If done other way around, the server would need to handle a high load of continuous work requests that would be difficult to distinguish from a DDoS attack. So if the server pushes new block header candidates to clients, then the problem boils down to increasing bandwidth of the servers to achieve a tenfold increase in work distribution. Or distributing the servers geographically to achieve a lower latency. Propagating blocks does not require additional CPU resources, so mining pools administrators would need to increase moderately their investment in the server infrastructure to achieve lower latency and higher bandwidth, but I guess the investment would be low. 2. It will increase the probability of a block-chain split The convergence of the network relies on the diminishing probability of two honest miners creating simultaneous competing blocks chains. To increase the competition chain, competing blocks must be generated in almost simultaneously (in the same time window approximately bounded by the network average block propagation delay). The probability of a block competition decreases exponentially with the number of blocks. In fact, the probability of a sustained competition on ten 1-minute blocks is one million times lower than the probability of a competition of one 10-minute block. So even if the competition probability of six 1-minute blocks is higher than of six ten-minute blocks, this does not imply reducing the block rate increases this chance, but on the contrary, reduces it. 3, It will reduce the security of the network The security of the network is based on two facts: A- The miners are incentivized to extend the best chain B- The probability of a reversal based on a long block competition decreases as more confirmation blocks are appended. C- Renting or buying hardware to perform a 51% attack is costly. A still holds. B holds for the same amount of confirmation blocks, so 6 confirmation blocks in a 10-minute block-chain is approximately equivalent to 6 confirmation blocks in a 1-minute block-chain. Only C changes, as renting the hashing power for 6 minutes is ten times less expensive as renting it for 1 hour. However, there is no shop where one can find 51% of the hashing power to rent right now, nor probably will ever be if Bitcoin succeeds. Last, you can still have a 1 hour confirmation (60 1-minute blocks) if you wish for high-valued payments, so the security decreases only if participant wish to decrease it. 4. Reducing the block propagation time on the average case is good, but what happen in the worse case? Most methods proposed to reduce the block propagation delay do it only on the average case. Any kind of block compression relies on both parties sharing some previous information. In the worse case it's true that a miner can create and try to broadcast a block that takes too much time to verify or bandwidth to transmit. This is currently true on the Bitcoin network. Nevertheless there is no such incentive for miners, since they will be shooting on their own foots. Peter Todd has argued that the best strategy for miners is actually to reach 51% of the network, but not more. In other words, to exclude the slowest 49% percent. But this strategy of creating bloated blocks is too risky in practice, and surely doomed to fail, as network conditions dynamically change. Also it would be perceived as an attack to the network, and the miner (if it is a public mining pool) would be probably blacklisted. 5. Thousands of SPV wallets running in mobile devices would need to be upgraded (thanks Mike). That depends on the current upgrade rate for SPV wallets like Bitcoin Wallet and BreadWallet. Suppose that the upgrade rate is 80%/year: we develop the source code for the change now and apply the change in
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Reducing the block rate instead of increasing the maximum block size
So if the server pushes new block header candidates to clients, then the problem boils down to increasing bandwidth of the servers to achieve a tenfold increase in work distribution. Most Stratum pools already do multiple updates of the header every block period, bandwidth is really inconsequential, it's the latency that kills. At the present time you are looking up to 15 seconds between the first and last pools to push headers to their clients for the latest block. It's sort of inconsequential with a 10 minute block time, but it cuts into a 1 minute one very heavily. Some pools already don't do their own validation of blocks, but simply mirror other pools, pushing them to be even more latency focused will just make this an epidemic of invalidity rather than a solution. There are several proof-of-work cryptocurrencies in existence that have lower than 1 minute block intervals and they work just fine. First there was Bitcoin with a 10 minute interval, then was LiteCoin using a 2.5 interval, then was DogeCoin with 1 minute, and then QuarkCoin with just 30 seconds. You can't really use these as examples of things going just fine. None of these networks see anything approaching the Bitcoin transaction volume and none have even remotely the same network size. Some Bitcoin forks use floats in consensus critical code and work just fine, for the moment. We can't justify poor decisions with but the altcoins are doing it. Is there even a single study of the stale rates within these networks? -- One dashboard for servers and applications across Physical-Virtual-Cloud Widest out-of-the-box monitoring support with 50+ applications Performance metrics, stats and reports that give you Actionable Insights Deep dive visibility with transaction tracing using APM Insight. http://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/290420510;117567292;y ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Reducing the block rate instead of increasing the maximum block size
