Does anybody have more info on this ?
http://developer.intel.com/design/network/82559c.htm
Intel® 82559C Fast Ethernet Multifunction PCI CardBus Controller and the
Intel® 82594ED encryption co-processor provide an encryption chipset
that enables high-performance Internet Protocol Security
In [EMAIL PROTECTED], on 09/16/99
at 03:28 AM, John Gilmore [EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
With the random number generator and now the IPSEC accelerator, Intel is
really bidding to be the preferred hardware supplier for people who care
about security. Now if they'd only let us dump the braindead
--- begin forwarded text
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 1999 08:24:58 -0400
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: Robert Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: DCSB: Gerald Gold; Internet Content -- Stories from the Front
Cc: Gerald Gold [EMAIL PROTECTED], Warren Agin [EMAIL PROTECTED],
John Gilmore wrote:
raw data rate, since 10-20% is used by packet headers/trailers/interpacket
spacing/etc. And I've never seen software 3DES run at 32 Mbits/sec;
what processor were they using?
On a pentium II 350, I get triple DES in cbc-ede mode doing 23.2
Mbits/sec
(Mbits == 1e6). The
"William H. Geiger III" [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
IMHO hardware based crypto is dangerous especially from a company like
Intel that will not allow it's designs to be peer reviewed. Their entire
attitude is "trust us we are Intel". Well sorry I don't. Intel's RNG and
now it's IPSEC
In [EMAIL PROTECTED], on 09/16/99
at 09:20 AM, "William H. Geiger III" [EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
As for their RNG hardware, Paul Kocher was invited to look inside the
Kimono and has published a full report on it, and he didn't find anything
odd... --Perry]
I read the report and I was less
HOT TIP, I would like to announce a new invention of mine the "Secret
Message Service". This is a free service delivered from my new web site
at:
www.javacrypt.com.
Also while browsing tech news sites to announce my new invetion I
noticed that the
hackertimes.com web site has been
[MODERATOR's NOTE: I'm sorry, but I find this totally wrongheaded. A
3DES ethernet card need not be "trusted" -- if the thing interoperates
with other IPSec implementations, its correct, pure and
simple. Indeed, the slightest flaw and it would not
interoperate. Perhaps they could rig it to
Dave Farber:
As I said , the devil is in the details.
Let me agree. Remember when the Administration said it was giving
industry what it wanted -- transferring crypto exports to the Commerce
Dept? And when later "industry" worked out a deal so they could "easily"
export key-recovery products,
--- begin forwarded text
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 1999 14:36:39 -0400
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: Hudson Barton [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Administration Updates Encryption Policy
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
List-Subscribe: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]?subject=subscribe%20mac-crypto
Office of the Press
For Immediate Release
September 16, 1998
STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY
Robert, that was *last year*'s encryption policy "liberalization".
Great joke though. I read through four or five paragraphs before
it became too obvious. Remember what they promised last year, and
what the
Greg Broiles wrote:
[MODERATOR's NOTE: I'm sorry, but I find this totally wrongheaded. A
3DES ethernet card need not be "trusted" -- if the thing interoperates
with other IPSec implementations, its correct, pure and
simple. Indeed, the slightest flaw and it would not
interoperate.
John Gilmore wrote:
There's a vague and undefined term in the press leaks so far:
One-Time Technical Review
What does this mean? It appeared in some early crypto liberalization
bills floated in Congressional committees.
Based on my previous experience with the export process,
When we got an export license for Stronghold earlier this year (don't ask),
the process consisted of filling out an application form listing the types
of encryption and ciphers supported, key sizes supported, etc., then
answering a few follow-up questions of that sort from some NSA staffer, and
--- begin forwarded text
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 1999 15:32:09 -0400
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: David Farber [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: IP: Statement By The Press Secretary: Administration Announces New
Approach to Encryption
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
--- begin forwarded text
Date: 16 Sep 99 15:09:33 EDT
From: ROBERT HARPER [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Ignition Point [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: IP: White House changes crypto policy!
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: ROBERT HARPER [EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://foxnews.com/
White House bows to
John,
I buttonholed William Reinsch, Commerce Dept undersecretary, outside the
White House briefing room a few minutes ago. I happened to ask him the same
question you bring up here: What's up with that one-time technical review?
Things were crowded and noisy, but here's what I learned. (The
Bram writes:
Paul Kocher has said the design looks sound, which I believe, but
unforotunately the raw output of Intel's RNG just plain can't be accessed
without it going through whitening first. Unsurprisingly, all the output
passes all statistical tests. Well, duh, it's been sent through
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Declan McCullagh wr
ites:
What I found most interesting was what Attorney General Reno said about the
government's cryptanalysis abilities. When asked if she can break strong,
64 bit equivalent crypto, she said, "We have carefully looked at this and
think it's
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