At a stretch, one can imagine circumstances in which trying multiple seeds
to choose a curve would lead to an attack that we would not easily
replicate. I don't suggest that this is really what happened; I'm just
trying to work out whether it's possible.
Suppose you can easily break an elliptic
On Sep 10, 2013, at 3:56 PM, Bill Stewart bill.stew...@pobox.com wrote:
One point which has been mentioned, but perhaps not emphasised enough - if
NSA have a secret backdoor into the main NIST ECC curves, then even if the
fact of the backdoor was exposed - the method is pretty well known -
On Tue, Sep 10, 2013 at 12:56:16PM -0700, Bill Stewart wrote:
I thought the normal operating mode for PFS is that there's an
initial session key exchange (typically RSA) and authentication,
which is used to set up an encrypted session, and within that
session there's a DH or ECDH key exchange
At 10:39 AM 9/11/2013, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
Perfect Forward Secrecy is not perfect. In fact it is no better than
regular public key. The only difference is that if the public key
system is cracked then with PFS the attacker has to break every
single key exchange and not just the keys in
On Wed, Sep 11, 2013 at 2:40 PM, Bill Stewart bill.stew...@pobox.comwrote:
At 10:39 AM 9/11/2013, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
Perfect Forward Secrecy is not perfect. In fact it is no better than
regular public key. The only difference is that if the public key system is
cracked then with PFS
On Fri, Sep 06, 2013 at 06:18:05PM +0100, Ben Laurie wrote:
On 6 September 2013 18:13, Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.com wrote:
It would be good to see them abandon RC4 of course, and soon.
In favour of what, exactly? We're out of good ciphersuites.
Please ask your friendly
On 6/09/13 21:11 PM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
On Fri, 6 Sep 2013 18:56:51 +0100 Ben Laurie b...@links.org wrote:
The problem is that there's nothing good [in the way of ciphers]
left for TLS 1.2.
So, lets say in public that the browser vendors have no excuse left
for not going to 1.2.
I hate
One solution, preventing passive attacks, is for major browsers
and websites to switch to using PFS ciphersuites (i.e. those
based on ephemeral Diffie-Hellmann key exchange).
It occurred to me yesterday that this seems like something all major
service providers should be doing. I'm sure
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On 9/6/13 8:36 AM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
One solution, preventing passive attacks, is for major
browsers and websites to switch to using PFS ciphersuites (i.e.
those based on ephemeral Diffie-Hellmann key exchange).
It occurred to me yesterday
On Fri, 6 Sep 2013 18:18:05 +0100 Ben Laurie b...@links.org wrote:
On 6 September 2013 18:13, Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.com
wrote:
Google is also now (I believe) using PFS on their connections, and
they handle more traffic than anyone. A connection I just made to
Hi,
It would be good to see them abandon RC4 of course, and soon.
In favour of what, exactly? We're out of good ciphersuites.
I thought AES was okay for TLS 1.2? Isn't the issue simply that
Firefox etc. still use TLS 1.0? Note that this was a TLS 1.2
connection.
Firefox has added TLS 1.2
On 06.09.2013 18:20, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
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On 9/6/13 8:36 AM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
One solution, preventing passive attacks, is for major
browsers and websites to switch to using PFS ciphersuites (i.e.
those based on ephemeral Diffie-Hellmann
On 9/6/2013 9:52 AM, Raphaël Jacquot wrote:
To meet today’s PCI DSS crypto standards DHE is not required.
PCI is about credit card fraud. Mastercard/Visa aren't worried that
criminals are storing all your internet purchase transactions with the
hope they can crack it later; if the FBI/NSA want
On 6 September 2013 18:24, Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.com wrote:
On Fri, 6 Sep 2013 18:18:05 +0100 Ben Laurie b...@links.org wrote:
On 6 September 2013 18:13, Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.com
wrote:
Google is also now (I believe) using PFS on their connections, and
they
On 06/09/13 15:36, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
One solution, preventing passive attacks, is for major browsers
and websites to switch to using PFS ciphersuites (i.e. those
based on ephemeral Diffie-Hellmann key exchange).
It occurred to me yesterday that this seems like something all major
service
On Fri, 6 Sep 2013 18:56:51 +0100 Ben Laurie b...@links.org wrote:
The problem is that there's nothing good [in the way of ciphers]
left for TLS 1.2.
So, lets say in public that the browser vendors have no excuse left
for not going to 1.2.
I hate to be a conspiracy nutter, but it is that kind
On 6 September 2013 18:13, Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.com wrote:
Google is also now (I believe) using PFS on their connections, and
they handle more traffic than anyone. A connection I just made to
https://www.google.com/ came out as, TLS 1.2, RC4_128, SHA1,
ECDHE_RSA.
It would be good
On 6/09/13 20:15 PM, Daniel Veditz wrote:
On 9/6/2013 9:52 AM, Raphaël Jacquot wrote:
To meet today’s PCI DSS crypto standards DHE is not required.
PCI is about credit card fraud.
So was SSL ;-) Sorry, couldn't resist...
Mastercard/Visa aren't worried that
criminals are storing all
On 6 September 2013 17:20, Peter Saint-Andre stpe...@stpeter.im wrote:
Is there a handy list of PFS-friendly
ciphersuites that I can communicate to XMPP developers and admins so
they can start upgrading their software and deployments?
Anything with EDH, DHE or ECDHE in the name...
we were brought in as consultants to a small client/server startup that wanted to do payment transactions on
their server, they had this technology they called SSL they wanted to use, the result is now
frequently called electronic commerce. The two people at the startup responsible for the
PEM == Perry E Metzger pe...@piermont.com writes:
PEM Anyone at a browser vendor resisting the move to 1.2 should be
PEM viewed with deep suspicion.
Is anyone?
NSS has 1.2 now; it is, AIUI, in progress for ff and sm.
Chromium supports it (as of version 29, it seems).
Opera supports 1.2 (at
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On 09/06/2013 01:13 PM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Google is also now (I believe) using PFS on their connections, and
they handle more traffic than anyone. A connection I just made to
https://www.google.com/ came out as, TLS 1.2, RC4_128, SHA1,
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On 09/06/2013 01:13 PM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Google is also now (I believe) using PFS on their connections, and
they handle more traffic than anyone. A connection I just made to
https://www.google.com/ came out as, TLS 1.2, RC4_128, SHA1,
On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 5:34 PM, The Doctor dr...@virtadpt.net wrote:
Symmetric cipher RC4 (weak 10/49)
Symmetric key length 128 bits (weak 8/19)
Cert issued by Google, Inc, US SHA-1 with RSA @ 2048 bit (MODERATE 2/6)
First time I've heard of 128-bit symmetric called weak... Sure, RC4
isn't
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On 09/06/2013 09:02 PM, Chris Palmer wrote:
First time I've heard of 128-bit symmetric called weak... Sure,
RC4 isn't awesome but they seem to be saying that 128-bit keys per
se are weak.
calomel.org may be erring on the side of weak due to known
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