Re: [Cryptography] Traffic Analysis (was Re: PRISM PROOF Email)

2013-08-27 Thread Wendy M. Grossman
On 08/27/2013 01:17, Perry E. Metzger wrote: On Mon, 26 Aug 2013 17:39:16 -0400 The Doctor dr...@virtadpt.net wrote: On 08/26/2013 09:26 AM, Perry E. Metzger wrote: Mix networks are, however, a well technique. Onion networks, which are related, are widely deployed right now in the form of

Re: [Cryptography] Traffic Analysis (was Re: PRISM PROOF Email)

2013-08-26 Thread Perry E. Metzger
On Sun, 25 Aug 2013 23:40:35 -0400 Phillip Hallam-Baker hal...@gmail.com wrote: There has to be a layered approach. Traffic analysis is probably going to demand steganography and that is almost by definition outside standards work. I'm unaware of anyone who has seriously proposed

[Cryptography] Traffic Analysis (was Re: PRISM PROOF Email)

2013-08-25 Thread Perry E. Metzger
On Fri, 23 Aug 2013 09:38:21 -0700 Carl Ellison c...@acm.org wrote: Meanwhile PRISM was more about metadata than content, right? How are we going to prevent traffic analysis worldwide? The best technology for that is mix networks. At one point, early in the cypherpunks era, mix networks were

Re: [Cryptography] Traffic Analysis (was Re: PRISM PROOF Email)

2013-08-25 Thread Phillip Hallam-Baker
There has to be a layered approach. Traffic analysis is probably going to demand steganography and that is almost by definition outside standards work. The part of Prism that I consider to be blatantly unconstitutional is that they keep all the emails so that they can search them years later