Re: Small TCP packets == very large overhead == DoS?

In some mail from gregory duchemin, sie said: hello, know if the TCP silly window syndrome might be used too ? Uploading/downloading files byte per byte to/from a remote ftp server with a stupid window size of one byte may generate a very high overhead. Silly window sizes aren't so bad.

Re: Cobalt Cube Webmail directory traversal

I confirmed this on Cobalt's, now Sun, Cube III. Paul Marshall wrote: At 08:41 05/07/2001, you wrote: I just got a new Cobalt Cube today and I have been poking around at it for security issues... I noticed this minor issue in the webmail system. Your users are not aloud to have shell

xloadimage remote exploit - tstot.c

//tstot.c / zen-parse presents tstot.c - remote portbinding exploit for RedHat 7.0 Netscape 4.77

Re: Small TCP packets == very large overhead == DoS?

In some mail from Russ, sie said: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- According to MSDN, NT 3.5/3.51/4.0 and Windows 2000 implement a minimum MSS of 68 bytes (found under the discussion of PMTU and RFC 791 and 1191), as prescribed by RFC 791. I think some people are not understanding the

APOP passwords at risk

hello This is the exact same thing APOP does - server sends a string, client appends password to string, takes MD5 hash and sends back. If your cracker is what you say it is (I haven't checked) then APOP should be just as vulnerable. Greetz, Peter yep, looking briefly at the rfc 1939, i found

Re: Tripwire temporary files

Jarno Huuskonen wrote: After that I looked at the tripwire sources and confirmed the problem. (See e.g. core/archive.cpp, core/unix/unixfsservices.cpp and tw/textreportviewer.cpp). If you noticed a few more lines down the file get's removed. - TSTRING cUnixFSServices::MakeTempFilename(

Re: Messenger/Hotmail passwords at risk

On Mon, 9 Jul 2001, Jeffrey W. Baker wrote: Uh huh. So you are saying that, given MD5(password), password may be recovered by brute force. And this is new/interesting in what way? The interesting thing is he can (allegedly) do it at 2.5e6 tries/second on an affordable machine. Being able to

Re: Tripwire temporary files

Jarno Huuskonen wrote: I found out about the problem when I noticed a temporary file /tmp/twtempa19212 left in /tmp. Out of curiosity I ran the tripwire binary with strace and noticed that temporary files in /tmp are opened without the O_EXCL flag. Here a strace from tripwire 1.2

Re: dip 3.3.7p-overflow

On Mon, 9 Jul 2001, sebi hegi wrote: Hi! After doing a check on my SuSE linux 7.0 x86 i found something interesting: hegi@faust:~ ls -la /usr/sbin/dip -rwsr-xr-- 1 root dialout 62056 Jul 29 2000 /usr/sbin/dip DIP: Dialup IP Protocol Driver version 3.3.7p-uri (25 Dec 96)

Re: Tripwire temporary files

On Tue, Jul 10, Paul Starzetz wrote: Jarno Huuskonen wrote: I found out about the problem when I noticed a temporary file /tmp/twtempa19212 left in /tmp. Out of curiosity I ran the tripwire binary with strace and noticed that temporary files in /tmp are opened without the O_EXCL

Re: Small TCP packets == very large overhead == DoS?

Darren Reed wrote: Silly window sizes aren't so bad. If you have a window size of one then you only ever have one outstanding piece of data sent at a time. So if I have 16k of data, it might take 32k or more packets, but I can only send one packet at a time. With a window size of 1, a

Re: Small TCP packets == very large overhead == DoS?

