Security/Crypto/E-commerce Tutorial site - improvements

and Payments for Mobile Commerce` Feedback welcome (on the lectures and overview as well as on our projects). Please forward this informations to others who may be intersted. Best Regards, Amir Herzberg IBM Research Lab in Haifa (Tel Aviv Office) http://www.hrl.il.ibm.com

WAP security - anything except WTLS?

thanks... (why I need it ? finishing an overview on security for mobile commerce... other inputs welcome... ) Best Regards, Amir Herzberg IBM Research Lab in Haifa (Tel Aviv Office) http://www.hrl.il.ibm.com From [EMAIL PROTECTED] Mon Sep 11 11:17:52 2000 Envelope-to: archive@jab.org Received

Re: Secrets Lies, a comment (proactive security)

Ed replied to me, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Ed says, The solution is to use a multifold of links, arranged in time and space such that rather than making the impossible assumption that "no part will fail at any time," we can design a system where up to M parts can fail at any

Re: Secrets Lies, a comment

same time -- where M can be the entire number of parts. This sounds like `proactive security`, as defined in several cryptographic works. You may want to check it out at http://www.hrl.il.ibm.com/proactive Best Regards, Amir Herzberg IBM Research Lab in Haifa (Tel Aviv Office) http://www.hrl.il.ibm.com

Course foils available: Introduction to Cryptography and Electronic Commerce

) will be appreciated. Best Regards, Amir Herzberg IBM Research Lab in Haifa (Tel Aviv Office) http://www.hrl.il.ibm.com

Re: RFC 2828 on Internet Security Glossary (fwd)

. Diffie-Hellman based) proposed do not achieve it, since a computationally unbounded attacker can break the DH exchange (by doing discrete logs). So PFS is really a poor name, IMHO. Better drop the `perfect` term which is misleading. OTOH, it sounds nice :-) Best Regards, Amir Herzberg Speci

Re: GPS integrity and proactive secure clock synchronization

ources) to detect tampering with GPS signals (also for location???) It seems an interesting and challenging area. Best Regards, Amir Herzberg IBM Research Lab in Haifa (Tel Aviv Office) http://www.hrl.il.ibm.com Best Regards, Amir Herzberg IBM Research Lab in Haifa (Tel Aviv Office) http://www.hrl.il.ibm.com

Re: GPS integrity

will be surprised if this was really done securely. Best Regards, Amir Herzberg IBM Research Lab in Haifa (Tel Aviv Office) http://www.hrl.il.ibm.com Eugene Leitl [EMAIL PROTECTED] on 05/09/2000 12:10:27 AM Please respond to Eugene Leitl [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Ian BROWN [EMAIL PROTECTED] cc: [EMAIL

Re: time dependant

Release Encryption Giovanni Di Crescenzo, Rafail Ostrovsky, and S. Rajagopalan Computer Science Department, University of California San Diego, http://www.argreenhouse.com/papers/rafail/42.ps Best Regards, Amir Herzberg Manager, E-Business and Security Technologies IBM Research Lab i

IBM Micro Payments available for (free) trials

for standards etc. - in particular we are the first implementation of the W3C Micropayments Markup spec Our approach is to make the software widely available thru partnerships with ISPs, telcos, banks, processors - as well as OEM channels. Best Regards, Amir Herzberg Manager, E-Business

Re: Internal vs external threats, any references?

s (or, with proactive security, even to all servers - but not at the same time). Best Regards, Amir Herzberg Manager, E-Business and Security Technologies IBM Research Lab in Haifa (Tel Aviv Office) http://www.hrl.il.ibm.com New e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] New Lotus notes mail: amir herzberg/haifa

Re: Ecash without a mint, or - making anonymous payments practical

, and certainly coins may contain secret marks. Why? Best Regards, Amir Herzberg Manager, E-Business and Security Technologies IBM Research - Haifa Lab (Tel Aviv Office) http://www.hrl.il.ibm.com New e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] New Lotus notes mail: amir herzberg/haifa/ibm@IBMIL

Re: Ecash without a mint, or - making anonymous payments practical

event just confirm to me that there is interest in the BOF and in at least us proposing our protocols). Discussions of the BOF are in [EMAIL PROTECTED] Best Regards, Amir Herzberg Manager, E-Business and Security Technologies IBM Research - Haifa Lab (Tel Aviv Office) http://www.hrl.il.ibm.com

Re: Ecash without a mint, or - making anonymous payments practical

, Amir Herzberg Manager, E-Business and Security Technologies IBM Research - Haifa Lab (Tel Aviv Office) http://www.hrl.il.ibm.com New e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] New Lotus notes mail: amir herzberg/haifa/ibm@IBMIL

secure (proactive?) clock synchronization

properties!!). Thanks for any pointers. Best Regards, Amir Herzberg Manager, E-Business and Security Technologies IBM Research - Haifa Lab (Tel Aviv Office) http://www.hrl.il.ibm.com New e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] New Lotus notes mail: amir herzberg/haifa/ibm@IBMIL

another small comment on: Five years, and still no useful internet cash

between the two as iKP was really just a credit card protocol. In our site you can find papers and presentations with much more details on IBM Micro payments... Best Regards, Amir Herzberg Manager, E-Business and Security Technologies IBM Research - Haifa Lab (Tel Aviv Office) http

Proactive Security Home Page

security in general) are most welcome. Best Regards, Amir Herzberg Manager, E-Business and Security Technologies IBM Research - Haifa Lab (Tel Aviv Office) http://www.hrl.il.ibm.com New e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] New Lotus notes mail: amir herzberg/haifa/ibm@IBMIL

Research positions in crypto and e-commerce

in these areas. To see more positions in IBM Research: http://domino.watson.ibm.com/hr/research/resumes.nsf/Employment/Job+Listing s?OpenDocument Thanks, Amir Herzberg Manager, E-Business and Security Technologies IBM Research - Tel Aviv site of the Haifa Lab http://www.hrl.il.ibm.com Fax 972-3-691-4736

Re: New Version of the AES Peformance Comparison Paper

Bruce, thanks! Very useful and well written! Also: it would be nice if we also had comparisons to DES and TripleDES just for completeness (of the speed and RAM requirements). One question: the performance figures seem very close to these at http://www.seven77.demon.co.uk/aes.htm - except