. Elligator 2 works fine on curve25519.
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makes me *less* secure than no BTNS at all.
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applying it to IPv4 would break too
many people. Not enough people use IPv6, so they are insisting on good
hygiene there.
Why do you not have PTR records for your IPv6 address? The problem is
that, not Google's policy.
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On Sep 4, 2013 12:14 AM, Lucky Green shamr...@cypherpunks.to wrote:
I *have* PTR records for my IPv6 addresses. What I don't know is which
PTR records will make Gmail happy. SPF PTR records clearly do not do the
trick.
SPF uses TXT records, not PTR ones. Can you share your IPv6 address? I'll
record. Otherwise, mail will be marked as spam
or possibly rejected.
Because under ipv6 your prefix is supposed to be stable (customer
identifier) and the namespace delegated to you on request. Have you
asked your provider for an ipv6 namespace delegation?
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:
On Thu, Aug 29, 2013 at 1:59 PM, Taral tar...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 12:08 PM, Lucky Green shamr...@cypherpunks.to
wrote:
Additional guidelines for IPv6
The sending IP must have a PTR record (i.e., a reverse DNS of the
sending IP) and it should match the IP obtained
On Sat, Jul 17, 2010 at 7:41 AM, Paul Wouters p...@xelerance.com wrote:
Several are using old SHA-1 hashes...
old ?
old in that they are explicitly not recommended by the latest specs
I was looking at.
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. 172800 IN DS 15191 8 2
A057C8553B1DC6CF158A87CD2D0BAA2CDC9C6A14FA03DE02B19AB0DA 62AF279E
Several are using old SHA-1 hashes...
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as non-password-based
authentication (e.g. smart card) and multi-factor authentication.
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, but isn't local to me. Does anyone know of a paper?
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On Fri, Jan 30, 2009 at 1:47 PM, Ray Dillinger b...@sonic.net wrote:
This is basic digital signatures; it would work.
What's your transition plan? How do you deal with stolen trust
tokens? (Think trojans/worms.)
Also see: http://craphound.com/spamsolutions.txt
--
Taral tar...@gmail.com
Please
other people say who've read the source code.
Really? What about hardware backdoors? I'm thinking something like the
old /bin/login backdoor that had compiler support, but in hardware.
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the kernel hands out entropy to multiple
concurrent consumers. I don't think it's a semantic issue.
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system or a
system that has lost its cert.
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I've attached below Rick's reply to this thread. Rick Carback is a member of
the PunchScan team.
- Taral
-- Forwarded message --
From: Rick Carback
Date: Dec 16, 2007 12:01 PM
Subject: Re: Fwd: Fwd: PunchScan voting protocol
I think there are some misconceptions/assumptions
provide an attack model.
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On 12/10/07, Steven M. Bellovin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Believe it or not, I thought of CFB...
What about PCFB to get around the block issue? I remember freenet
using it that way...
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Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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the legitimacy of networking
infrastructure which is designed to provide high security.
Funny how they didn't provide any details.
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Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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for invalid or no username
This makes some sense...
1. Client may request proof of host private key.
2. Client must authenticate.
3. Client may request a copy of the host public key.
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Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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DNS is not significantly
more trustworthy than simply querying the remote host on a known port
if you don't have DNSSEC.
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Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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that lock.
I'm just waiting for someone with access to photograph said keys and
post it all over the internet.
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Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED]
You can't prove anything.
-- Gödel's Incompetence Theorem
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in auctions of
adult materials.
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Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED]
You can't prove anything.
-- Gödel's Incompetence Theorem
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anything in
the GSM standard that would allow this either.
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Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED]
You can't prove anything.
-- Gödel's Incompetence Theorem
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On 7/4/06, Andrea Pasquinucci [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
About RNG, does someone in the list have any comment, ideas on this
http://www.idquantique.com/products/quantis.htm
Why? Noise-based RNGs are just as random and just as quantum. :)
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Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED]
You can't prove anything
On 5/10/06, John R. Black [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I skimmed this. The start of the article says that after 3 rounds AES
achieves perfect diffusion?!
No, it says their old ASD could not distinguish encrypted data from
random after 3 rounds.
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Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED]
You can't prove anything
the two.
This implication runs both ways. Given d and e (and pq), one can
compute p and q. Proving this is an exercise left to the reader.
--
Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED]
You can't prove anything.
-- Gödel's Incompetence Theorem
, theoretically.
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Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED]
You can't prove anything.
-- Gödel's Incompetence Theorem
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://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/02/quantum_computi.html
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Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Computer science is no more about computers than astronomy is about
telescopes.
-- Edsger Dijkstra
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the signatures on the chosen messages).
I think you're referring to the Desmedt-Odlyzko selective forgery attack.
See http://www.ipa.go.jp/security/enc/CRYPTREC/fy15/doc/1014_Menezes.sigs.pdf
--
Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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The Cryptography
some insights on this? Is it ready for
prime time or just a proof-of-concept? Any known issues?
If you want encryption with authentication, there's the gaim-encryption
plugin. I get the feeling gaim-otr is for more specific circumstances.
--
Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED]
This message is digitally
install anything.
Then again, the only extension I have installed (FlashGot), I manually
checked myself.
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Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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A: Because it fouls the order in which people normally read text.
Q: Why is top-posting such a bad
think this last bit is untrue. You will find that the expected number
of states of the PRNG after extracting one bit of randomness is half of
the number of states you had before, thus resulting in one bit of
entropy loss.
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Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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that there is
infinite compute capacity. From an information-theoretic point of view,
there is NO SUCH THING as a perfect one-way function.
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Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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A: Because it fouls the order in which people normally read text.
Q
On Wed, Dec 22, 2004 at 10:58:11AM -0600, Matt Crawford wrote:
On Dec 15, 2004, at 11:54, Taral wrote:
What stops someone using 3 players and majority voting on frame data
bits?
As I understand it, they use such a huge number of bits for marking,
that any reasonably-sized assembly
system had an implementation like this
originally...
--
Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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A: Because it fouls the order in which people normally read text.
Q: Why is top-posting such a bad thing?
A: Top-posting.
Q: What is the most annoying
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