Derek Atkins [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Actually, the ASN.1 part is a major factor in the X.509 interoperability
problems. Different cert vendors include different extensions, or different
encodings. They put different information into different parts of the
certificate (or indeed the same
Eric Murray [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Too often people see something like Peter's statement above and say oh, it's
that nasty ASN.1 in X.509 that is the problem, so we'll just do it in XML
instead and then it'll work fine which is simply not true. The formatting of
the certificates is such a
Bodo Moeller [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Using an explicit state machine helps to get code suitable for multiplexing
within a single thread various connections using non-blocking I/O.
Is there some specific advantage here, or is it an academic exercise? Some
quirk of supporting certain types of
Ian Grigg [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
It's also very much oriented to x.509 and similar certificate/PKI models,
which means it is difficult to use in web of trust (I know this because we
started on the path of adding web of trust and text signing features to x.509
before going back to OpenPGP),
Ian Grigg [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Also, a lot of cryptosystems are put together by committees. SSH was
originally put together by one guy. He did the lot. Allegedly, a fairly
grotty protocol with a number of weakneses, but it was there and up and
running. And SSH-2 is apparantly nice,
