your comments don't appear to be inconsistent with Jane Winn's writings on PKIs
for instance her paper:: Hedgehog and Fox: PKI and Plublic Private Sector Risk
Management
The Hedgehog and the Fox: Distinguishing Public and Private Sector Approaches to
Managing Risk for Internet
Did I miss something, or is this the first time that GSM acknowledges in
an official statement (though indirectly) the correctness of the A5/1
implementation provided by Green/Goldberg/Wagner?
Well then, congratulations! Nonetheless, I would be interested to know
where and when this statement
From: David Sobel [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: BXA release URL
John -
It's at:
http://204.193.246.62/public.nsf/docs/60D6B47456BB389F852568640078B6C0
Also, I've put up the HTML of the regs. CDT has them up and
they appear to be "public" at this point (the National Journal
was saying earlier
Okay, I've read the latest version of the regs. As usual, they're long and
confusing, with exceptions to the exceptions to the exceptions. But
several things seem to stand out.
1. You can export pretty much anything to anyone but a foreign
government or to the seven pariah countries (Libya,
(This doesn't appear to be on www.bxa.doc.gov anywhere yet. BXA's
PR people say their web team is off at a retreat somewhere... --gnu)
Forwarded-by: David Sobel [EMAIL PROTECTED]
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Wednesday, January 12, 2000
Contact:
Morrie Goodman 202-482-4883
Eugene Cottilli (202)
At 3:31 PM -0800 on 1/12/00, John Gilmore wrote:
In addition, the guidelines also implement agreements reached by
the Wassenaar Arrangement in December 1998 by decontrolling
64-bit mass market products, 56-bit encryption items and 512-bit
key management products. Today's changes do not
"R. A. Hettinga" [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Since the state is, in a world of ubiquitous networks and financial
cryptography, going the way of the Church (i.e. more ceremony than
hegemony) I bet 1gAU (compounded) that, 400 years from now,
cryptography will *still* be a munition.
I claim that
