Re: Hardware Random Number Generators

1999-01-28 Thread Martin Minow
This I got from computer historian, Simon Lavington. The (Manchester) Ferranti Mark I had a hardware random number generator. This was specified by Alan Turing - (A copy of his original Internal Report, dated 1949 I believe, still exists.) ... For what it's worth, Illiac 1 (also a

Re: Cryptoprocessors and reverse engineering

1999-01-29 Thread Martin Minow
d for your particular chip -- and only that specific chip. This essentially puts the "dongle" inside the processor. Mathematica does something similar, using other "system-unique" information to bind the application to a specific machine. This is, of course, another argument *for*

NY Times article on Shamir's public key breaking machine

1999-05-01 Thread Martin Minow
ith keys of 512 bits or less -- that is, keys less than about 150 digits long -- would be vulnerable in the future, an exposure that would have seemed unthinkable only five years ago. The longer 1,024-bit keys that are available today would not be vulnerable at present." Martin Minow [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: MacOS 8.7 Security

1999-05-18 Thread Martin Minow
At 3:57 PM -0700 5/17/99, Dave Del Torto wrote: If this is based on the "speaker independent" voice recognition in PlainTalk, My understanding is that it not based on a speaker independent technology and, as a former linguist, it is not clear to me that the technology offers information useful

Re: The Beer Bottle Cipher (some fun summer reading for you...)

1999-06-30 Thread Martin Minow
At 12:07 -0400 1999.06.30, Ron Rivest described the Beer Bottle Cypher, asking: The actual security of this cipher seems to be an open question... Can it be broken? Have you tried getting an export license for it? Martin Minow [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: plausible CAPI recovery designs (Re: FW: Cryptonym...)

1999-09-09 Thread Martin Minow
le software releases. Martin Minow [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: Why did White House change its mind on crypto?

1999-09-17 Thread Martin Minow
. I don't see how the government can take this responsibility away from the jury. Martin Minow [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: having source code for your CPU chip -- NOT

1999-09-23 Thread Martin Minow
ase anyone is interested. The entire source code of the C compiler is small enough to sight-verify in about a man-month. A "Small C" compiler (see early issues of Dr. Dobbs) can be implemented in about 3 man months and ought to be good enough for crypto work. Martin Minow [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Bruce Schneier Interviewed in SlashDot.

1999-10-30 Thread Martin Minow
You will find an interesting and informative interview with Bruce Schneier on cryptogrphy in SlashDot: http://slashdot.org/interviews/99/10/29/0832246.shtml Martin Minow [EMAIL PROTECTED]

New Scientist Article on Do-it-yourself Evesdropping

1999-11-08 Thread Martin Minow
ent issues in the amateur radio magazine, QST, for one example of a radio using a digital signal processor for signal management and overall control.] Transcribed by Martin Minow, [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Siemens German Digital Signature Chip Hacked

1999-12-01 Thread Martin Minow
lesec private keys. Martin Minow [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- Please reply to mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]

Encryption Rules Change Delayed.

1999-12-14 Thread Martin Minow
of us who have been following the Bernstein case will recall that the government successfully requested a delay in the appeal to the full 9th Circuit (to mid-March as I recall) as the new regulations would affect the appeal process. Martin Minow [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: [PGP]: PGP 6.5.2 Random Number Generator (RNG) support

2000-02-02 Thread Martin Minow
into its CPU. Also, there are much better places to leak information, including keyboard and monitor designs that radiate detectable signals (the "Tempest" problem). Martin Minow [EMAIL PROTECTED]