A processor that can do a DES round in 1 clock

2006-02-12 Thread David G. Koontz
I've seen this quite some time in the past, it wasn't for public disclosure. Periodically I've looked for a copy on the internet. This is from Strech Inc., their Software Configurable Processor. http://www.pdcl.eng.wayne.edu/msp6/MSP6_Workshop_Keynote_2004_POSTING.pdf The stuff on DES

Re: GnuTLS (libgrypt really) and Postfix

2006-02-12 Thread Ben Laurie
Werner Koch wrote: On Sat, 11 Feb 2006 12:36:52 +0100, Simon Josefsson said: 1) It invoke exit, as you have noticed. While this only happen in extreme and fatal situations, and not during runtime, it is not that serious. Yet, I agree it is poor design to do this in a

Re: Nonrepudiation - in some sense

2006-02-12 Thread Ben Laurie
Victor Duchovni wrote: On Fri, Feb 10, 2006 at 07:49:59PM +, Ben Laurie wrote: Secondly, obviously, you can only decrypt SSL if you have the private key, so presumably this is referring only to incoming SSL connections. And only if EDH (or more generally all PFS) ciphers are disabled.

Re: general defensive crypto coding principles

2006-02-12 Thread Ben Laurie
Travis H. wrote: On 2/8/06, Jack Lloyd [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: An obvious example occurs when using a deterministic authentication scheme like HMAC - an attacker can with high probability detect duplicate plaintexts by looking for identical tags. I think though that the solution is fairly

Re: GnuTLS (libgrypt really) and Postfix

2006-02-12 Thread Werner Koch
On Sun, 12 Feb 2006 13:46:05 -0500, John Denker said: That is a remarkably unprofessional suggestion. I hope the people who write software for autopilots, pacemakers, antilock brakes, etc. do not follow this suggestion. Thus my remark about a independend failsafe system. I strongly hope

Re: GnuTLS (libgrypt really) and Postfix

2006-02-12 Thread Dave Korn
Werner Koch wrote: On Sat, 11 Feb 2006 12:36:52 +0100, Simon Josefsson said: 1) It invoke exit, as you have noticed. While this only happen in extreme and fatal situations, and not during runtime, it is not that serious. Yet, I agree it is poor design to do this in a

Re: general defensive crypto coding principles

2006-02-12 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 5:40 PM + 2/12/06, Ben Laurie wrote: It also defends against the MD5 crack, and is one of the recommended IETF solutions to hash problems. s/recommended/proposed/ The IETF has not recommended any solutions to hash problems. The sense of the room at the Hash BOF and the SAAG discussion