Hi professors...
I'm a student studying cryptography and e-cash. I've been wondering, why
many cryptographic protocols based on discrete log problem such as Schnorr,
Brand's e-cash, Chaum Pedersen's DLP blind signature, etc, we must choose
a prime q p where q divides (p-1)? q is the
In its Tuesday edition, the New York Times reports that the
new encryption rules will not be released this week, as
originally planned.
http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/12/cyber/capital/14capital.html
"The delay gives officials another month to address the widespread
criticism that
At 12:25 PM 12/13/1999 -0800, David Honig wrote:
Has anyone extrapolated from the fact that the more you carry a device with
you, the less physically subvertible it is? Your home machine may be more
robust against that attack than your office machine, e.g., if some friendly
or yourself occupies
On 13 Dec 1999 18:40:02 - lcs Mixmaster Remailer [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
While this is true, keep in mind that there is more to mounting
a successful cryptographic attack than adding root keys and fake
certificates. It is also necessary to intercept the messages which
might
Unless I missed something big in D.C., I presume this is simply the
announcement of a pro-forma bulk export license for PGP (and the repackaged
PGP Enterprise Security Suite?) for Business.
And, although it is difficult to discert amid all the
self-congratulatory hoopla, I
At 10:46 PM 12/13/99 -0800, Bill Stewart wrote:
Yes and no. My laptop is much more likely to get stolen than my home PC
(though less likely to get blackbagged.)
If a laptop is stolen, the loss should be financial, not information
leakage. But the issue here is subversion, not loss; as you
Fire at will, people...
Cheers,
RAH
(Yes, you'd helping him write his story. For free. So, what else is new? :-))
--- begin forwarded text
From: "Davis, Don" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: "'[EMAIL PROTECTED]'" [EMAIL PROTECTED], "'[EMAIL PROTECTED]'" [EMAIL PROTECTED],
"'[EMAIL PROTECTED]'"
Arrianto Mukti Wibowo writes:
About Mondex, probably you are right. No information is available about the
internals of Mondex, and is kept secret, unlike CAFE which the specification
The fact that Mondex keeps its VM specs secret does not forebode well
for its security. Apparently, the VM
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Hello,
I suppose I shouldn't get into a "ADK features are not Key Escrow" debate
as I am sure everyone's opinions are already set in stone...
However, I would like to address the perception (below) that the ADK
feature has been "locked-open" as
