Re: [Bitcoin-development] Bait for reusable addresses

2014-01-24 Thread Mike Hearn

 brittleness. The real world experience is that users, or to be exact
 wallet authors, turn down SPV privacy parameters until bloom filters
 have almost no privacy in exchange for little bandwidth usage.


That's not fundamental though, it just reflects that the only
implementation of this is used on a wide range of devices and doesn't yet
have any notion of bandwidth modes or monitoring. It can and will be
resolved at some point.
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Bait for reusable addresses

2014-01-24 Thread Peter Todd
On Fri, Jan 24, 2014 at 12:26:19PM +, Mike Hearn wrote:
 
  brittleness. The real world experience is that users, or to be exact
  wallet authors, turn down SPV privacy parameters until bloom filters
  have almost no privacy in exchange for little bandwidth usage.
 
 
 That's not fundamental though, it just reflects that the only
 implementation of this is used on a wide range of devices and doesn't yet
 have any notion of bandwidth modes or monitoring. It can and will be
 resolved at some point.

Resolved for some users, not for all. The underlying trade-off will
always be there; less bandwidth makes it harder, more addresses to check
makes it harder; an HD wallet used properly without re-using addresses
will quickly lead to a fairly full bloom filter unless addresses are
expired, and expiration leads to scenarios where funds can be lost.

I think we need to provide users with better options than that.

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Bait for reusable addresses

2014-01-24 Thread Adam Back
I think prefix has analysis side effects.  There are (at least) 4 things
that link payments: the graph of payment flows, timing, precise amounts, IP
addresses, but with prefix a 5th: the prefix allows public elmination of
candidates connections, I think that may make network flow analysis even
more effective than it has been.

So SPV can be tuned as Mike just said, and as Greg pointed out somewhere
bloom is more private than prefix because its a wallet to node connection,
not a node broadcast, and Mike mentioned embedded Tor in another post to
boost node-capture issues with hostile network.

So reusable addresses are cool for full node recipients (0-bit prefix) or
trusted server offload (your own desktop, VPS, or trusted service provider
node, and solve real problems for the use case of static and donation
addresses particularly with this second delegatable key for no-funds at risk
search (which is even good as Jeremey said for your own node, in a offline
wallet use case).

Now while it would be clearly a very nice win if reusable addresses could be
made SPV-like in network characteristics and privacy, but we dont have a
plausible mechanism yet IMO.  Close as we got was Greg's enhancement of
my/your bloom bait/prefix concept to make multiple candidate baits to
provide some ambiguity (still allows elimination, just slightly less of it).

If we can find some efficient crypto to solve that last one, we could even
adopt them generally if it was efficient enough without needing interactive
one-use address release.

Maybe we should ask some math/theoretical crypto people if there is anything
like public key watermarking or something that could solve this problem
efficiently.

For the related but different case of transaction level authenticity I like
Alan's server derived but communicated scalar  base to allow the client to
do at least TOFU.

Payment protocol may add another level of identity framework on top of TOFU
addresses (at a lower level than the payment messages defined now), and
without then needing a batch upload of offline signed secondary address
sigature that Mike described a while back, at least in person, maybe online
somewhere (an add on with similar purpose and effect to Alan's TOFU, but
then with revocation, identity and certification for merchants).

I have not talked about payment protocols main app level function I think we
all understand and agree on the purpose and use of the server and optional
client certs in that.  People may wish to add other cert types later (eg
PGP, SSH etc) but this version covers the common merchant tech, and allows
client-side certs to be experimented with for identity also (eg imagine as a
way to enrol with regulated entities like exchanges.)

Tell me if I am misunderstanding anything :)

Adam

On Fri, Jan 24, 2014 at 12:26:19PM +, Mike Hearn wrote:
 brittleness. The real world experience is that users, or to be exact
 wallet authors, turn down SPV privacy parameters until bloom filters
 have almost no privacy in exchange for little bandwidth usage.

   That's not fundamental though, it just reflects that the only
   implementation of this is used on a wide range of devices and doesn't
   yet have any notion of bandwidth modes or monitoring. It can and will
   be resolved at some point.Â

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Bait for reusable addresses

2014-01-24 Thread Peter Todd
On Fri, Jan 24, 2014 at 04:42:35PM +0100, Adam Back wrote:
 I think prefix has analysis side effects.  There are (at least) 4 things
 that link payments: the graph of payment flows, timing, precise amounts, IP
 addresses, but with prefix a 5th: the prefix allows public elmination of
 candidates connections, I think that may make network flow analysis even
 more effective than it has been.

