Ben Laurie writes:
If you want a lot of people to see it, you can't keep it secret. If you
can't keep it secret, you may as well just come out with it and publish
the bits without stego.
What did I miss?
It depends on how hostile the regime is. If you want to publish
something but
At 1:34 AM -0500 1/26/2000, Marc Horowitz wrote:
Rick Smith [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
The basic notion of stego is that one replaces 'noise' in a document with
the stego'ed information. Thus, a 'good' stego system must use a crypto
strategy whose statistical properties mimic the noise
Okay, here's something I've been thinking of for a while. Run a
political discussion mailing list which mails audio files back and
forth. This list, at least in the US, would enjoy the highest
Constitutional protection. However, you'd never know if the low bits
of the audio stream have been
"The Ultimate Spy" book (by Keith Melton, published by Dorling Kindersley)
describes "the thing", a russian spying device in the 1950's, it also
features a lot of radio equipment and a non-contact (induction) spying
device for telephones (based on the Hall phenomenon).
regards,
Alexandre
On Tue, Jan 25, 2000 at 04:51:12PM -0800, Nelson Minar wrote:
Of course, this isn't easy to do - "matching statistical properties"
isn't a simple closed problem. But I bet you could do fairly well in
certain circumstances. For instance, Linux uses a strong random number
when starting a TCP
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Marc Horowitz writes:
In short, is steganography the ultimate surveillance tool?
Like most surveillance technologies, this is a game of constant
incremental improvements. You watch me through a window, I put up
curtains. You listen through a hidden
Vin McLellan [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
I suspect that RSA did send out more than a few nastygrams to OEMs
or other mass marketeers about "illicit use" of RC4, but -- at least in
recent years -- its complaints probably went to commercial enterprises which
both (a) sought to resell the
question becomes, without identifying the location of the ciphertext in a
prior agreement or on some outside channel, can a person communicate with
friends without alerting enemies to the existance of secret communications?
In this case you are entering the realm of psychology. There may be a
At 12:12 AM 01/27/2000 +, Ben Laurie wrote:
I can't quite see the point of forward stego.
I'll leave it to Russ to explain his application if he wants to.
Why not publish something
public key encrypted and publish the private key later?
Symmetric cryptography has two advantages in this
Ted Lemon wrote:
Amateurs in the crypto world seem to get bitten by this fairly
frequently - read the recent transcripts to the New York preliminary
injunction on the DeCSS case for supporting evidence. If you're out
to prove a point, and you're riding the fine edge of legality and
civil
Comments?
I think your proposal is not entirely unreasonable, although I wonder
if the people who have the most interest in a secure system are not
the banks, but the insurance companies and the customers. My
impression of banks is that as long as they can quantify the potential
loss, they
Ted Lemon wrote:
Ed Gerck wrote [reinserted for context]:
In fact, if there would be a pre-defined reward for those that find holes
in today's increasing electronic and "secure" systems then companies
could rely in that reward both as a payment cap and as way to separate
reward from
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