Re: EDP (entropy distribution protocol), userland PRNG design

2006-02-08 Thread Eric Rescorla
Travis H. [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: On 2/4/06, Eric Rescorla [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Look, this design just reduces to a standard cryptographic PRNG with some of the seed being random and periodically being reseeded by the random network stream you're sending around. There's no need to

Re: EDP (entropy distribution protocol), userland PRNG design

2006-02-08 Thread Bill Stewart
At 01:01 AM 2/4/2006, Travis H. wrote: Assume further that it is not cost-effective to furnish each with a HWRNG, even one as inexpensive as a sound card (for example, they may not have a spare slot on the motherboard nor built-in sound). ... Suppose that /dev/random is too slow (SHA-1 was never

Re: thoughts on one time pads

2006-02-08 Thread Travis H.
If anyone is interested in participating in the design of a system that could be used for manual key distribution and/or OTP purposes, email me. I figure we can talk about our special cases off-list, and maybe submit the final design to the list for people to take their best crack at it. --

Re: serious threat models

2006-02-08 Thread Peter Gutmann
Steven M. Bellovin [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: What makes this interesting is how it was done: software was installed on the switch that diverted calls to a prepaid phone. Think about who could manage that. Just in case people think the answer is The MIB, it's actually Any kid with a bit of

Re: Hiding data on 3.5 using 40 track mode

2006-02-08 Thread Ben Laurie
Dave Howe wrote: Oh - before I forget, I was thinking about covert channels and cds a few days ago and realised there is already one - CDs support a special mode called CD+G - this is used making karaoke cds to support the video data stream; the vast majority of pc drives cannot read

Re: methods of filling encrypted disks

2006-02-08 Thread Ben Laurie
Travis H. wrote: So on this page: http://www.saout.de/tikiwiki/tiki-index.php?page=EncryptedDevice there is a suggestion that people fill the encrypted image of a dm-crypt target with random data. Why? I assume this is because making the filesystem on the unencrypted (upper) layer will

PQCrypto: Registration Open

2006-02-08 Thread Christopher Wolf
Will large quantum computers be built? If so, what will they do to the cryptographic landscape? Anyone who can build a large quantum computer can break today's most popular public-key cryptosystems: e.g., RSA, DSA, and ECDSA. But there are several other cryptosystems that are conjectured to

general defensive crypto coding principles

2006-02-08 Thread Travis H.
Hey, In Practical Cryptography, Schneier mentions a couple of general principles that he thinks wise when writing code which uses or implements cryptographic routines. Bear with me as I try to remember them: 1) When using a user input, run it through a OWF first. NB: This is a possible DoS

square roots modulo a prime p

2006-02-08 Thread Alexander Klimov
Hi. I have checked several papers and software packages which implement modular square root and it looks like there is no agreement about what algorithm is the best except that everybody does the same for p=3(4). Chapter 3 of HAC suggests special algorithms for p=3(4) and p=5(8); a general

Find me a hash

2006-02-08 Thread Harald Hanche-Olsen
Susan Landau has an article in the upcoming March issue of Notices of the AMS: Find me a hash. There is a short preview of the article here: http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2006-02/ams-dsa020106.php it even includes a non-public (whatever that means) link to the paper itself:

Re: general defensive crypto coding principles

2006-02-08 Thread Sidney Markowitz
Simon Josefsson wrote: Travis H. [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: ... 3) Authenticate the plaintext, not the ciphertext. This is a general [...] I wonder whether this is really a good suggestion, considering Krawczyk's paper that show that this construct is not generically secure. See