On Wed, 2 Feb 2000, Martin Minow wrote:
http://www.cryptography.com/intelRNG.pdf.
The one problem I have with the RNG, based on my reading of the
analysis, is that programmers cannot access the "raw" bitstream,
only the stream after the "digital post-processing" that converts
the
--- begin forwarded text
Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2000 16:57:44 -0800
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: Somebody
Subject: Patent for pinpointing cellphones
Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2000 07:39:56 -0500
From: Somebody Else
Subject: Remember the revelation that cell phone location could be
pinpointed to a smaller
At 09:15 AM 02/02/2000 -0800, Eric Murray wrote:
Until Intel releases the design for the RNG, I would treat it the same
as any suspect source of entropy- assume that it can contain no
entropy. That means that you whiten its output before mixing it
together with your other entropy sources (some
Arnold G. Reinhold wrote: [ on 11:38 AM 1/31/00 -0500 ]
Does anyone know a good advocacy page for crypto freedom in the UK?
I'd like to comply with the following request.
Try http://www.stand.org.uk/
Udhay
--
_
Lucky Green writes:
Your post is the third or forth post I have seen in the last year that
claims that Paul concluded that Intel's RNG outputs strong random numbers.
Such as when they said (http://www.cryptography.com/intelRNG.pdf):
Cryptographically, we believe that the Intel RNG is
Judge Kaplan has issued his Memorandum Opinion in
the DeCSS MPAA v. 3 suit in New York:
http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/courtweb/pdf/00-01149.PDF
We offer an HTML version:
http://cryptome.org/dvd-mpaa-3-mo.htm
Judge Kaplan aims at settling the code as expression
dispute, citing Bernstein,
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