Re: The Shining Cryptographers Net

2001-01-22 Thread hal
John Denker writes: A much better strategy for Eve is to _not_ make so many measurements. Rather, she should preserve the photon in all its analog, quantum-mechanical glory and recirculate it back to Bob, bypassing the other participants in the ring. Then Bob, in blissful ignorance,

Re: The Shining Cryptographers Net

2001-01-21 Thread hal
This message analyzes the Shining Cryptographers network in terms of how much information Eve the eavesdropper can hope to get by measuring the photon state before and after it is rotated. See earlier messages for more detail about how the SC Net works. This analysis will focus on one

Re: The Shining Cryptographers Net

2001-01-21 Thread John Denker
At 10:10 AM 1/20/01 -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: This analysis will focus on one particular kind of attack. Eve will make measurements of the photon polarization angle as it travels through the network and attempt to deduce information about the signals being sent by the participants. This

Re: The Shining Cryptographers Net

2001-01-19 Thread Ray Dillinger
On Thu, 18 Jan 2001 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Or does somebody have a good defense against this hyper-active attack? The only thing I can suggest would be if the rotation stations could somehow count or limit the number of photons going through so that they would know when there were extra.

Re: The Shining Cryptographers Net

2001-01-19 Thread John Denker
At 02:04 PM 1/18/01 -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: the rotation stations could somehow count or limit the number of photons going through so that they would know when there were extra. I think this is possible in theory; Right, it is. Here's a Gedankenexperiment: temporarily trap the signal

Re: The Shining Cryptographers Net

2001-01-19 Thread hal
Ray Dillinger wrote, quoting me: Another idea would be for the stations to actually absorb the photon in some manner that preserved its polarization, and then to re-emit it. These could be primed to pass only a single photon. Now you are talking serious voodoo. I don't think that this can

Re: The Shining Cryptographers Net

2001-01-18 Thread Jaap-Henk Hoepman
In the `traditional' DC Net, how is absence of a message detected? If this is a seperately distinguishable outcome of a round, each round may return three outcomes: `0', `1' and `none'. To represent these quantum mechanically, you need at least a 3-state quantum system (to make the outcomes

Re: The Shining Cryptographers Net

2001-01-18 Thread hal
Jaap-Henk Hoepman, [EMAIL PROTECTED], writes: In the `traditional' DC Net, how is absence of a message detected? A practical implementation of a DC Net would require multiple protocol layers. The lowest layer is the "raw" DC net itself, which has the property that each person sends a bit

Re: The Shining Cryptographers Net

2001-01-18 Thread John Denker
At 11:20 PM 1/17/01 -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote in part: The probability that Eve's measurement will leave the result unchanged is 3/4, and therefore the probability that she will perturb the result is 1/4. OK so far. Then, for the case of two measurements, Eve's chances of perturbing the

Re: The Shining Cryptographers Net

2001-01-18 Thread hal
John Denker, [EMAIL PROTECTED], writes: Eve need not limit herself to snooping "the signal". What she really wants to know is the "state of mind" of the participants, i.e. the settings of their rotators. If she knows that, she knows everything. She can, as a final step, synthesize a

Re: The Shining Cryptographers Net

2001-01-17 Thread John Denker
At 08:35 PM 1/16/01 -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: To recap, a group of cryptographers wants to communicate anonymously, without the sender of a message being traced. To recap in more detail, as I understand it: 1) The desired result is a plain broadcast message, open to the world

Re: The Shining Cryptographers Net

2001-01-17 Thread hal
hey aren't supposed to. There has been various work done on tracing disruptors. Similar extensions to the simple Shining Cryptographers net would be needed once actual evidence of Eve's manipulation is detected. (In addition the SC Net is equally as vulnerable to disruptors as the DC Net, of course.

Re: The Shining Cryptographers Net

2001-01-16 Thread John Denker
At 10:35 PM 1/15/01 -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Here is a rough idea for a quantum-cryptography variant on the DC Net, the Dining Cryptographers Net invented by David Chaum. The photon starts off with vertical polarization. Each cryptographer manages a station through which the photon

Re: The Shining Cryptographers Net

2001-01-16 Thread hal
John Denker, [EMAIL PROTECTED], writes: At 10:35 PM 1/15/01 -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Here is a rough idea for a quantum-cryptography variant on the DC Net, the Dining Cryptographers Net invented by David Chaum. Hmmm. This seems like a mistake in the physics. If the attacker, Eve,

Re: The Shining Cryptographers Net

2001-01-16 Thread hal
Let me follow up on the Shining Cryptographers idea with a more careful analysis of the last proposal I made in my earlier posting. To recap, a group of cryptographers wants to communicate anonymously, without the sender of a message being traced. They do so by circulating a photon around a

The Shining Cryptographers Net

2001-01-15 Thread hal
The Shining Cryptographers Net Here is a rough idea for a quantum-cryptography variant on the DC Net, the Dining Cryptographers Net invented by David Chaum. It does not provide as much anonymity as the DC Net, but perhaps will inspire others to look for a more powerful design. In a simple