On Mon, May 11, 2015 at 04:03:29AM -0300, Sergio Lerner wrote: Arguments against reducing the block interval 1. It will encourage centralization, because participants of mining pools will loose more money because of excessive initial block template latency, which leads to higher stale shares When a new block is solved, that information needs to propagate throughout the Bitcoin network up to the mining pool operator nodes, then a new block header candidate is created, and this header must be propagated to all the mining pool users, ether by a push or a pull model. Generally the mining server pushes new work units to the individual miners. If done other way around, the server would need to handle a high load of continuous work requests that would be difficult to distinguish from a DDoS attack. So if the server pushes new block header candidates to clients, then the problem boils down to increasing bandwidth of the servers to achieve a tenfold increase in work distribution. Or distributing the servers geographically to achieve a lower latency. Propagating blocks does not require additional CPU resources, so mining pools administrators would need to increase moderately their investment in the server infrastructure to achieve lower latency and higher bandwidth, but I guess the investment would be low. It's *way* easier to buy more bandwidth that it is to get lower latency. After all, getting to the other side of the planet via fiber takes at *minimum* 100ms simply due to the speed of light; routing overheads approximately double or triple that for all but highly specialized and very, very expensive, networking services. Bandwidth simply can't fix the speed of light. It's also not at all realistic or desirable to assume connectivity in a single hop, so you can again multiply that base latency by 2-5 times. And on top of *that* you have to take into account latency from hasher to mining pool - time that the hashing power isn't working on the new block because they're work unit hasn't been updated matters just as much as the time to get that block to the pool in the first place. Being forced to reduce that latency is very damaging to the ecosystem as you're making it more profitable to keep hashing power centralized. In any case, even with 10 minute blocks pools already pay a lot of attention to latency... Why make that problem 10x worse? 2. It will increase the probability of a block-chain split The convergence of the network relies on the diminishing probability of two honest miners creating simultaneous competing blocks chains. To increase the competition chain, competing blocks must be generated in almost simultaneously (in the same time window approximately bounded by the network average block propagation delay). The probability of a block competition decreases exponentially with the number of blocks. In fact, the probability of a sustained competition on ten 1-minute blocks is one million times lower than the probability of a competition of one 10-minute block. So even if the competition probability of six 1-minute blocks is higher than of six ten-minute blocks, this does not imply reducing the block rate increases this chance, but on the contrary, reduces it. Can you explain your reasoning here in detail? 4. Reducing the block propagation time on the average case is good, but what happen in the worse case? Most methods proposed to reduce the block propagation delay do it only on the average case. Any kind of block compression relies on both parties sharing some previous information. In the worse case it's true that a miner can create and try to broadcast a block that takes too much time to verify or bandwidth to transmit. This is currently true on the Bitcoin network. Nevertheless there is no such incentive for miners, since they will be shooting on their own foots. Peter Todd has argued that the best strategy for miners is actually to reach 51% of the network, but not more. In other words, to exclude the slowest 49% Actually the correct figure is less than ~30%: http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg03200.html percent. But this strategy of creating bloated blocks is too risky in practice, and surely doomed to fail, as network conditions dynamically change. They dynamically change? Source? Remember that the strategy still gives you a benefit if you simply target, say, 75% rather than the minimum threshold. Also it would be perceived as an attack to the network, and the miner (if it is a public mining pool) would be probably blacklisted. How do you see that blacklisting actually being done? Equally, it's easy to portray such mining as being for the good of Bitcoin - we're just making transaction cheap! tough luck if your shitty pool can't keep up This is quite unlike selfish mining. 7. There has been insufficient testing and/or insufficient research into technical/economic implications or reducing
