Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?

2013-10-09 Thread Watson Ladd
On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 7:38 AM, Jerry Leichter leich...@lrw.com wrote: On Oct 8, 2013, at 1:11 AM, Bill Frantz fra...@pwpconsult.com wrote: If we can't select ciphersuites that we are sure we will always be comfortable with (for at least some forseeable lifetime) then we urgently need the

Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?

2013-10-09 Thread Watson Ladd
On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 1:46 PM, Bill Frantz fra...@pwpconsult.com wrote: On 10/8/13 at 7:38 AM, leich...@lrw.com (Jerry Leichter) wrote: On Oct 8, 2013, at 1:11 AM, Bill Frantz fra...@pwpconsult.com wrote: We seriously need to consider what the design lifespan of our crypto suites is in

Re: [Cryptography] AES-256- More NIST-y? paranoia

2013-10-04 Thread Watson Ladd
. -- Jerry ___ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography Sincerely, Watson Ladd -- Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase

Re: [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized

2013-10-04 Thread Watson Ladd
On Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 1:35 PM, Lodewijk andré de la porte l...@odewijk.nlwrote: IMO readability is very hard to measure. Likely things being where you expect them to be, with minimal confusing characters but clear anchoring so you can start reading from anywhere. If someone could write a

Re: [Cryptography] NIST about to weaken SHA3?

2013-09-30 Thread Watson Ladd
On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 2:21 PM, James A. Donald jam...@echeque.com wrote: On 2013-10-01 00:44, Viktor Dukhovni wrote: Should one also accuse ESTREAM of maliciously weakening SALSA? Or might one admit the possibility that winning designs in contests are at times quite conservative and that

Re: [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing

2013-09-16 Thread Watson Ladd
of finding linear approximations to the encryption function. But I personally don't think this is much use. We have ciphers that have stood up to lots of analysis. The real problems have been in modes of operation, key negotiation, and deployment. Sincerely, Watson Ladd