I wrote:
Looking a little more closely, I found this paper by Patarin from
Crypto 2005 which describes security bounds for higher round Feistel
constructions:
http://www.springerlink.com/content/gtcabev3ucv8apdu/
I was wrong, this was from Crypto 03. And as Eric Rescorla has already
pointed
- Jonathan Katz [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
But he probably wants an encryption scheme, not a cipher.
Jon, I'm not sure I understand what you mean.
If I am reading his message correctly, the original poster seems
to be asking for a format-preserving encryption over a domain
with 10^40
Steven M. Bellovin writes, in part:
-+---
| There's a limit to how far they can go with that, because of the fear
| of people abandoning the transponders.
| snip
| As for usage-based driving -- the first question is the political will
| to do so.
| snip
|
The relationship to this list may then be thin
excepting that the collection and handling of
such data remains of substantial interest.
Actually, it points to cash settlement of road tolls.
That's not unknown. On the Niagara Falls toll bridges, they have an
ETC system where you buy your
Eric Rescorla [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
There are a set of techniques that allow you to encrypt elements of arbitrary
sets back onto that set.
... and most of them seem to be excessively complicated for what they end up
achieving. Just for reference the mechanism from the sci.crypt thread of
At Thu, 28 Aug 2008 17:32:10 +1200,
Peter Gutmann wrote:
Eric Rescorla [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
There are a set of techniques that allow you to encrypt elements of arbitrary
sets back onto that set.
... and most of them seem to be excessively complicated for what they end up
achieving.
On 27 aug, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
Finally, the transponders may not matter much longer; OCR on license
plates is getting that good. As has already been mentioned, the 407
ETR road in Toronto already relies on this to some extent; it won't be
too much longer before the human assist is all
On Wed, Aug 27, 2008 at 12:16:23PM -0400, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
Finally, the transponders may not matter much longer; OCR on license
plates is getting that good. As has already been mentioned, the 407
ETR road in Toronto already relies on this to some extent; it won't be
too much longer
Apropos the recent discussion of Fake UIs and the problem of people
most needing sensitivity to the dangers being most insensitive:
ISS laptops found to be infected with Gammima.AG virus; apparently
not the first infection on the ISS.
What's worth noting about this story is that the laptops
On Thu, 28 Aug 2008 10:49:20 +0200
Eugen Leitl [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Wed, Aug 27, 2008 at 12:16:23PM -0400, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
Finally, the transponders may not matter much longer; OCR on license
plates is getting that good. As has already been mentioned, the 407
ETR road
On Wed, 27 Aug 2008, Eric Rescorla wrote:
At Wed, 27 Aug 2008 16:10:51 -0400 (EDT),
Jonathan Katz wrote:
On Wed, 27 Aug 2008, Eric Rescorla wrote:
At Wed, 27 Aug 2008 17:05:44 +0200,
There are a set of techniques that allow you to encrypt elements of
arbitrary sets back onto that set.
The
On Wed, 27 Aug 2008, Hovav Shacham wrote:
- Jonathan Katz [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
But he probably wants an encryption scheme, not a cipher.
Jon, I'm not sure I understand what you mean.
If I am reading his message correctly, the original poster seems
to be asking for a
Sherri Davidoff [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Look for general tracking to appear everywhere.
Anonymous travel is dead. Even for subway riders who still use tokens
and citizens that bicycle around town, the proliferation of cameras,
facial recognition technology,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toll_Collect is in operation in entire
Germany. It does OCR on all license plates (also used for police
purposes in realtime, despite initial vigorous denial) but currently
is only used for truck toll.
How well does that actually work? There were many articles
On Thu, 28 Aug 2008 17:55:57 +0200
Stefan Kelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toll_Collect is in operation in entire
Germany. It does OCR on all license plates (also used for police
purposes in realtime, despite initial vigorous denial) but
currently is only used
everything forever. With disk prices falling
as they are, keeping everything is cheaper
than careful selective deletion, that's for
sure.
I disagree.
We've been helping the German Toll Collect system (as
discussed in this thread as well) setting up and implementing
their data privacy
There has been a lot of talk on the list recently about the privacy
issues associated with various toll and fare collecting systems, but
others have been pointing out, correctly I think, that this matters
less and less because of other technological developments.
New York City recently announced
On Thu, Aug 28, 2008 at 06:03:14PM +0200, Stefan Kelm wrote:
We've been helping the German Toll Collect system (as
discussed in this thread as well) setting up and implementing
their data privacy concept. This concept requires Toll Collect
to delete almost any data after a certain (quite
Hello,
Actually, block ciphers encrypting blocks of *decimal* numbers exist:
- TOY100 [1] encrypts blocks of 32 decimal digits
- DEAN18 [2] encrypts blocks of 18 decimal digits
- DEAN27 [3] encrypts blocks of 27 decimal digits
TOY100 is (almost) broken by the generalized linear cryptanalysis
One of the earlier messages (I lost it) said that Philipp said that
there was information that could be used as a nonce. In that case, I
would recommend a stream cipher used to generate 133 bits at a time; if
the lump of bits represents an integer in the correct range, add it
modulo 10^40...
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