Re: [Cryptography] Thoughts about keys

2013-09-02 Thread Faré
So, how do I translate al...@example.org into a key? Once again, what do you think of namecoin? A bitcoin-like consensual database based on proof of work. If you also require proof-of-key via signature from the recipient, majority attacks make DoS easy, but identity stealing is still dependent

Re: [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis

2013-09-02 Thread James A. Donald
On 2013-09-01 9:11 PM, Jerry Leichter wrote: Meanwhile, on the authentication side, Stuxnet provided evidence that the secret community *does* have capabilities (to conduct a collision attacks) beyond those known to the public - capabilities sufficient to produce fake Windows updates. Do we

Re: [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis

2013-09-02 Thread Jerry Leichter
On Sep 1, 2013, at 6:06 PM, Perry E. Metzger wrote: We know what they spec for use by the rest of the US government in Suite B. http://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/suiteb_cryptography/ AES with 128-bit keys provides adequate protection for classified information up to the SECRET level.

Re: [Cryptography] Thoughts about keys

2013-09-02 Thread Perry E. Metzger
On Mon, 2 Sep 2013 03:00:42 +0200 Faré fah...@gmail.com wrote: At intervals, the trustworthy organization (and others like it) can send out email messages to Alice, encrypted in said key, saying Hi there! Please reply with a message containing this magic cookie, encrypted in our key,

Re: [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis

2013-09-02 Thread Perry E. Metzger
On Mon, 2 Sep 2013 00:06:21 -0400 Jerry Leichter leich...@lrw.com wrote: - To let's look at what they want for TOP SECRET. First off, RSA - accepted for a transition period for SECRET, and then only with 2048 bit moduli, which until the last year or so were almost unknown in commercial

Re: [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis

2013-09-02 Thread Jerry Leichter
On Sep 1, 2013, at 10:35 PM, James A. Donald wrote: Meanwhile, on the authentication side, Stuxnet provided evidence that the secret community *does* have capabilities (to conduct a collision attacks) beyond those known to the public - capabilities sufficient to produce fake Windows

Re: [Cryptography] Thoughts about keys

2013-09-02 Thread Perry E. Metzger
On Mon, 2 Sep 2013 19:53:03 +0200 Faré fah...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Sep 2, 2013 at 7:19 PM, Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.com wrote: On Mon, 2 Sep 2013 03:00:42 +0200 Faré fah...@gmail.com wrote: At intervals, the trustworthy organization (and others like it) can send out email

Re: [Cryptography] Thoughts about keys

2013-09-02 Thread Faré
On Mon, Sep 2, 2013 at 7:19 PM, Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.com wrote: On Mon, 2 Sep 2013 03:00:42 +0200 Faré fah...@gmail.com wrote: At intervals, the trustworthy organization (and others like it) can send out email messages to Alice, encrypted in said key, saying Hi there! Please

Re: [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis

2013-09-02 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler
recent post with email discussing PGP-like implementation ... a decade before PGP in financial crypto blog http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2013i.html#69 and then a little later realizing there were 3-kinds of crypto (when I was told I could make as many boxes as I wanted ... but could only sell to

Re: [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis

2013-09-02 Thread Perry E. Metzger
On Mon, 2 Sep 2013 15:09:31 -0400 Jerry Leichter leich...@lrw.com wrote: On Sep 2, 2013, at 1:25 PM, Perry E. Metzger wrote: On Mon, 2 Sep 2013 00:06:21 -0400 Jerry Leichter leich...@lrw.com wrote: - To let's look at what they want for TOP SECRET. First off, RSA - accepted for a

Re: [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis

2013-09-02 Thread Jerry Leichter
On Sep 2, 2013, at 1:25 PM, Perry E. Metzger wrote: On Mon, 2 Sep 2013 00:06:21 -0400 Jerry Leichter leich...@lrw.com wrote: - To let's look at what they want for TOP SECRET. First off, RSA - accepted for a transition period for SECRET, and then only with 2048 bit moduli, which until the

