Re: Entropy and PRNGs

2005-01-26 Thread John Denker
Ed Gerck wrote: Let me comment, John, that thermal noise is not random When did you figure that out? If you'd been paying attention, you'd know that I figured that out a long time ago. First of all, the phrase not random is ambiguous. I said Some people think random should denote 100% entropy

Re: Entropy and PRNGs

2005-01-11 Thread Ed Gerck
John Denker wrote: For the sources of entropy that I consider real entropy, such as thermal noise, for a modest payoff I'd be willing to bet my life -- and also the lives of millions of innocent people -- on the proposition that no adversary, no matter how far in the future and no matter how

Re: Entropy and PRNGs

2005-01-10 Thread John Denker
Referring to http://www.apache-ssl.org/randomness.pdf I wrote: I just took a look at the first couple of pages. IMHO it has much room for improvement. David Wagner responded: I guess I have to take exception. I disagree. I think Ben Laurie's paper is quite good. I thought your criticisms missed

Re: Entropy and PRNGs

2005-01-10 Thread John Denker
Ben Laurie wrote: The point I am trying to make is that predictability is in the eye of the beholder. I think it is unpredictable, my attacker does not. I still cannot see how that can happen to anyone unless they're being willfully stupid. It's like something out of Mad Magazine: White Spy

Re: Entropy and PRNGs

2005-01-10 Thread John Kelsey
From: John Denker [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Jan 10, 2005 12:21 AM To: David Wagner [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com Subject: Re: Entropy and PRNGs Conditioned on everything known to the attacker, of course. Well, of course indeed! That notion of entropy -- the entropy

Re: Entropy and PRNGs

2005-01-10 Thread John Denker
John Kelsey wrote: If your attacker (who lives sometime in the future, and may have a large budget besides) comes up with a better model to describe the process you're using as a source of noise, you could be out of luck. The thing that matters is H(X| all information available to the attacker),

Entropy and PRNGs

2005-01-10 Thread David Wagner
John Denker writes: Well, of course indeed! That notion of entropy -- the entropy in the adversary's frame of reference -- is precisely the notion that is appropriate to any adversarial situation, as I have consistently and clearly stated in my writings; [...] There is only one entropy that

Entropy and PRNGs

2005-01-09 Thread David Wagner
John Denker writes: Ben Laurie wrote: http://www.apache-ssl.org/randomness.pdf I just took a look at the first couple of pages. IMHO it has much room for improvement. I guess I have to take exception. I disagree. I think Ben Laurie's paper is quite good. I thought your criticisms missed some

Entropy and PRNGs

2005-01-07 Thread Ben Laurie
Given recent discussion, this is perhaps a good moment to point at a paper I wrote a while back on PRNGs for Dr. Dobbs, where, I'll bet, most of you didn't read it. http://www.apache-ssl.org/randomness.pdf One day, I plan to implement the API I describe there. Cheers, Ben. --