Does anybody know of a field in which a + b and a * b can be computed
quickly but (and this is important) it's computationally intractable to
compute the additive inverse of a?
I need it for a technique I'm working on.
-Bram
[Bram: All fields of n elements are isomorphic to all other fields of
On Thu, 9 Mar 2000, bram wrote:
Does anybody know of a field in which a + b and a * b can be computed
quickly but (and this is important) it's computationally intractable to
compute the additive inverse of a?
[Bram: All fields of n elements are isomorphic to all other fields of
n elements
[apologies for any duplication owing to multiple lists etc.]
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http://www.fipr.org/sfs2000
Every finite field F is a finite abelian
group under addition, and so has a minimal annihilator or characteristic
p which must be prime with the property that a + ... + a
(p times)
= 0 for every element a of
F. So
-a = a + ... + a (p-1 times).
Now this is supposed to be hard to compute.
We
At 05:50 9/03/2000 -0800, bram wrote:
Does anybody know of a field in which a + b and a * b can be computed
quickly but (and this is important) it's computationally intractable to
compute the additive inverse of a?
If you literally mean "field", there must be a multiplicative identity,
called
You posit the difficulty of obtaining additive inverses,
this would suggest that they need to exist, and you likely want addition
to be commutative, so you at least have a ring.
What actual algebraic properties do you need?
The possible choices from most specialized to least specialized (that
http://www.mozillazine.org/
Thursday March 9th, 2000
Mozilla Crypto Released for Windows, Linux!
The first crypto-enabled builds of Mozilla have come online. Currently
there are Windows and Linux builds available - a Mac version will be
available soon. Enabled in these initial builds are
from the RFC distribution list:
A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.
RFC 2792
Title: DSA and RSA Key and Signature Encoding for the
KeyNote Trust Management System
Author(s): M. Blaze, J. Ioannidis, A. Keromytis
At 10:56 AM -0500 3/8/2000, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], "Matt Crawford" writes:
If you're going to trust that CryptoSat, inc. hasn't stashed a local
copy of the private key, why not eliminate all that radio gear and trust
CryptoTime, inc. not to publish the
