s which do not take into account the
message's statistics and perfunctorily pad bits -- which is a funny
flaw, since the attackers of such systems always tend to do
otherwise.
Comments?
Cheers,
Ed Gerck
__
Dr.rer.
ble election system" with their own following definition:
4. Universally Verifiable Elections - secure, efficient, and maintains the voter's
privacy. Furthermore, anyone can verify that the election was conducted fairly,
without compromising voters' privacy.
Comments?
Cheers,
Ed Gerck
Anonymous wrote:
Ed Gerck wrote:
Did any of you see this
http://www.votehere.net/content/Products.asp#InternetVotingSystems
that proposes to authenticate the voter by asking for his/her/its SSN#?
It looked like the idea for this part was to prevent double voting,
plus make sure
yone would tell all the others what
it verified, then it would work ;-) but, then, no protocol is necessary
or even possible for the sheer size of msgs involved.
Cheers,
Ed Gerck
voter can only check if his own vote if counted
correctly. If
it is verifiable whether all votes are counted correctly, then the verifiability is
universally.
8. Receiptfreeness: A voter can't prove to a coercer, how he has voted. As a result,
verifiable vote buying is impossible.
Cheers,
Ed Gerck
when
seen in conjunction with other requirements (e.g., the
FECs Voting System Standards) and what is provided
by current cryptographic protocols.
Comments are welcome.
Cheers,
Ed Gerck
d outs, but the idea is to use the reward
mechanism in a positive way to counter what I may call a "tendency"
and its potential bad effects, while preserving the good ones -- especially
to enhance security in a quasi-public review process.
Comments?
Ed Gerck
Ted Lemon wrote:
Ed Gerck wrote [reinserted for context]:
In fact, if there would be a pre-defined reward for those that find holes
in today's increasing electronic and "secure" systems then companies
could rely in that reward both as a payment cap and as way to separate
r
which has always one bit more than the highest bit of any key in existence, even of
itself. Without
any regard, of course, to the protocol it uses.
Cheers,
Ed Gerck
://www.ivta.org
Cheers,
Ed Gerck
gap -- perhaps with your help as well.
Cheers,
Ed Gerck
[1] Safevote (www.safevote.com) is a founding member of the Internet
Voting Technology Alliance (www.ivta.org) and develops OEM (Original
Equipment Manufacturer) systems for Internet voting, polling, public
elections, bidding, consensus
ance) at ivta.org will
surely deal with these principles more and more.
Please see my comments from the viewpoint of understanding what
needs to be done in terms of raising awareness about the
difficulties -- kudos for Bruce! However, denying a solution
is IMO not intellectually fair and not according to what we
already have learned.
Cheers,
Ed Gerck
f PGP, IMO it is actually it's Achilles heel.
BTW, many lawyers like to use PGP and it is a good usage niche. Here, in the
North Bay Area of SF, PGP is not uncommon in such small-group business users.
Cheers,
Ed Gerck
David Honig wrote:
At 04:45 PM 8/30/00 -0700, Ed Gerck wrote:
about whether they work. So, understanding the mathematical
properties of trust (trust not as an emotion but as something
essentially communicable), how can trust can provide an answer
Hmm, the flow of trust
ces with some degree
of reliability, notwithstanding the additional efforts.
Cheers,
Ed Gerck
Ed Gerck wrote:
Even though the web-of-trust seems to be a pretty good part of PGP,
IMO it is actually it's Achilles heel.
I agree with most comments but they seem to deal more with symptons. Let
me just clarify/justify the above and why I think this is IMO actually the root
cause of problems
someone else, you automatically
trust that other party.
Depends on the browser. This is not a requirement or feature of X.509,
though often so confused. For an example where it is not, see Apache.
Cheers,
Ed Gerck
e absolute. And
they are quite different when non-boolean variables (ie, real-world variables)
are used. They are complementary concepts and *both* need to be used or
we lose expressive power in protocols, contracts, etc..
Cheers,
Ed Gerck
To transfer the cryptographic meaning of "non-r
iation as we feel the need
for it in protocols -- and note that we did not invent it, rather we discovered it.
Authentication is not sufficient to describe validity.
Cheers,
Ed Gerck
,
Ed Gerck
foolproof, secure, simple to operate and affordable".
Cheers,
Ed Gerck
record of their vote, so they know exactly what they have done at the
polls" as Baltimore's words did, and that is why you will like the system
I produce, is snake oil of good quality IMO.
I know you are at MIT, but please do not feel offended -- just help
correct it, if you can.
Cheers,
Ed Ger
is sponsoring the Election Technology
Expo. The Expo will be at the Hyatt Regency in Sacramento, January 16,
from 9:00 to 3:00. It opens at 8:00 for registration. There will be also
a series of panels in the morning.
For information, contact
Bruce McDannold [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cheers,
Ed Gerck
this Jan/16-17.
4. My testimony to the California Legislative Hearing on Elections, available in a
verbatiom copy from the tapes, at
http://www.mail-archive.com/tech@ivta.org/msg00104.html
Cheers,
Ed Gerck
William Allen Simpson wrote:
And in the same vein, I forwarded Ed Gerck's list of published
'requirements' to Lynn. She intends to use them as a perfect example
of what we DO NOT want!
see below, before you set yourself to re-invent the wheel.
Ed Gerck wrote:
1. Sixteen requirements
David Honig wrote:
First of all, that's not "privacy", that's "anonymity".
We have voter registration precisely so that we know who the voters
are! We are not changing voter registration
Ed Gerck wrote:
4. Fail-safe privacy in universal verifiability.
William Allen Simpson wrote:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
I'm sorry for the second message, but I could not let the egregious
error pass uncorrected:
:-) egregious ...
Ed Gerck wrote:
The law does not allow it, and for good reasons as you mention.
...
The voting apparatus
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