[Moderator's note: there are messages still in the queue that will go
out later today, but I felt this had to go out ASAP --Perry]
From the New York Times, word that the Obama administration wants to
compel access to encrypted communications.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/us/27wiretap.html
From the New York Times, word that the Obama administration wants
to compel access to encrypted communications.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/us/27wiretap.html
...
I expect this law to be, overall, counterproductive.
From the information given in the NYT article, I conclude that
the law
On 28/09/10 1:26 AM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
From the New York Times, word that the Obama administration wants to
compel access to encrypted communications.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/us/27wiretap.html
Someone should beat up the FBI for using specious arguments:
But as an example,
I said (something like) this when Haystack first appeared on this
list...
Words dissidents and oppressive regimes have no place in
serious discussions among cryptographers. Once we start assigning
ethical categorizations to those that protect and those that attack
(data files, communications
On 17 Sep 2010 at 20:53, Peter Gutmann wrote:
From the ukcrypto mailing list:
Just had a new Lloyds credit card delivered, it had a sticker saying I have
to call a number to activate it. I call, it's an automated system.
It asks for the card number, fair enough. It asks for the
I don't know how NZ banks do it; in the US, they use the phone
number you're calling from. Yes, it's spoofable, but most folks (a)
don't know it, and (b) don't know how.
No, they don't use the phone number to validate anything. I routinely
ignore the instructions to call from your home
On Wed, Sep 15, 2010 at 11:07 AM, Peter Gutmann
pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote:
Tom Ritter t...@ritter.vg writes:
What's weird is I find confusing literature about what *is* the default for
protecting the viewstate.
I still haven't seen the paper/slides from the talk so it's a bit hard to
On Fri, 17 Sep 2010, Steven Bellovin wrote:
On Sep 17, 2010, at 4:53 51AM, Peter Gutmann wrote:
From the ukcrypto mailing list:
AIUI, and I may be wrong, the purpose of activation is to prevent lost-in-
the-post theft/fraud - so what do they need details which a thief who has
the card in his
I don't know anything beyond this this news story, but interesting...
http://www.praguemonitor.com/2010/09/14/mfd-bis-offers-tax-free-money-encryption-system
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* Adam Fields:
I find it hard to believe that even the most uninformed dissidents
would be using an untested, unaudited, _beta_, __foreign__ new service
for anything. Is there any reason to believe otherwise?
I wouldn't be surprised if there are plenty such tools in circulation
which are used
Does anyone know of any ciphers where bits of keys modify the control path,
rather than just data operations? Yes, I know that that's a slippery concept,
since ultimately things like addition and multiplication can be implemented
with loops in the hardware or firmware. I also suspect that
--- Start of forwarded message ---
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 2010 13:00:27 -0400 (EDT)
From: Sven Dietrich sp...@cs.stevens.edu
Subject: WECSR 2011 CFP - Deadline Oct 15, 2010 - please disseminate
Source is at: http://www.cs.stevens.edu/~spock/wecsr2011/cfp.html
Call for Papers
2nd Workshop on
ANNOUNCING Tahoe, the Least-Authority File System, v1.8.0
The Tahoe-LAFS team is pleased to announce the immediate
availability of version 1.8.0 of Tahoe-LAFS, an extremely
reliable distributed storage system. Get it here:
http://tahoe-lafs.org/source/tahoe/trunk/docs/quickstart.html
Tahoe-LAFS
Per
http://news.softpedia.com/news/New-Trojan-Steals-Digital-Certificates-157442.shtml
there's a new Trojan out there that looks for a steals Cert_*.p12 files --
certificates with private keys. Since the private keys are password-protected,
it thoughtfully installs a keystroke logger as
Peter Gutmann wrote:
Tom Ritter t...@ritter.vg writes:
What's weird is I find confusing literature about what *is* the default for
protecting the viewstate.
I still haven't seen the paper/slides from the talk so it's a bit hard to
comment on the specifics, but if you're using .NET's
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,druck-719726,00.html
09/27/2010 11:23 AM
Recruited by West Germany
Former Stasi Cryptographers Now Develop Technology for NATO
By Marcel Rosenbach and Holger Stark
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the West Germans were desperate to
http://www.boingboing.net/2010/09/27/obama-administration.html
A good first point of interest clearinghouse site for the issue can be found
on Boing Boing.
It points to a Green Greenwald article on Salon and the ACLU.
There's also a nice piece at the Cato Institute
On 2010 Sep 24, at 12:47 , Steven Bellovin wrote:
Per
http://news.softpedia.com/news/New-Trojan-Steals-Digital-Certificates-157442.shtml
there's a new Trojan out there that looks for a steals Cert_*.p12 files --
certificates with private keys. Since the private keys are
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