I've seen this quite some time in the past, it wasn't for public
disclosure. Periodically I've looked for a copy on the internet.
This is from Strech Inc., their Software Configurable Processor.
http://www.pdcl.eng.wayne.edu/msp6/MSP6_Workshop_Keynote_2004_POSTING.pdf
The stuff on DES
Werner Koch wrote:
On Sat, 11 Feb 2006 12:36:52 +0100, Simon Josefsson said:
1) It invoke exit, as you have noticed. While this only happen
in extreme and fatal situations, and not during runtime,
it is not that serious. Yet, I agree it is poor design to
do this in a
Victor Duchovni wrote:
On Fri, Feb 10, 2006 at 07:49:59PM +, Ben Laurie wrote:
Secondly, obviously, you can only decrypt SSL if you have the private
key, so presumably this is referring only to incoming SSL connections.
And only if EDH (or more generally all PFS) ciphers are disabled.
Travis H. wrote:
On 2/8/06, Jack Lloyd [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
An obvious example occurs when using a
deterministic authentication scheme like HMAC - an attacker can with high
probability detect duplicate plaintexts by looking for identical tags.
I think though that the solution is fairly
On Sun, 12 Feb 2006 13:46:05 -0500, John Denker said:
That is a remarkably unprofessional suggestion. I hope the people
who write software for autopilots, pacemakers, antilock brakes,
etc. do not follow this suggestion.
Thus my remark about a independend failsafe system.
I strongly hope
Werner Koch wrote:
On Sat, 11 Feb 2006 12:36:52 +0100, Simon Josefsson said:
1) It invoke exit, as you have noticed. While this only happen
in extreme and fatal situations, and not during runtime,
it is not that serious. Yet, I agree it is poor design to
do this in a
At 5:40 PM + 2/12/06, Ben Laurie wrote:
It also defends against the MD5 crack, and is one of the recommended
IETF solutions to hash problems.
s/recommended/proposed/
The IETF has not recommended any solutions to hash problems. The
sense of the room at the Hash BOF and the SAAG discussion