There has been some recent attention to the constitutionality of
state laws that prohibit the direct shipment of alcoholic beverages.
On one side are Kenneth Starr and Clint Bolick, defending the interests
of the winery-backed "Coalition for Free Trade" and on the other
side are Robert Bork and C. Boyden Gray, representing, among others,
the "Wine and Spirits Wholesalers of America."

The central question seems to be:  Which deserves precedence, the spirit
of free trade protected by the Commerce Clause or states' rights as
defined by the 21st Amendment?   The state rules and regulations on
the shipment of alcohol are incredibly complex and put the wineries at
a distinct disadvantage in that, for example, California producers cannot
ship to many states, though wineries within those states can ship to internal
addresses.   But the other side counters with the fact that alcohol--perhaps
like "death"--is "different" in that it has its own amendment which was
meant to allow the states to make such decisions and set such regulations
on their own terms.   And, I probably don't need to add, there is a
tremendous amount of money to be gained--or lost--on both sides of this
issue. 

I know that the 7th Circut recently upheld Indiana's direct shipping law and
I have heard that some expect that this issue will reach the Supremes at
some point.  I am going to be discussing this issue in class (yes, I am deliberately
using an alcohol-related issue to bolster my undergraduates' interest in
Constitutional Law) and I would appreciate the insights of list-members--on or
off list as you so desire.

Best,
Brian Pinaire
************************************
Assistant Professor
Dept. of Political Science
Lehigh University


David Bernstein wrote:
I don't think Lochner was about reining in interest group politics, and it certainly wasn't understood that way in the post-New Deal era until Howard's book. Rather, Lochner was about, and was understood to be about, protecting fundamental liberties from unreasonable government interference (I have a forthcoming Georgetown Law Journal article on this, available at SSRN).  Justice Souter has commented that Meyer and Pierce were right, and Lochner was wrong, only because the Court was incorrect in thinking that liberty of contract deserves protection as a fundamental right, not in abstracting fundamental rights from the due process clause. In that sense, Lochner has in fact not been overruled, but has indeed been resurrected in the Court's modern substantive due process jurisprudence, of which Lawrence v. Texas is both the most recent and the clearest example.
 
 
In a message dated 10/30/2003 12:50:54 PM Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
This is an interesting question.  As Howard notes, one can overrule the
holding in Lochner without rejecting the premise that courts should serve
as active monitors of what is increasingly becoming an interest-group
polity characterized by attempting to capture the machinery of government
in order to reward one's friends 9i.e., seek otherwise illegitimate rents)
and hinder one's adversaries.  In some sense, that doesn't get overturned
(assuming it has been) until such cases as Williamson and Hawaii v.
Midkiff, where the court establishes a basically non-rebuttable presumption
that whatever a legislature says is "the public interest" just is, by
virtue of that assertion, dispositive with regard to a reviewing court.  I
begin my course on the welfare state by asking students to read UAW v. Lyng
and ask whether it matters (or should matter) that the court is persuaded
that Congress is engaged in a good faith effort to "level the playing
field" (by barring food stamps to strikers) as against intervening in a
class war on the said of management against labor.  If one believes that it
does matter--i.e., that one must demonstrate a good faith belief that it
serves the public interest (and how exactly does one do this), then Lochner
is still alive and well.  Indeed, isn't the present litigation attacking
blatantly partisan gerrymandering Lochnerish?  Tom DeLay has no conception
of "neutrality" and "fairness."  He is out to use all of the power at his
command to marginalize the Democratic Party (which he, of course, insists
on calling the "Democrat" Party), just as Phil Burton, in California, used
all the power at his command to do the same to California Republicans in
the 1980s.  Now one can, I suppose, argue that enhancing the Republican (or
Democratic) Party just *is* to enhance the public welfare.  Must a court
believe this, or can a court simply say "To the victor belongs the
spoils.  That's what politics is really about, and the Constitution puts
few limits on the ability of the winning majority to loot the treasury or
stack the political process in their favor."

sandy
 
 
Professor David E. Bernstein
George Mason University School of Law http://mason.gmu.edu/~dbernste
blog: http://volokh.com/index.htm?bloggers=DavidB

***********************************************
My latest book, You Can't Say That!
The Growing Threat to Civil Liberties
from Antidiscrimination Laws
, has just
been published
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