Re: very high speed hardware RNG

2008-12-30 Thread Jerry Leichter
On Dec 28, 2008, at 8:12 PM, Perry E. Metzger wrote: Semiconductor laser based RNG with rates in the gigabits per second. http://www.physorg.com/news148660964.html My take: neat, but not as important as simply including a decent hardware RNG (even a slow one) in all PC chipsets would be.

Re: very high speed hardware RNG

2008-12-30 Thread Jack Lloyd
On Sun, Dec 28, 2008 at 08:12:09PM -0500, Perry E. Metzger wrote: Semiconductor laser based RNG with rates in the gigabits per second. http://www.physorg.com/news148660964.html My take: neat, but not as important as simply including a decent hardware RNG (even a slow one) in all PC

Re: Security by asking the drunk whether he's drunk

2008-12-30 Thread Peter Gutmann
David Molnar dmol...@eecs.berkeley.edu writes: Service from a group at CMU that uses semi-trusted notary servers to periodically probe a web site to see which public key it uses. The notaries provide the list of keys used to you, so you can attempt to detect things like a site that has a

Re: Security by asking the drunk whether he's drunk

2008-12-30 Thread Ben Laurie
On Mon, Dec 29, 2008 at 10:10 AM, Peter Gutmann pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote: David Molnar dmol...@eecs.berkeley.edu writes: Service from a group at CMU that uses semi-trusted notary servers to periodically probe a web site to see which public key it uses. The notaries provide the list of

Re: Security by asking the drunk whether he's drunk

2008-12-30 Thread Peter Gutmann
Ben Laurie b...@google.com writes: what happens when the cert rolls? If the key also changes (which would seem to me to be good practice), then the site looks suspect for a while. I'm not aware of any absolute figures for this but there's a lot of anecdotal evidence that many cert renewals just

Re: Security by asking the drunk whether he's drunk

2008-12-30 Thread Ben Laurie
On Tue, Dec 30, 2008 at 4:25 AM, Peter Gutmann pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote: Ben Laurie b...@google.com writes: what happens when the cert rolls? If the key also changes (which would seem to me to be good practice), then the site looks suspect for a while. I'm not aware of any absolute

FBI code-cracking contest

2008-12-30 Thread Steven M. Bellovin
http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/36704 --Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to majord...@metzdowd.com

Short announcement: MD5 considered harmful today - Creating a rogue CA certificate

2008-12-30 Thread Weger, B.M.M. de
Hi all, Today, 30 December 2008, at the 25th Annual Chaos Communication Congress in Berlin, we announced that we are currently in possession of a rogue Certification Authority certificate. This certificate will be accepted as valid and trusted by all common browsers, because it appears to be

Fw: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue CA certificate

2008-12-30 Thread Steven M. Bellovin
Begin forwarded message: Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2008 11:05:28 -0500 From: Russ Housley hous...@vigilsec.com To: ietf-p...@imc.org, ietf-sm...@imc.org, s...@ietf.org, c...@irtf.org Subject: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue CA certificate http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/ MD5

MD5 considered harmful today

2008-12-30 Thread Jacob Appelbaum
Hello, I wanted to chime in more during the previous x509 discussions but I was delayed by some research. I thought that I'd like to chime in that this new research about attacking x509 is now released. We gave a talk about it at the 25c3 about an hour or two ago. MD5 considered harmful today:

Re: very high speed hardware RNG

2008-12-30 Thread Jack Lloyd
On Tue, Dec 30, 2008 at 11:45:27AM -0500, Steven M. Bellovin wrote: Of course, every time a manufacturer has tried it, assorted people (including many on this list) complain that it's been sabotaged by the NSA or by alien space bats or some such. Well, maybe it has. Or maybe it was just not

Researchers Show How to Forge Site Certificates |

2008-12-30 Thread David G. Koontz
http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/researchers-show-how-forge-site-certificates By Ed Felten - Posted on December 30th, 2008 at 11:18 am Today at the Chaos Computing Congress, a group of researchers (Alex Sotirov, Marc Stevens, Jake Appelbaum, Arjen Lenstra, Benne de Weger, and David

Researchers Use PlayStation Cluster to Forge a Web Skeleton Key

2008-12-30 Thread David G. Koontz
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/12/berlin.html More coverage on the MD5 collisions. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to majord...@metzdowd.com

Steve Bellovin on the MD5 Collision attacks, more on Wired

2008-12-30 Thread David G. Koontz
http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/blog//2008-12/2008-12-30.html Steve mentions the social pressures involved in disclosing the vulnerability: Verisign, in particular, appears to have been caught short. One of the CAs they operate still uses MD5. They said: The RapidSSL certificates are

Re: MD5 considered harmful today

2008-12-30 Thread Hal Finney
Re: http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/ Key facts: - 6 CAs were found still using MD5 in 2008: RapidSSL, FreeSSL, TC TrustCenter AG, RSA Data Security, Thawte, verisign.co.jp. Out of the 30,000 certificates we collected, about 9,000 were signed using MD5, and 97% of those were