According to Darren Reed: stupid window size of one byte may generate a very high overhead. Silly window sizes aren't so bad. Oh no, they can be very bad and can choke performance measurably. They are very subtle too because you will not see them if you are close to the server. Once your

Re: dip 3.3.7p-overflow

Hi sebi! On Mon, 09 Jul 2001, sebi hegi wrote: Hi! After doing a check on my SuSE linux 7.0 x86 i found something interesting: hegi@faust:~ ls -la /usr/sbin/dip -rwsr-xr-- 1 root dialout 62056 Jul 29 2000 /usr/sbin/dip note the rights DIP: Dialup IP Protocol Driver version

OpenSSL Security Advisory: PRNG weakness in versions up to 0.9.6a

OpenSSL Security Advisory [10 July 2001] WEAKNESS OF THE OpenSSL PRNG IN VERSIONS UP TO OpenSSL 0.9.6a - CONTENTS: - Synopsis - Detailed problem description - Solution - Impact - Source code patch [*] - Acknowledgement [*]

How Google indexed a file with no external link

I'm running a modest Apache 1.3.19 server on Mandrake 7.2, with a 2.4 kernel. No cgi's or PHP support, though I do have server-info and server-status enabled for local reference only. I noticed some hits in the Apache access_log for two files, index.old and index.older, which were backups of

RE: Small TCP packets == very large overhead == DoS?

From: Darren Reed [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] In some mail from Russ, sie said: I think some people are not understanding the difference between the TCP MSS and IP's MTU. Either that or both you and David LeBlanc are grasping at straws in order to make WindowsNT look better ;) I

Re: How Google indexed a file with no external link

Kevin ... I can tell you what's causing it, and how to disable it, but I can't point you to specific documentation about it. Kevin wrote: Looking a bit deeper, I saw googlebot (and later, some ordinary vistors) using this syntax: http://handsonhowto.com/?M=A

Re: How Google indexed a file with no external link

On Mon, Jul 09, 2001 at 09:47:44PM -0400, Kevin wrote: http://handsonhowto.com/?M=A http://handsonhowto.com/?S=D ...and if you try this yourself in Internet Explorer, you'll find that Apache is ignoring my index.html and is giving you a formatted directory of the docroot

Re: Many WAP gateways do not properly check SSL certificates

Since SSL certificates are tamper-evident as the cryptographic signature is checked against the root certificates of the large CAs (Thawte, Verisign, Global Trust etc.) this check gives assurance that the requesting party is connected to the right host - i.e. you are safe from a man-in-the-middle

Re: How Google indexed a file with no external link

The problem (at least in my case) has been resolved, so if you've been checking my site you can stop now: ;-) http://handsonhowto.com/?M=A http://handsonhowto.com/?S=D I now get the index.html page, as intended. The fix was to take all the Indexes options out of my httpd.conf;

FreeBSD 4.3 local root, yet Linux and *BSD much better than Windows

Georgi Guninski security advisory #48, 2001 FreeBSD 4.3 local root, yet Linux and *BSD much better than Windows Systems affected: FreeBSD 4.3 and probably earlier versions. Risk: High Date: 10 July 2001 Legal Notice: This Advisory is Copyright (c) 2001 Georgi Guninski. You may distribute it

Re: FreeBSD 4.3 local root, yet Linux and *BSD much better than Windows

FreeBSD 4.3 local root, yet Linux and *BSD much better than Windows This problem was already reported to FreeBSD Security Officer about two months ago, but it was totally ignored. -- * Fido: 2:480/124 ** WWW: http://www.frasunek.com/ ** NIC-HDL: PMF9-RIPE * * Inet: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ** PGP:

[ESA-20010709-01] OpenSSL PRNG Weakness

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 ++ | EnGarde Secure Linux Security Advisory July 09, 2001 | | http://www.engardelinux.org/ ESA-20010709-01 | |

cayman strikes again

try using '}' as a username without a password for cayman routers. login: } Password: Terminal shell v1.0 Cayman-DSL Model 3220-H, DMT-ADSL (Alcatel) plus 4-port hub Running GatorSurf version 5.3.0 (build R1) (} completed login: user level) Cayman-DSL{SNIP} ==

RE: Small TCP packets == very large overhead == DoS?

Please note that about 5% of the machines out there do not understand an MTU different than 1500, because some firewalls blocks all ICMP packets instead of sending back the ICMP packet with the recommended MTU. I explain further. You have a client machine A, a router A with MTU 576, another

[RHSA-2001:088-04] New xloadimage packages available

- Red Hat, Inc. Red Hat Security Advisory Synopsis: New xloadimage packages available Advisory ID: RHSA-2001:088-04 Issue date:2001-06-28 Updated on:2001-07-09 Product: