Re: serious threat models

2006-02-04 Thread Matt Blaze
Yes, it's not at all clear from these stories just what was going on or how high tech the attack would have to be. What does diverting to a prepaid mobile mean? Here's a possibility: they social engineered or otherwise compromised the target account to assigned it a new telephone number and

Re: serious threat models

2006-02-04 Thread Perry E. Metzger
Steven M. Bellovin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I hate to play clipping service, but this story is too important not to mention. Many top Greek officials, including the Prime Minister, and the U.S. embassy had their mobile phones tapped. What makes this interesting is how it was done:

training your customers to be phishing victims

2006-02-04 Thread Perry E. Metzger
I've often commented about how awful Chase's send our customers emails telling them to click on links policy is, but tonight I got one from them exhorting me to sign up for an identity theft protection plan. The irony is delicious. Perry

Hiding data on 3.5 using 40 track mode

2006-02-04 Thread Travis H.
In the FBI's public statement about Hannsen, they relate how he used a 3.5 floppy in 40 track mode to store data, but if it was read in the ordinay way it would appear blank. IIRC, high-density floppies are 80 tracks per inch, and double density were 40 tpi. So, how do you suppose this trick

Re: serious threat models

2006-02-04 Thread Travis H.
On 2/3/06, Jaap-Henk Hoepman [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: could this be done using phone conference facilities? Good guess! http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/02/phone_tapping_i.html ``The code tapped into the conference call system. It conference called phone calls to 14 prepaid mobile

Re: EDP (entropy distribution protocol), userland PRNG design

2006-02-04 Thread Travis H.
Assume that one is the sole user of a LAN and that the 10-20 machines on this network have a need for unpredictable numbers. Assume further that it is not cost-effective to furnish each with a HWRNG, even one as inexpensive as a sound card (for example, they may not have a spare slot on the

Re: serious threat models

2006-02-04 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler
Perry E. Metzger wrote: All phone switches, thanks to the US government's CALEA rules, are equipped with software that makes espionage easy. Whether that software was abused in this instance, I do not know, but I will point out that any switch sold in the US -- which is to say most switches

Re: EDP (entropy distribution protocol), userland PRNG design

2006-02-04 Thread Eric Rescorla
Travis H. [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: That leaves me with the following design: That random numbers be sent en clair from the system that can generate them to the system that needs them, where they are decrypted using a random key (generated locally by /dev/random) and fed into the system that

Re: serious threat models

2006-02-04 Thread Sidney Markowitz
Matt Blaze wrote: Yes, it's not at all clear from these stories just what was going on or how high tech the attack would have to be. What does diverting to a prepaid mobile mean? There is more information in Bruce Scheier's blog entry and his links to blog and news articles. It hit slashdot

Re: EDP (entropy distribution protocol), userland PRNG design

2006-02-04 Thread Jason Holt
On Sat, 4 Feb 2006, Travis H. wrote: Suppose that /dev/random is too slow (SHA-1 was never meant to generate a lot of output) because one of these machines wishes to generate a large file for use as a one-time pad*. That leaves distributing bits. * /dev/random's output is limited by

Re: Hiding data on 3.5 using 40 track mode

2006-02-04 Thread Dave Howe
Travis H. wrote: In the FBI's public statement about Hannsen, they relate how he used a 3.5 floppy in 40 track mode to store data, but if it was read in the ordinay way it would appear blank. IIRC, high-density floppies are 80 tracks per inch, and double density were 40 tpi. So, how do you