Re: key agility and IPsec

2000-04-27 Thread Ron Rivest
Steve -- Don't your statistics support the argument that key agility is *not* likely to be terribly important by itself? With a cache capable of storing only 5 key setups, you get at least a 75% hit rate, by your statistics. This effectively reduces key setup time by a factor of *four

Re: key agility and IPsec

2000-04-27 Thread Steven M. Bellovin
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Ron Rivest writes: Steve -- Don't your statistics support the argument that key agility is *not* likely to be terribly important by itself? With a cache capable of storing only 5 key setups, you get at least a 75% hit rate, by your statistics. This effectively

Key agility

2000-04-16 Thread Ron Rivest
Hi Steve (Bellovin) -- Good to see you again at AES3. I want to respond to your comments about key agility that you made at AES3, and also in your note posted here at "[EMAIL PROTECTED]". While key agility may be very important for some applications (e.g. ATM networks), and whil

Re: Key agility

2000-04-16 Thread Steven M. Bellovin
er-IP. (I should note that if VoIP develops as some expect, it will completely change the nature of Internet traffic.) Bottom line -- the actual dynamics of network traffic seem to matter quite a lot, and while we don't know all that we should, I see enough trends that I do believe that k