I think the secret sharing direction as Raph has described below is indeed
the most reasonable way to solve this problem. In fact, for a long time,
I've considered such a `secure long term archive` one of the important
applications to the work we've been doing on Proactive security, which
takes
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
I want to know whether there is a crypto building block which doesn't allow
someone to open an encrypted message before a certain date.
[Damn hard. Math functions don't grok "date". The only reasonable way
to do this without a trusted third party is to pick an
Would this work? Maybe it's too simple.
1. A sends B an encrypted file.
2. Sometime later, A sends B the decryption key.
I haven't had a chance to read all the links listed here, yet, due to the
press of other matters.
It does sound like an interesting problem, which may depend on a
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], "Matt Crawford" writes:
If you're going to trust that CryptoSat, inc. hasn't stashed a local
copy of the private key, why not eliminate all that radio gear and trust
CryptoTime, inc. not to publish the private key associated with date D
before date D?
The
In the future, it may be possible to base something like this on
physical principles. For example (and if I haven't dropped a decimal
point), Jupiter is never closer than about 2079 light-seconds from
Earth. A message encrypted with the public key of a satellite in that
orbit could not be
