NSA history

2008-11-14 Thread Charles Jackson
Here's a pointer to the new release

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB260/index.htm  

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unintended?

2008-11-14 Thread bmanning
(snicker)  from the local firefox


en-us.add-ons.mozilla.com:443 uses an invalid security certificate.

The certificate is not trusted because the issuer certificate is not trusted.

(Error code: sec_error_untrusted_issuer)




--bill

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WSJ Story on NSA history

2008-11-14 Thread Charles Jackson
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122660908325125509.html 

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Re: Bitcoin P2P e-cash paper

2008-11-14 Thread Satoshi Nakamoto
Hal Finney wrote:
 I think it is necessary that nodes keep a separate 
 pending-transaction list associated with each candidate chain. 
 ... One might also ask ... how many candidate chains must 
 a given node keep track of at one time, on average?

Fortunately, it's only necessary to keep a pending-transaction pool for the 
current best branch.  When a new block arrives for the best branch, 
ConnectBlock removes the block's transactions from the pending-tx pool.  If a 
different branch becomes longer, it calls DisconnectBlock on the main branch 
down to the fork, returning the block transactions to the pending-tx pool, and 
calls ConnectBlock on the new branch, sopping back up any transactions that 
were in both branches.  It's expected that reorgs like this would be rare and 
shallow.

With this optimisation, candidate branches are not really any burden.  They 
just sit on the disk and don't require attention unless they ever become the 
main chain.


 Or as James raised earlier, if the network broadcast 
 is reliable but depends on a potentially slow flooding 
 algorithm, how does that impact performance?

Broadcasts will probably be almost completely reliable.  TCP transmissions are 
rarely ever dropped these days, and the broadcast protocol has a retry 
mechanism to get the data from other nodes after a while.  If broadcasts turn 
out to be slower in practice than expected, the target time between blocks may 
have to be increased to avoid wasting resources.  We want blocks to usually 
propagate in much less time than it takes to generate them, otherwise nodes 
would spend too much time working on obsolete blocks.

I'm planning to run an automated test with computers randomly sending payments 
to each other and randomly dropping packets.


 3. The bitcoin system turns out to be socially useful and valuable, so
 that node operators feel that they are making a beneficial contribution
 to the world by their efforts (similar to the various @Home compute
 projects where people volunteer their compute resources for good causes).
 
 In this case it seems to me that simple altruism can suffice to keep the
 network running properly.

It's very attractive to the libertarian viewpoint if we can explain it 
properly.  I'm better with code than with words though.

Satoshi Nakamoto

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Re: unintended?

2008-11-14 Thread Chad Perrin
On Fri, Nov 14, 2008 at 01:26:29PM +, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 (snicker)  from the local firefox
 
 
 en-us.add-ons.mozilla.com:443 uses an invalid security certificate.
 
 The certificate is not trusted because the issuer certificate is not trusted.
 
 (Error code: sec_error_untrusted_issuer)

What does Perspectives have to say?

What installation of Firefox did you use?

I don't have that problem when I visit:
  https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/

Do you perhaps have some kind of malicious redirection going on there?

-- 
Chad Perrin [ content licensed PDL: http://pdl.apotheon.org ]
John Kenneth Galbraith: If all else fails, immortality can always be
assured through spectacular error.


pgpmgpO99DbkE.pgp
Description: PGP signature


Re: voting by m of n digital signature?

2008-11-14 Thread Florian Weimer
* James A. Donald:

 Is there a way of constructing a digital signature so
 that the signature proves that at least m possessors of
 secret keys corresponding to n public keys signed, for n
 a dozen or less, without revealing how many more than m,
 or which ones signed?

What about this?

  Christian Cachin, Asad Samar
  Secure Distributed DNS
  http://www.zurich.ibm.com/security/dti/#dnsrepl

Or do you require that potential signers must not be able to prove
that they signed?

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