James A. Donald wrote:
This attack does not require the certifier to be
compromised.
You are referring to a different page (that I did not reference).
Never-the-less, both attacks require the certifier to be compromised!
The attack was to generate a multitude of predictions
for the US
Weger, B.M.M. de wrote:
The parlor trick demonstrates a weakness of the pdf format, not MD5.
I disagree. We could just as easy have put the collision blocks
in visible images.
Parlor trick.
... We could just as easy have used MS Word
documents, or any document format in which there is some
Hi William,
... We say so on
the website. We did show this hiding of collisions for other data
formats, such as X.509 certificates
More interesting. Where on your web site? I've long abhorred the
X.509 format, and was a supporter of a more clean alternative.
See