Re: [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis

2013-09-02 Thread Phillip Hallam-Baker
On Sun, Sep 1, 2013 at 10:35 PM, James A. Donald jam...@echeque.com wrote: On 2013-09-01 9:11 PM, Jerry Leichter wrote: Meanwhile, on the authentication side, Stuxnet provided evidence that the secret community *does* have capabilities (to conduct a collision attacks) beyond those known to

Re: [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis

2013-09-02 Thread Perry E. Metzger
On Mon, 2 Sep 2013 14:45:00 -0400 Phillip Hallam-Baker hal...@gmail.com wrote: Do we know they produced fake windows updates without assistance from Microsoft? Given the reaction from Microsoft, yes. The Microsoft public affairs people have been demonstrating real anger at the Flame

Re: [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis

2013-09-02 Thread Phillip Hallam-Baker
You know, if there was a completely ironclad legal opinion that made use of ECC possible without the risk of a lawsuit costing over $2 million from Certicom then I would be happy to endorse a switch to ECC like the NSA is pushing for as well. I would not therefore draw the conclusion that NSA

Re: [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis

2013-09-02 Thread Christian Huitema
Do we know they produced fake windows updates without assistance from Microsoft? Given the reaction from Microsoft, yes. The Microsoft public affairs people have been demonstrating real anger at the Flame attack in many forums. But of course, sufficiently paranoid people might

Re: [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis

2013-09-02 Thread Perry E. Metzger
On Mon, 2 Sep 2013 13:14:00 -0700 Christian Huitema huit...@huitema.net wrote: Do we know they produced fake windows updates without assistance from Microsoft? Given the reaction from Microsoft, yes. The Microsoft public affairs people have been demonstrating real anger at

Re: [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis

2013-09-02 Thread Perry E. Metzger
On Mon, 2 Sep 2013 17:44:57 -0400 Jerry Leichter leich...@lrw.com wrote: ...Clearly, as things like bad vendor drivers updates have been sent out using stolen keys in the past, and clearly vendors might simply make mistakes in the future Except that that's not what happened in this

Re: [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis

2013-09-02 Thread Jerry Leichter
Do we know they produced fake windows updates without assistance from Microsoft? Given the reaction from Microsoft, yes. The Microsoft public affairs people have been demonstrating real anger at the Flame attack in many forums. ...Clearly, as things like bad vendor drivers updates have

[Cryptography] Google's Public Key Size (was Re: NSA and cryptanalysis)

2013-09-02 Thread Jeffrey I. Schiller
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On Mon, Sep 02, 2013 at 03:09:31PM -0400, Jerry Leichter wrote: Google recently switched to 2048 bit keys; hardly any other sites have done so, and some older software even has trouble talking to Google as a result. Btw. As a random side-note.

Re: [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis

2013-09-02 Thread Jack Lloyd
On Mon, Sep 02, 2013 at 03:09:31PM -0400, Jerry Leichter wrote: a) The very reference you give says that to be equivalent to 128 bits symmetric, you'd need a 3072 bit RSA key - but they require a 2048 bit key. And the same reference says that to be equivalent to 256 bits symmetric, you need

Re: [Cryptography] Backup is completely separate

2013-09-02 Thread John Kelsey
The backup access problem isn't just a crypto problem, it's a social/legal problem. There ultimately needs to be some outside mechanism for using social or legal means to ensure that, say, my kids can get access to at least some of my encrypted files after I drop dead or land in the hospital

Re: [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis

2013-09-02 Thread Jon Callas
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On Sep 2, 2013, at 3:06 PM, Jack Lloyd ll...@randombit.net wrote: On Mon, Sep 02, 2013 at 03:09:31PM -0400, Jerry Leichter wrote: a) The very reference you give says that to be equivalent to 128 bits symmetric, you'd need a 3072 bit RSA key -