Travis H. writes:
Ross Anderson once said cryptically,
HMAC has a long story attched to it - the triumph of the
theory community over common sense
He wouldn't expand on that any more... does anyone have an idea of
what he is referring to?
I might speculate, based on what you write here,
Owen Blacker wrote:
I wanted to create a file system that was
deniable: where encrypted files looked like random noise, and where it
was impossible to prove either the existence or non-existence of
encrypted files.
I spent some time thinking about this a few years back:
Hal Finney wrote:
Travis H. writes:
Ross Anderson once said cryptically,
HMAC has a long story attched to it - the triumph of the
theory community over common sense
He wouldn't expand on that any more... does anyone have an idea of
what he is referring to?
I might speculate, based on what
[A bit off topic but I thought I'd let it through anyway. Those
uninterested in OS design should skip the rest of this message. --Perry]
On 5/1/06, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Perry E. Metzger) wrote:
Disk encryption systems like CGD work
on the block level, and do not propagate CBC operations across
On 5/2/06, Ivan Krstic [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I spent some time thinking about this a few years back:
http://diswww.mit.edu/bloom-picayune/crypto/15520
Rubberhose was one of the things that came up, along with StegFS and
BestCrypt. Unfortunately, it seems like Rubberhose hasn't seen work in
On Tue, 2 May 2006, William Allen Simpson wrote:
I had a preliminary paper showing that the nested N-MAC/H-MAC design was
actually *weaker* than envelope style IP-MAC, [...]
But then again, Paul van Oorschot and myself found a key recovery attack
on envelope MAC that presents a certificational
http://microcodes.sourceforge.net/
There you can find a PDF reviewing the microcode update feature.
Apparently the updates from Intel are 2048 bytes long overall, and
have a 4-byte checksum, and are encrypted using some kind of
mechanism on the processor. Since they don't (to my knowledge)