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Reducing the block rate instead of increasing the maximum block size
On 2015-05-11 10:34, Peter Todd wrote: How do you see that blacklisting actually being done? Same way ghash.io was banned from the network when used Finney attacks against BetCoin Dice. As Andreas Antonopoulos says, if any of the miners do anything bad, we just ban them from mining. Any sort of attack like this only lasts 10 minutes as a result. Stop worrying so much. https://youtu.be/ncPyMUfNyVM?t=20s -- One dashboard for servers and applications across Physical-Virtual-Cloud Widest out-of-the-box monitoring support with 50+ applications Performance metrics, stats and reports that give you Actionable Insights Deep dive visibility with transaction tracing using APM Insight. http://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/290420510;117567292;y ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Reducing the block rate instead of increasing the maximum block size
I proposed the same thing last year (there's a video of the presentation I was giving somewhere around). My intuition was that this would require slowly reducing the inter-block time, probably by step reductions at particular block heights. Having had almost a year to think about it some more there are a few subtleties: 1) I think it could discourage decentralisation if the nominal 2 week period per difficulty retarget is retained. If we reached 4032 blocks and a 5 minute block time then there would be 2x as many blocks at any given difficulty which increases the odds of a smaller pool finding a block and thus getting a reward. Block rewards would have to drop in proportion to the reduced interval to keep the total schedule of 21M coins on track though, but the reduction in variance is a win for smaller miners. 2) There are limits to the block time. The speed of light is an ultimately limiting factor here, but we would want to avoid excessive orphan rates. 3) There would be some amount of confusion about numbers of confirmations. I actually think that confirmation numbers are a really misleading idea anyway and it would be safer to think in terms of minutes of security. A zero conf transaction has zero minutes, while right now 1, 2, 3 and 6 would be ten minutes, twenty minutes, thirty minutes and sixty minutes respectively. If our block time were 5 minutes then 8 confirmations would be forty minutes of security; if the block time was 2.5 minutes then 8 confirmations would be twenty minutes of security. The minutes of security measure indicates the mean number of minutes of the entire network's hash rate would be required to undo a transaction. 4) Reducing the inter-block time reduces the variance in reaching that sixty minutes of security level. The variance around finding 6 blocks with a ten minute interval is much wider than the variance for finding 12 blocks with a 5 minute interval. On 11 May 2015, at 08:30, Thy Shizzle thyshiz...@outlook.com wrote: Yes This! So many people seem hung up on growing the block size! If gaining a higher tps throughput is the main aim, I think that this proposition to speed up block creation has merit! Yes it will lead to an increase in the block chain still due to 1mb ~1 minute instead of ~10 minute, but the change to the protocol is minor, you are only adding in a different difficulty rate starting from hight blah, no new features or anything are being added so there seems to me much less of a security risk! Also that impact if a hard fork should be minimal because there is nothing but absolute incentive for miners to mine at the new easier difficulty! I feel this deserves a great deal of consideration as opposed to blowing out the block through miners voting etc From: Sergio Lerner mailto:sergioler...@certimix.com Sent: 11/05/2015 5:05 PM To: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net mailto:bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net Subject: [Bitcoin-development] Reducing the block rate instead of increasing the maximum block size In this e-mail I'll do my best to argue than if you accept that increasing the transactions/second is a good direction to go, then increasing the maximum block size is not the best way to do it. I argue that the right direction to go is to decrease the block rate to 1 minute, while keeping the block size limit to 1 Megabyte (or increasing it from a lower value such as 100 Kbyte and then have a step function). I'm backing up my claims with many hours of research simulating the Bitcoin network under different conditions [1]. I'll try to convince you by responding to each of the arguments I've heard against it. Arguments against reducing the block interval 1. It will encourage centralization, because participants of mining pools will loose more money because of excessive initial block template latency, which leads to higher stale shares When a new block is solved, that information needs to propagate throughout the Bitcoin network up to the mining pool operator nodes, then a new block header candidate is created, and this header must be propagated to all the mining pool users, ether by a push or a pull model. Generally the mining server pushes new work units to the individual miners. If done other way around, the server would need to handle a high load of continuous work requests that would be difficult to distinguish from a DDoS attack. So if the server pushes new block header candidates to clients, then the problem boils down to increasing bandwidth of the servers to achieve a tenfold increase in work distribution. Or distributing the servers geographically to achieve a lower latency. Propagating blocks does not require additional CPU resources, so mining pools administrators would need to increase moderately their investment in the server infrastructure to achieve lower latency and higher bandwidth, but I guess the investment would be
