On Tue, 27 Aug 2013 23:39:51 -0400 Jerry Leichter leich...@lrw.com
wrote:
It's not as if this isn't a design we have that we know works:
DNS.
As I said elsewhere: as a practical matter, almost no one using email
is a DNS administrator. This therefore cannot possibly deploy in
finite time for
First of all, I think systems that make people associate arbitrary
long strings with someone's email address aren't really acceptable.
I'll repeat that my model is give someone your email address on a
napkin in a bar. I do things like this often enough right now.
On Wed, 28 Aug 2013 06:41:27
On Tue, 27 Aug 2013 23:52:23 -0400 Jerry Leichter leich...@lrw.com
wrote:
But none of that matters much any more. Publication is usually
on-line, so contact addresses can be arbitrary links. When we meet
in person, we can exchange large numbers of bits between our
smartphones. Hell, even a
On 28/08/13 02:44 AM, radi...@gmail.com wrote:
Zooko's triangle, pet names...we have cracked the THEORY of secure naming, just
not the big obstacle of key exchange.
Perhaps in a sense of that, I can confirm that we may have an elegant
theory but practice still eludes us. I'm working with a
On 27/08/13 at 10:05pm, Christian Huitema wrote:
Suppose, as in Bitcoin, my email address *is* my public key
You can even use some hash compression tricks so you only need 9 or 10
characters to express the address as hash of the public key.
That works very well, until you have to change
On Aug 28, 2013, at 4:24 AM, danimoth wrote:
On 27/08/13 at 10:05pm, Christian Huitema wrote:
Suppose, as in Bitcoin, my email address *is* my public key
You can even use some hash compression tricks so you only need 9 or 10
characters to express the address as hash of the public key.
On Wed, 28 Aug 2013 10:24:43 -0400 Jerry Leichter leich...@lrw.com
wrote:
I wouldn't know how to trust publication online in the first
place.
In exactly the same way you trust paper publications that contain
today's style of addresses.
But I don't. As I said, I typically get a friend or
There is still a need for a distributed
database to handle the lookup load, though, and one that is not the
DNS.
What do you think of namecoin?
—♯ƒ • François-René ÐVB Rideau •ReflectionCybernethics• http://fare.tunes.org
Truth comes as conqueror only to those who have lost the art of
My target audience, like Perry's is people who simply can't cope with anything
more complex than an email address. For me secure mail has to look feel and
smell exactly the same as current mail. The only difference being that sometime
the secure mailer will say 'I can't contact that person
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
This is exactly the problem that Kim Cameron and I tried to solve by developing
what we called call signs. The idea is to compress the hash of the public by
solving a puzzle: find the arbitrary salt so that the hash of the salt and
the public key
A different take on the problem: Would something built around identify-based
encryption help here? It sounds very tempting: My email address (or any other
string - say a bitmap of a picture of me) *is* my public key. The problem is
that it requires a central server that implicitly has
On Aug 28, 2013, at 8:34 AM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
On Tue, 27 Aug 2013 23:39:51 -0400 Jerry Leichter leich...@lrw.com
wrote:
It's not as if this isn't a design we have that we know works:
DNS.
Read what I said: There's a *design* that works.
I never suggested *using DNS* - either its
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On 08/27/2013 09:47 PM, Jonathan Thornburg wrote:
Assuming it were widely deployed, would
DNSSEC-for-key-distribution be a reasonable way to store
email_address -- public_key mappings?
It might be a reasonable way of protecting PGP key
On Wed, 28 Aug 2013, Jerry Leichter wrote:
On the underlying matter of changing my public key: *Why* would I have
to change it? It's not, as today, because I've changed my ISP or employer
or some other random bit of routing information - presumably it's because
my public key has been
On Wed, 28 Aug 2013, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Anyway, I've already started implementing my proposed solution to that
part of the problem. There is still a need for a distributed database to
handle the lookup load, though, and one that is not the DNS.
(Delurking)
This suggests the use of
On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 5:33 AM, ianG i...@iang.org wrote:
Yes. I was never scared of the NSA. But the NSA and the FBI and the DEA
and every local police force ... that's terrifying. That's a purer
essence of
terror, far worse than terrorism. We need a new word.
It's a boot stamping on a
(This is the last week before school goes back which is stopping me getting to
the big iron and my coding platform if folk are wondering where the code is).
I had a discussion with some IETF types. Should I suggest a BOF in Vancouver?
Maybe this is an IRTF effort rather than IETF. One thing
On Aug 28, 2013, at 11:18 AM, Dave Horsfall d...@horsfall.org wrote:
On Wed, 28 Aug 2013, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Anyway, I've already started implementing my proposed solution to that
part of the problem. There is still a need for a distributed database to
handle the lookup load,
On Aug 28, 2013, at 2:04 PM, Faré fah...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 4:15 PM, Phill hal...@gmail.com wrote:
My target audience, like Perry's is people who simply can't cope with
anything more complex than an email address. For me secure mail has to look
feel and smell exactly
On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 4:15 PM, Phill hal...@gmail.com wrote:
My target audience, like Perry's is people who simply can't cope with
anything more complex than an email address. For me secure mail has to look
feel and smell exactly the same as current mail. The only difference being
that
The source is up on sourceforge now. It does need some spring cleaning and
documenting which I hope to get to next week.
The documentation is in the following directory
https://sourceforge.net/p/jsonschema/code/ci/master/tree/Web/
The origins of this work is that about 70% of the effort in
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