You know, we've made this discussion rather confusing because we're
using the term prefix for both prefix filters - which are equivalent
to bloom filters but with better scalability - and the act of forcing a
scriptPubKey to match some given prefix. I suggest we call the latter
concept 'wallet clustering' as it can just as easily be applied to bloom
filters, as well as Gregory Maxwell's candidate bait scheme, and for
that matter, prefix filters with a tweak option, e.g. H(scriptPubKey |
nTweak)

So yeah, clustering schemes make network flow analysis easier if the
attacker only has blockchain data to work from. But they can also make
network flow analysis significantly harder for attackers that have query
logs from attackers running nodes, and as we know sybiling the network
to get query logs is very easy. I'd rather develop systems that don't
fail catastrophically against sybil attack.

 So SPV can be tuned as Mike just said, and as Greg pointed out somewhere
 bloom is more private than prefix because its a wallet to node connection,
 not a node broadcast, and Mike mentioned embedded Tor in another post to
 boost node-capture issues with hostile network.

The hostile network is likely to have a significant percentage of
hostile, query-logging nodes. For one thing, running nodes is expensive
and would be even more so in a blocksize limit raising scenario, and a
easy way to pay those costs is by selling query data.

 So reusable addresses are cool for full node recipients (0-bit prefix) or
 trusted server offload (your own desktop, VPS, or trusted service provider
 node, and solve real problems for the use case of static and donation
 addresses particularly with this second delegatable key for no-funds at risk
 search (which is even good as Jeremey said for your own node, in a offline
 wallet use case).

Sure, in some cases you can use zero-length prefixes with trusted nodes;
not many users have access to such nodes.

 Now while it would be clearly a very nice win if reusable addresses could be
 made SPV-like in network characteristics and privacy, but we dont have a
 plausible mechanism yet IMO.  Close as we got was Greg's enhancement of
 my/your bloom bait/prefix concept to make multiple candidate baits to
 provide some ambiguity (still allows elimination, just slightly less of it).
 
 If we can find some efficient crypto to solve that last one, we could even
 adopt them generally if it was efficient enough without needing interactive
 one-use address release.

Conversely, it'd be interesting if someone can dig up a proof showing
that doing much better than Gregory's ambiguity tradeoff is impossible.
My gut feeling is that it is, especially if you take into account the
desire for scalability - if we're to make the blocksize bigger assuming
all nodes have all data for every block just isn't going to happen.

 Maybe we should ask some math/theoretical crypto people if there is anything
 like public key watermarking or something that could solve this problem
 efficiently.

Yes, and I think such schemes should be pursued. But in the near-term
what can we offer users?

Remember that making stealth addresses and similar clustering-using
schemes capable of backward compatible upgrades isn't hard; if the
crypto is found later it can be adopted.

What is harder is that people want miners to commit to various types of
indexes - changing those indexes would require a soft-fork and there's
much pressure for those indexes to have very good performance
properties.

 For the related but different case of transaction level authenticity I like
 Alan's server derived but communicated scalar  base to allow the client to
 do at least TOFU.
 
 Payment protocol may add another level of identity framework on top of TOFU
 addresses (at a lower level than the payment messages defined now), and
 without then needing a batch upload of offline signed secondary address
 sigature that Mike described a while back, at least in person, maybe online
 somewhere (an add on with similar purpose and effect to Alan's TOFU, but
 then with revocation, identity and certification for merchants).

Note how well the OpenPGP + bitcoin address UID ideas I and others have
been talking about meshes with TOFU: the logic for Do I trust this
address to send money? and Do I trust this PGP key to send more
encrypted mail/verify signatures? is just different questions about the
same human identity, so combining the two is synergistic. For instance I
might want to communicate securely with a friend via email and also send
funds to them securely.

An interesting nuance is 

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Bait for reusable addresses

2014-01-24 Thread Jeremy Spilman
 
 
 
 I think we need to provide users with better options than that.
 

Perfect privacy without extraordinary computational overhead today means 
downloading everything. But we could provide better tools to *shift* bandwidth 
requirements rather than try to reduce them. 

I've been thinking about a setup where user runs a UTXO only, and maybe even 
outbound-connect only (like bitcoinj), full node at home. Then using Tor, 
mostly for tunneling, they host a hidden service they can connect back to from 
their smartphone to see balances, manage receive addresses, send funds, etc.

The smartphone is not doing SPV, it's like a web client for the wallet running 
at home. The initial connection between the smartphone and home wallet has the 
phone learn two codes, one is the hidden service name, another is an access 
token which is revocable. You may require further authentication from that 
point. 

With fast bootstrapping / checkpointing of the UTXO I think usability could be 
as good as SPV, and you would get push-notification of relevant transactions 
with zero privacy trade-off.

I wonder if people would want to run such an app, if they would run it on their 
desktop, a dedicated machine, or an old smartphone or other cheap ARM device.

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