On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 8:54 PM, Lucky Green shamr...@cypherpunks.to wrote:
In its cryptic explanation of the bounces, Google makes one thing clear:
whatever
reason they have to bounce the email, that reason only applies to IPv6. I
believe
this is wrong.
It only applies to IPv6 because
On 3/09/13 18:13 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
The real issue is that the P-521 curve has IP against it, so if you
want to use freely usable curves, you're stuck with P-256 and P-384
until some more patents expire. That's more of it than 192 bit
security. We can hold our
As a pure aside...
On Tue, 3 Sep 2013 15:16:14 -0400 Faré fah...@gmail.com wrote:
Can't you trivially transform a hash into a PRNG, a PRNG into a
cypher, and vice versa?
Phil Karn described a construction for turning any hash function into
the core of a Feistel cipher in 1991. So far as I can
On 4 September 2013 15:49, Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.com wrote:
On Wed, 4 Sep 2013 10:37:12 -0400 Perry E. Metzger
pe...@piermont.com wrote:
Phil Karn described a construction for turning any hash function
into the core of a Feistel cipher in 1991. So far as I can tell,
such ciphers
On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 6:06 PM, Jerry Leichter leich...@lrw.com wrote:
On Sep 3, 2013, at 3:16 PM, Faré fah...@gmail.com wrote:
Can't you trivially transform a hash into a PRNG, a PRNG into a
cypher, and vice versa?
No.
Let H(X) = SHA-512(X) || SHA-512(X)
where '||' is concatenation.
On Wed, Sep 4, 2013 at 11:26 AM, Jerry Leichter leich...@lrw.com wrote:
Just because it's trivial to produce bogus crypto doesn't mean it's
non-trivial to produce good crypto, given a few universal recipes.
Look, if you want to play around a produce things that look secure to you and
a few of
While doing some research on the history of hashing for a client I
discovered that it is described in the very first edition of the ACM
journal and the paper is a translation of a Russian paper.
One of the many problems with the ITAR mindset is the assumption that all
real ideas are invented
On a more theoretical basis, Phil Rogaway gave a presentation at MIT many
years ago where he showed the use of a one-way function as the construction
primitive for every other type of symmetric algorithm.
--
Website: http://hallambaker.com/
___
The
At 08:20 04/09/2013, ianG wrote:
On 3/09/13 18:13 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
Do we have an ECC curve that is (1) secure and (2) has a written
description prior to 1 Sept 1993?
(Not answering your direct question.) Personally, I was happy to
plan on using DJB's Curve25519. He's
This first publication of differential cryptanalysis was at CRYPTO'90. I
highly doubt Karn analyzed his construction relative to DC. (His post
certainly makes no mention of it.)
At first glance - I certainly haven't worked this through - it should be
straightforward to construct a hash will
On Sep 4, 2013, at 10:45 AM, Faré fah...@gmail.com wrote:
Can't you trivially transform a hash into a PRNG, a PRNG into a
cypher, and vice versa?
No.
Let H(X) = SHA-512(X) || SHA-512(X)
where '||' is concatenation. Assuming SHA-512 is a cryptographically secure
hash H trivially is as
On Sep 4, 2013 12:14 AM, Lucky Green shamr...@cypherpunks.to wrote:
I *have* PTR records for my IPv6 addresses. What I don't know is which
PTR records will make Gmail happy. SPF PTR records clearly do not do the
trick.
SPF uses TXT records, not PTR ones. Can you share your IPv6 address? I'll
On Tue, Sep 03, 2013 at 10:27:14PM -0700, Taral wrote:
On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 8:54 PM, Lucky Green shamr...@cypherpunks.to wrote:
In its cryptic explanation of the bounces, Google makes one thing clear:
whatever
reason they have to bounce the email, that reason only applies to IPv6. I
On Wed, 4 Sep 2013 09:14:36 +0200 Lucky Green
shamr...@cypherpunks.to wrote:
I *have* PTR records for my IPv6 addresses. What I don't know is
which PTR records will make Gmail happy. SPF PTR records clearly do
not do the trick.
I think this conversation has, at this point, gone well beyond the
On Wed, 4 Sep 2013 10:37:12 -0400 Perry E. Metzger
pe...@piermont.com wrote:
Phil Karn described a construction for turning any hash function
into the core of a Feistel cipher in 1991. So far as I can tell,
such ciphers are actually quite secure, though impractically slow.
Pointers to his
On 2013-09-04 16:37, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Phil Karn described a construction for turning any hash function into
the core of a Feistel cipher in 1991. So far as I can tell, such
ciphers are actually quite secure, though impractically slow.
Pointers to his original sci.crypt posting would be
At 03:06 PM 9/3/2013, Jerry Leichter wrote:
On Sep 3, 2013, at 3:16 PM, Faré fah...@gmail.com wrote:
Can't you trivially transform a hash into a PRNG, a PRNG into a
cypher, and vice versa?
No.
[...]
I don't actually know if there exists a
construction of a PRNG from a cryptographically
On Mon, Sep 2, 2013 at 3:04 PM, Jeffrey I. Schiller j...@mit.edu wrote:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On Mon, Sep 02, 2013 at 03:09:31PM -0400, Jerry Leichter wrote:
Google recently switched to 2048 bit keys; hardly any other sites
have done so, and some older software
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