[Some interesting thinking going on. Wasn't there some similar ideas
presented/published at a past FC conference?]
Subject: [gsc] Digital cache with extended features
Date: Sun, 06 May 2007 12:57:08 +0300
From: George Hara [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
It
Phil Zimmermann is going in tonight (7 May) for heart bypass surgery.
He's not in immediate danger -- he's not having a heart attack, he's
not no in immediate danger, but they're pushing him into the hospital
quicker than any reasonable person would like. Obviously, that makes
for worries.
From: Shu-jen Chang [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Public comments on the hash algorithm requirements and
evaluation criteria posted online Date: Tue, 08 May 2007 12:13:58 -0400
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 5.1.1
FYI
Public comments on the hash algorithm
Well, there's an idea: use different physical media formats for
entertainment and non-entertainment content (meaning, content created by
MPAA members vs. not) and don't sell writable media nor devices capable
of writing it for the former, not to the public, keeping very tight
controls on the
*
IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics 2007
May 23-24, 2007
Hyatt Hotel
New Brunswick, New Jersey
** DEADLINE FOR EARLY REGISTRATION IS ALMOST HERE **
Hosted by:
On Fri, Apr 27, 2007 at 05:13:44PM -0400, Leichter, Jerry wrote:
Frankly, for SSH this isn't a very plausible attack, since it's not
clear how you could force chosen plaintext into an SSH session between
messages. A later paper suggested that SSL is more vulnerable:
A browser plugin can
On Wed, May 02, 2007 at 09:29:39AM -0600, Anne Lynn Wheeler wrote:
where there is possibly the suggestion that if the only thing being
performed
is authentication (and doesn't require either integrity and/or privacy) ...
then possibly a totally different protocol by utilized (rather than
I was recently asked why not just deploy a Enterprise Right Management
solution instead of using various encryption tools to prevent data
leaks.
Any thoughts?
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Travis H. wrote:
This reminds me a bit of a suggestion I once heard for protocol
designers that the messages of the various steps of the protocol
include a step number or something like it to prevent cut-and-paste
attacks (presumably each message has some redundancy to protect the
On May 8, 2007, at 10:16 AM, Ali, Saqib wrote:
I was recently asked why not just deploy a Enterprise Right Management
solution instead of using various encryption tools to prevent data
leaks.
Any thoughts?
What problem are you trying to solve?
If you're dealing with a rights-management
On Wed, 9 May 2007 15:35:44 -0400
Thor Lancelot Simon [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Wed, May 09, 2007 at 01:13:36AM -0500, Travis H. wrote:
On Fri, Apr 27, 2007 at 05:13:44PM -0400, Leichter, Jerry wrote:
Frankly, for SSH this isn't a very plausible attack, since it's
not clear how you
| Frankly, for SSH this isn't a very plausible attack, since it's not
| clear how you could force chosen plaintext into an SSH session between
| messages. A later paper suggested that SSL is more vulnerable:
| A browser plugin can insert data into an SSL protected session, so
| might be
| Frankly, for SSH this isn't a very plausible attack, since it's not
| clear how you could force chosen plaintext into an SSH session between
| messages. A later paper suggested that SSL is more vulnerable:
| A browser plugin can insert data into an SSL protected session, so
| might be able
On Thu, May 03, 2007 at 07:57:18PM +1000, James A. Donald wrote:
Assume Ann's secret key is a, and her public key is A = G^a mod P
Assume Bob's secret key is b, and his public key is B = G^b mod P
Bob wants to send Ann a message.
Bob generates a secret random number x, and sends Ann X =
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