At 10:10 AM 1/20/01 -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
This analysis will focus on one particular kind of attack. Eve will make
measurements of the photon polarization angle as it travels through the
network and attempt to deduce information about the signals being sent
by the participants.
This
At 02:04 PM 1/18/01 -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
the rotation stations could
somehow count or limit the number of photons going through so that they
would know when there were extra. I think this is possible in theory;
Right, it is. Here's a Gedankenexperiment: temporarily trap the signal
At 11:20 PM 1/17/01 -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote in part:
The probability that Eve's measurement will leave the result unchanged is
3/4, and therefore the probability that she will perturb the result is 1/4.
OK so far. Then, for the case of two measurements,
Eve's chances of perturbing the
At 08:35 PM 1/16/01 -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
To recap, a group of cryptographers wants to communicate anonymously,
without the sender of a message being traced.
To recap in more detail, as I understand it:
1) The desired result is a plain broadcast message, open to the world
At 10:35 PM 1/15/01 -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Here is a rough idea for a quantum-cryptography variant on the DC Net,
the Dining Cryptographers Net invented by David Chaum.
The photon starts off with vertical polarization. Each cryptographer
manages a station through which the photon
At 01:37 PM 1/12/01 -0800, Ray Dillinger mentioned:
interferometry to get the exact locations
on a keyboard of keystrokes from the sound of someone typing.
Whereupon Perry conjectured:
A quick contemplation of the wavelength of the sounds in question
would put an end to that speculation I
At 12:50 PM 3/25/00 -0800, Bram Cohen wrote:
Given that f(x+1) = f(x) * f(x) + c, does anybody know how to express f(x)
in closed form?
Well... That's an example of an iterated nonlinear map. Such things have
been extensively studied. For some values of c, for some initial
conditions, the
Hi Ted --
At 11:41 PM 8/14/99 -0400, you wrote:
standard Mathematician's style --- encrypted by formulae
guaranteed to make it opaque to all but those who are trained in the
peculiar style of Mathematics' papers.
...
someone tried to pursuade me to use Maurer's test
...
too memory
At 10:08 AM 8/4/99 -0400, D. Hugh Redelmeier wrote:
I think that this description reflects an inappropriate understanding
of entropy. Entropy is in some sense spread throughout the whole
output of /dev/urandom. You don't use entropy up, you spread it over
more and more bytes of output. This
At 10:09 AM 8/2/99 -0400, Paul Koning wrote:
1. Estimating entropy. Yes, that's the hard one. It's orthogonal
from everything else. /dev/random has a fairly simple approach;
Yarrow is more complex.
It's not clear which is better. If there's reason to worry about the
one in /dev/random, a
At 01:27 PM 8/2/99 -0400, Paul Koning wrote:
we weren't talking about "in principle" or "in general".
Sure, given an unspecified process of unknown (to me) properties I
cannot make sensible statements about its entropy. That is true but
it isn't relevant to the discussion.
Instead, we're
At 01:50 PM 8/2/99 -0400, Paul Koning wrote:
I only remember a few proposals (2 or 3?) and they didn't seem to be
[unduly weak]. Or do you feel that what I've proposed is this
weak? If so, why? I've seen comments that say "be careful" but I
don't remember any comments suggesting that what I
At 08:02 PM 7/22/99 +0200, Anonymous wrote:
That is:
1a') When there is entropy in the pool, it [/dev/urandom]
gobbles it all up before
acting like a PRNG. Leverage factor=1. This causes other applications to
stall if they need to read /dev/random.
This does not seem to be a big
At 07:31 AM 7/26/99 -0400, Bill Sommerfeld wrote:
".. for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be
questioned in any other place."
But then again, i'm not a lawyer, and I'm also not sure how this
provision has been interpreted in the past..
IANL but as you can imagine, members
Hi Folks --
I have a question about various scenarios for an attack against IPsec by way
of the random number generator. The people on the linux-ipsec mailing list
suggested I bring it up here.
Specifically: consider a central machine (call it Whitney) that is
implementing many IPsec
15 matches
Mail list logo