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Reducing the block rate instead of increasing the maximum block size
On 11 May 2015, at 12:10, insecurity@national.shitposting.agency wrote: On 2015-05-11 10:34, Peter Todd wrote: How do you see that blacklisting actually being done? Same way ghash.io was banned from the network when used Finney attacks against BetCoin Dice. As Andreas Antonopoulos says, if any of the miners do anything bad, we just ban them from mining. Any sort of attack like this only lasts 10 minutes as a result. Stop worrying so much. This doesn't work because a large-scale miner can trivially make themselves look like a very large number of much smaller scale miners. Their ability to minimize variance comes from the cumulative totals they control so 10 pools of 1% of the network cumulatively have the same variance as 1 pool with 10% of the network. It's also very easy for miners to relay blocks via different addresses and the cost is minimal. The biggest cost would be in DDoS prevention and a miner that actually split their pool into lots of small fragments would actually give themselves the ability to do quite a lot of DDoS mitigation anyway. If no-one is doing this right now it's simply because they've not had the right incentives to make it worthwhile; if the incentives make it worthwhile then this is pretty trivial to do. This is one area where anonymity on behalf of transaction validators and block makers essentially makes it pretty-much impossible to maintain any sort of sanctions against antisocial behaviour. -- One dashboard for servers and applications across Physical-Virtual-Cloud Widest out-of-the-box monitoring support with 50+ applications Performance metrics, stats and reports that give you Actionable Insights Deep dive visibility with transaction tracing using APM Insight. http://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/290420510;117567292;y ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Reducing the block rate instead of increasing the maximum block size
The propagation speed gain from having smaller blocks is linear in the size reduction, down to a small size, after which the delay of the first byte prevails [1], however the blockchain fork rate increases superlinearly, giving an overall worse tradeoff. A high blockchain fork rate is a symptom of inefficient use of the network's mining resources and may give an advantage to an attacker that is more efficient in communicating internally. I'd strongly against increasing the block generation rate in Bitcoin, it'd be a very controversial proposal and would not solve anything. [1] http://www.tik.ee.ethz.ch/file/49318d3f56c1d525aabf7fda78b23fc0/P2P2013_041.pdf On Mon, May 11, 2015 at 1:51 PM Dave Hudson d...@hashingit.com wrote: On 11 May 2015, at 12:10, insecurity@national.shitposting.agency wrote: On 2015-05-11 10:34, Peter Todd wrote: How do you see that blacklisting actually being done? Same way ghash.io was banned from the network when used Finney attacks against BetCoin Dice. As Andreas Antonopoulos says, if any of the miners do anything bad, we just ban them from mining. Any sort of attack like this only lasts 10 minutes as a result. Stop worrying so much. This doesn't work because a large-scale miner can trivially make themselves look like a very large number of much smaller scale miners. Their ability to minimize variance comes from the cumulative totals they control so 10 pools of 1% of the network cumulatively have the same variance as 1 pool with 10% of the network. It's also very easy for miners to relay blocks via different addresses and the cost is minimal. The biggest cost would be in DDoS prevention and a miner that actually split their pool into lots of small fragments would actually give themselves the ability to do quite a lot of DDoS mitigation anyway. If no-one is doing this right now it's simply because they've not had the right incentives to make it worthwhile; if the incentives make it worthwhile then this is pretty trivial to do. This is one area where anonymity on behalf of transaction validators and block makers essentially makes it pretty-much impossible to maintain any sort of sanctions against antisocial behaviour. -- One dashboard for servers and applications across Physical-Virtual-Cloud Widest out-of-the-box monitoring support with 50+ applications Performance metrics, stats and reports that give you Actionable Insights Deep dive visibility with transaction tracing using APM Insight. http://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/290420510;117567292;y ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development -- One dashboard for servers and applications across Physical-Virtual-Cloud Widest out-of-the-box monitoring support with 50+ applications Performance metrics, stats and reports that give you Actionable Insights Deep dive visibility with transaction tracing using APM Insight. http://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/290420510;117567292;y___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Reducing the block rate instead of increasing the maximum block size
