European Union sets free export of encryption products
Jelle van Buuren 22.05.2000
EU sets encryption free, USA protest
The European ministers of Foreign Affairs are expected to decide monday to
lift all barriers to the export of encryption software to countries
outside the European Union.
John Gilmore wrote:
Anybody tested the primes in major products lately?
Interesting point ... of course, these days one can produce checkable
certificates of primality - but I'm not aware of any free software to do
it ... is there any?
Is it time for the Campaign for Real Primes[1]?
Cheers,
At 03:48 PM 05/23/2000 -0700, John Gilmore wrote:
Rick Smith wrote:
If the NSA approaches Microsoft to acquire their support of NSA's
surveillance mission, then the information will have to be shared
with a bunch of people inside Microsoft, and they're not all going
to keep it secret.
Two
Enzo Michelangeli wrote:
- Original Message -
From: Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: John Gilmore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Rick Smith [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED];
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, May 24, 2000 9:08 PM
Subject: Re: NSA back doors in encryption products
At 03:48 PM 5/23/00 -0700, John Gilmore wrote:
... I have a well-founded rumor that a major Silicon Valley company was
approached by NSA in the '90s with a proposal to insert a deliberate
security bug into their products. They declined when they realized
that an allegation of the bug NSA wanted
In message 001a01bfc599$355fc440$31cf54ca@emnb, "Enzo Michelangeli" writes:
John Gilmore wrote:
Anybody tested the primes in major products lately?
Interesting point ... of course, these days one can produce checkable
certificates of primality - but I'm not aware of any free software to
Enzo Michelangeli noted some primality checking software:
CERTIFIX is an executable for Win95, Win98, NT (hardware Intel
compatible).
And Ben Laurie wrote:
'nuff said!
Of course, this increases the size of the conspiracy at Microsoft -- if you
have anti-backdoor code, then Microsoft needs
John Gillmore wrote:
Turning down the offer on verifiability grounds left them wondering
whether they really would have done it if it'd been possible to keep
the whole thing secret. The quid pro quo offered by NSA would be that
their products would have no trouble getting through the (at the
--- begin forwarded text
Date: Wed, 24 May 2000 16:24:04 -0400 (EDT)
From: Christof Paar [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: WPI Crypto Seminar: ;
Subject: WPI Cryptoseminar, Thursday, 5/25
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: Christof Paar [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sorry for the late notice. Christof
Before continuing, let me state my three opinions that this is based on:
1) There is a non-zero risk of backdoors in commercial software, but the
perpetrators are as likely (IMHO more likely) to be outside parties and not
US agencies like NSA.
2) A persistent backdoor in Windows would have to
On Wed, 24 May 2000, Eugene Leitl wrote:
Rick Smith writes:
If NSA/MS are not doing it, they must be pretty stupid, because I'd do
it in their place. The prudent assumption is hence: your online system
can't be completely trusted, whether OpenSource, or not. Encryption
should be done in
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