Re: [akr@M17N.ORG: cvs security problem]

2000-07-31 Thread Tanaka Akira
In article [EMAIL PROTECTED], Michael Richardson [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Systems that give shells out to people that have write access are already open to running programs by clients. So, this really affects people that use :pserver: with write access. The problem also affects

Re: [akr@M17N.ORG: cvs security problem]

2000-07-31 Thread Tanaka Akira
In article [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Larry Jones) writes: It's a known problem. Like it says in the Cederqvist manual (under "Security considerations with password authentication"): ... once a user has non-read-only access to the repository, she can execute

Re: [akr@M17N.ORG: cvs security problem]

2000-07-31 Thread Tanaka Akira
In article [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Larry Jones) writes: Update.prog just contains the name of the program to run, not the actual code. If you can't commit, you can't upload arbitrary code to run, you can only run pre-existing code on the server, and you have no control over

Re: [akr@M17N.ORG: cvs security problem]

2000-07-29 Thread Michael Richardson
"Ian" == Ian Lance Taylor [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Ian This looks like a serious security problem. It appears to open Ian anonymous CVS servers to a wide range of attack. Correct me if I'm wrong, but it seems that one has to have commit permissions to create these files, so in

Re: [akr@M17N.ORG: cvs security problem]

2000-07-29 Thread Michael Richardson
"Karl" == Karl Fogel [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Karl Sorry -- good point. I'll look at it in detail when I'm looking at it Karl in detail, which will be early next week. In the meantime, I'll keep Karl my mouth shut. :-) Karl -K Karl Ian Lance Taylor [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: [akr@M17N.ORG: cvs security problem]

2000-07-28 Thread Karl Fogel
Ian Lance Taylor [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: This looks like a serious security problem. It appears to open anonymous CVS servers to a wide range of attack. It looks serious, but not for anonymous-only servers, since anonymous users can't commit. The hole here, I think, is that someone who

Re: [akr@M17N.ORG: cvs security problem]

2000-07-28 Thread Larry Jones
Ian Lance Taylor writes: This looks like a serious security problem. It appears to open anonymous CVS servers to a wide range of attack. It's a known problem. Like it says in the Cederqvist manual (under "Security considerations with password authentication"): ... once a user has

Re: [akr@M17N.ORG: cvs security problem]

2000-07-28 Thread Ian Lance Taylor
From: Karl Fogel [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: 28 Jul 2000 14:01:23 -0500 Ian Lance Taylor [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: This looks like a serious security problem. It appears to open anonymous CVS servers to a wide range of attack. It looks serious, but not for anonymous-only

Re: [akr@M17N.ORG: cvs security problem]

2000-07-28 Thread Karl Fogel
Sorry -- good point. I'll look at it in detail when I'm looking at it in detail, which will be early next week. In the meantime, I'll keep my mouth shut. :-) -K Ian Lance Taylor [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: From: Karl Fogel [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: 28 Jul 2000 14:01:23 -0500 Ian

Re: [akr@M17N.ORG: cvs security problem]

2000-07-28 Thread Pavel Roskin
Hello! On 28 Jul 2000, Karl Fogel wrote: Sorry -- good point. I'll look at it in detail when I'm looking at it in detail, which will be early next week. In the meantime, I'll keep my mouth shut. :-) I hope that there is no immediate danger. Look at serve_update_prog() - it checks whether

Re: [akr@M17N.ORG: cvs security problem]

2000-07-28 Thread Ian Lance Taylor
Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2000 17:45:13 -0400 (EDT) From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Larry Jones) Ian Lance Taylor writes: What if I frob Update.prog? I don't claim to understand all the cases here, but it appears that that will be run by `cvs update'. Update.prog just contains the name

Re: [akr@M17N.ORG: cvs security problem]

2000-07-28 Thread Ian Lance Taylor
Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2000 17:36:53 -0400 (EDT) From: Pavel Roskin [EMAIL PROTECTED] I hope that there is no immediate danger. Look at serve_update_prog() - it checks whether commits are allowed and exits if they are not. It prints a strange message though: E Flag -u in modules

Re: [akr@M17N.ORG: cvs security problem]

2000-07-28 Thread Ian Lance Taylor
Date: 28 Jul 2000 14:58:08 -0700 From: Ian Lance Taylor [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2000 17:36:53 -0400 (EDT) From: Pavel Roskin [EMAIL PROTECTED] I hope that there is no immediate danger. Look at serve_update_prog() - it checks whether commits are allowed

Re: [akr@M17N.ORG: cvs security problem]

2000-07-28 Thread Pavel Roskin
Update.prog just contains the name of the program to run, not the actual code. If you can't commit, you can't upload arbitrary code to run, you can only run pre-existing code on the server, and you have no control over its input or arguments, so it's a very low-level threat. cat "wget

Re: [akr@M17N.ORG: cvs security problem]

2000-07-28 Thread Mike Castle
On Fri, Jul 28, 2000 at 05:20:13PM -0400, Larry Jones wrote: -- the simplest fix would be to just get rid of checkin and update programs, but I'm not sure how people would feel about that. It would probably remove any chance I have of getting the