On Monday, May 11, 2015 7:03:29 AM Sergio Lerner wrote: 1. It will encourage centralization, because participants of mining pools will loose more money because of excessive initial block template latency, which leads to higher stale shares When a new block is solved, that information needs to propagate throughout the Bitcoin network up to the mining pool operator nodes, then a new block header candidate is created, and this header must be propagated to all the mining pool users, ether by a push or a pull model. Generally the mining server pushes new work units to the individual miners. If done other way around, the server would need to handle a high load of continuous work requests that would be difficult to distinguish from a DDoS attack. So if the server pushes new block header candidates to clients, then the problem boils down to increasing bandwidth of the servers to achieve a tenfold increase in work distribution. Or distributing the servers geographically to achieve a lower latency. Propagating blocks does not require additional CPU resources, so mining pools administrators would need to increase moderately their investment in the server infrastructure to achieve lower latency and higher bandwidth, but I guess the investment would be low. 1. Latency is what matters here, not bandwidth so much. And latency reduction is either expensive or impossible. 2. Mining pools are mostly run at a loss (with exception to only the most centralised pools), and have nothing to invest in increasing infrastructure. 3, It will reduce the security of the network The security of the network is based on two facts: A- The miners are incentivized to extend the best chain B- The probability of a reversal based on a long block competition decreases as more confirmation blocks are appended. C- Renting or buying hardware to perform a 51% attack is costly. A still holds. B holds for the same amount of confirmation blocks, so 6 confirmation blocks in a 10-minute block-chain is approximately equivalent to 6 confirmation blocks in a 1-minute block-chain. Only C changes, as renting the hashing power for 6 minutes is ten times less expensive as renting it for 1 hour. However, there is no shop where one can find 51% of the hashing power to rent right now, nor probably will ever be if Bitcoin succeeds. Last, you can still have a 1 hour confirmation (60 1-minute blocks) if you wish for high-valued payments, so the security decreases only if participant wish to decrease it. You're overlooking at least: 1. The real network has to suffer wasted work as a result of the stale blocks, while an attacker does not. If 20% of blocks are stale, the attacker only needs 40% of the legitimate hashrate to achieve 50%-in-practice. 2. Since blocks are individually weaker, it becomes cheaper to DoS nodes with invalid blocks. (not sure if this is a real concern, but it ought to be considered and addressed) 4. Reducing the block propagation time on the average case is good, but what happen in the worse case? Most methods proposed to reduce the block propagation delay do it only on the average case. Any kind of block compression relies on both parties sharing some previous information. In the worse case it's true that a miner can create and try to broadcast a block that takes too much time to verify or bandwidth to transmit. This is currently true on the Bitcoin network. Nevertheless there is no such incentive for miners, since they will be shooting on their own foots. Peter Todd has argued that the best strategy for miners is actually to reach 51% of the network, but not more. In other words, to exclude the slowest 49% percent. But this strategy of creating bloated blocks is too risky in practice, and surely doomed to fail, as network conditions dynamically change. Also it would be perceived as an attack to the network, and the miner (if it is a public mining pool) would be probably blacklisted. One can probably overcome changing network conditions merely by trying to reach 75% and exclude the slowest 25%. Also, there is no way to identify or blacklist miners. 5. Thousands of SPV wallets running in mobile devices would need to be upgraded (thanks Mike). That depends on the current upgrade rate for SPV wallets like Bitcoin Wallet and BreadWallet. Suppose that the upgrade rate is 80%/year: we develop the source code for the change now and apply the change in Q2 2016, then most of the nodes will already be upgraded by when the hardfork takes place. Also a public notice telling people to upgrade in web pages, bitcointalk, SPV wallets warnings, coindesk, one year in advance will give plenty of time to SPV wallet users to upgrade. I agree this shouldn't be a real concern. SPV wallets are also more likely and less risky (globally) to be auto-updated. 6. If there are 10x more blocks, then there are 10x more block headers, and that increases the amount of bandwidth SPV wallets