On Aug 6, 2009, at 1:52 AM, Ben Laurie wrote:
Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote:
I don't think there is any basis to the claims that Cleversafe makes
that their erasure-coding (Information Dispersal)-based system is
fundamentally safer, e.g. these claims from [3]: a malicious party
cannot recreate
Thomas Hardjono wrote:
Having worked at a large CA for along time (trying to push for client-side
certs with little luck), here are some thoughts on what Chrome could provide:
There are use cases where a centralized authority is useful.
Client side is not one of them.
Typical usage is is
[dropping tahoe-dev from Cc:]
On Thursday,2009-08-06, at 2:52 , Ben Laurie wrote:
Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote:
I don't think there is any basis to the claims that Cleversafe
makes that their erasure-coding (Information Dispersal)-based
system is fundamentally safer
...
Surely this is
Just about all notebooks shipped in the last 5 years or more contain a
helpful bit of code in the BIOS that allows for remote tracing in case
of theft. Unfortunately, it's got serious security holes, allowing it
to be used for much more nefarious purposes - like rootkits that
survive disk
[dropped tahoe-dev from Cc:]
On Thursday,2009-08-06, at 17:08 , james hughes wrote:
Until you reach the threshold, you do not have the information to
attack. It becomes information theoretic secure.
This is true for information-theoretically secure secret sharing, but
not true for
3. Cleversafe should really tone down the Fear Uncertainty and
Doubt about today's encryption being mincemeat for tomorrow's
cryptanalysts. It might turn out to be true, but if so it will be
due to cryptanalytic innovations more than due to Moore's Law. And
it might not turn out like
