Date: Tue, 10 Aug 1999 11:05:44 -0400
From: "Arnold G. Reinhold" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
A hardware RNG can also be added at the board level. This takes
careful engineering, but is not that expensive. The review of the
Pentium III RNG on www.cryptography.com seems to imply that Intel
Paul Koning writes:
The most straightforward way to do what's proposed seems to be like
this:
1. Make two pools, one for /dev/random, one for /dev/urandom. The
former needs an entropy counter, the latter doesn't need it.
2. Create a third pool, which doesn't ned to be big. That's the
On Wed, 11 Aug 1999, Anonymous wrote:
Everyone seems to be ignoring the fact that there will be a hardware RNG,
well designed and carefully analyzed, installed on nearly every Intel
based system that is manufactured after 1999. There is no need for a
third party board, at least not on Intel
Hi,
As readers of sci.crypt and the [EMAIL PROTECTED] list will know, I
was struck by an apparent discrepancy between the NIST report on
the AES first round and one of the papers it refers to. I sent the
following mail to the AES list:
There seems to be a discrepancy between Biham and Shamir's
At 12:25 PM -0400 8/11/99, Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote:
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 1999 11:05:44 -0400
From: "Arnold G. Reinhold" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
A hardware RNG can also be added at the board level. This takes
careful engineering, but is not that expensive. The review of the
Pentium III RNG
On Wed, 11 Aug 1999, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
This thread started over concerns about diskless nodes that want to
run IPsec. Worst case, these boxes would not have any slots or other
expansion capability. The only source of entropy would be network
transactions, which makes me nervous...
The L0pht has issued a new advisory for an routing-type attack that can,
they say, allow for man-in-the-middle attacks against SSL-protected sessions
(http://www.l0pht.com/advisories/rdp.txt).
The implication -- that there's a flaw in SSL -- is probably wrong. But
they're dead-on right that
