Paul Hoffman wrote:
At 5:40 PM + 2/12/06, Ben Laurie wrote:
It also defends against the MD5 crack, and is one of the recommended
IETF solutions to hash problems.
s/recommended/proposed/
The IETF has not recommended any solutions to hash problems. The sense
of the room at the Hash BOF
John Denker [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Werner Koch retorted:
I disagree strongly here. Any code which detects an impossible state
or an error clearly due to a programming error by the caller should
die as soon as possible.
That is a remarkably unprofessional suggestion. I hope the people
David Wagner wrote:
This just shows the dangers of over-generalization.
One could make an even stronger statement about the dangers of
making assumptions that are not provably correct.
Of course, we have to decide which is more important: integrity,
or availability.
That is a false
Werner Koch [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
On Sat, 11 Feb 2006 12:36:52 +0100, Simon Josefsson said:
1) It invoke exit, as you have noticed. While this only happen
in extreme and fatal situations, and not during runtime,
it is not that serious. Yet, I agree it is poor design to
Jack Lloyd [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
On Fri, Feb 10, 2006 at 07:21:05PM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote:
Well, that's the exact problem that I pointed out in my previous message - in
order to get this right, people have to read the mind of the paper author to
divine their intent. Since the
