On 09/11/2013 12:54 PM, Alan Braggins wrote:
On 10/09/13 15:58, james hughes wrote:
On Sep 9, 2013, at 9:10 PM, Tony Arcieri basc...@gmail.com
mailto:basc...@gmail.com wrote:
On Mon, Sep 9, 2013 at 9:29 AM, Ben Laurie b...@links.org
mailto:b...@links.org wrote:
And the brief summary is:
On 9 September 2013 22:49, Stephen Farrell stephen.farr...@cs.tcd.iewrote:
Hi Ben,
On 09/09/2013 05:29 PM, Ben Laurie wrote:
Perry asked me to summarise the status of TLS a while back ... luckily I
don't have to because someone else has:
On 09/10/2013 02:01 PM, Ben Laurie wrote:
Claiming that all the rest are no good also seems overblown, if
that's what you meant.
Other than minor variations on the above, all the other ciphersuites have
problems - known attacks, unreviewed ciphers, etc.
There are issues, sure. And way
Hi Hanno,
Please send any comments on this draft to the TLS Working Group mailing
list, t...@ietf.org.
Thanks,
Yaron
On 09/10/2013 12:14 AM, Hanno Böck wrote:
On Mon, 9 Sep 2013 17:29:24 +0100
Ben Laurie b...@links.org wrote:
Perry asked me to summarise the status of TLS a while
On Mon, Sep 9, 2013 at 9:29 AM, Ben Laurie b...@links.org wrote:
And the brief summary is: there's only one ciphersuite left that's good,
and unfortunately its only available in TLS 1.2:
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
A lot of people don't like GCM either ;) So we're screwed!
Well,
On 10 September 2013 03:59, james hughes hugh...@mac.com wrote:
On Sep 9, 2013, at 2:49 PM, Stephen Farrell stephen.farr...@cs.tcd.ie
wrote:
On 09/09/2013 05:29 PM, Ben Laurie wrote:
Perry asked me to summarise the status of TLS a while back ... luckily I
don't have to because someone
On 10/09/13 14:03, Ben Laurie wrote:
On 10 September 2013 03:59, james hughes hugh...@mac.com
mailto:hugh...@mac.com wrote:
[...]
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
I retract my previous +1 for this ciphersuite. This is hard coded
1024 DHE and 1024bit RSA.
It is not hard coded
On Sep 9, 2013, at 9:10 PM, Tony Arcieri basc...@gmail.com wrote:
On Mon, Sep 9, 2013 at 9:29 AM, Ben Laurie b...@links.org wrote:
And the brief summary is: there's only one ciphersuite left that's good, and
unfortunately its only available in TLS 1.2:
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
Perry asked me to summarise the status of TLS a while back ... luckily I
don't have to because someone else has:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-00
In short, I agree with that draft. And the brief summary is: there's only
one ciphersuite left that's good, and unfortunately its
On Mon, 9 Sep 2013 17:29:24 +0100
Ben Laurie b...@links.org wrote:
Perry asked me to summarise the status of TLS a while back ...
luckily I don't have to because someone else has:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-00
In short, I agree with that draft. And the brief summary
On Sep 9, 2013, at 9:29 AM, Ben Laurie b...@links.org wrote:
Perry asked me to summarise the status of TLS a while back ... luckily I
don't have to because someone else has:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-00
In short, I agree with that draft. And the brief summary is:
Hi Ben,
On 09/09/2013 05:29 PM, Ben Laurie wrote:
Perry asked me to summarise the status of TLS a while back ... luckily I
don't have to because someone else has:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-00
In short, I agree with that draft. And the brief summary is: there's only
On Sep 9, 2013, at 2:49 PM, Stephen Farrell stephen.farr...@cs.tcd.ie wrote:
On 09/09/2013 05:29 PM, Ben Laurie wrote:
Perry asked me to summarise the status of TLS a while back ... luckily I
don't have to because someone else has:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-00
In
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