Re: Formal notice given of rearrangement of deck chairs on RMS PKItanic

2010-10-07 Thread Peter Gutmann
Victor Duchovni victor.ducho...@morganstanley.com writes: What are EE certs, did you mean EV? End-entity certs, i.e. non-CA certs. This means that potentially after the end of this year and definitely after 2013 it will not be possible to use any key shorted than 2048 bits with Firefox.

Re: Formal notice given of rearrangement of deck chairs on RMS PKItanic

2010-10-07 Thread Peter Gutmann
Matt Crawford craw...@fnal.gov writes: EE = End Entity, but I don't read the first sentence the way Peter did. As I mentioned in my previous followup, it's badly worded, but the intent is to ban any keys 2K bits of any kind (currently with evolving weasel-words about letting CAs certify them

Formal notice given of rearrangement of deck chairs on RMS PKItanic

2010-10-06 Thread Peter Gutmann
From https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:MD5and1024: December 31, 2010 - CAs should stop issuing intermediate and end-entity certificates from roots with RSA key sizes smaller than 2048 bits [0]. All CAs should stop issuing intermediate and end-entity certificates with RSA key size smaller than

Re: Formal notice given of rearrangement of deck chairs on RMS PKItanic

2010-10-06 Thread Jack Lloyd
On Wed, Oct 06, 2010 at 04:52:46PM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote: Right, because the problem with commercial PKI is all those attackers who are factoring 1024-bit moduli, and apart from that every other bit of it works perfectly. _If_ Mozilla and the other browser vendors actually go through

Re: Formal notice given of rearrangement of deck chairs on RMS PKItanic

2010-10-06 Thread Victor Duchovni
On Wed, Oct 06, 2010 at 04:52:46PM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote: From https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:MD5and1024: December 31, 2010 - CAs should stop issuing intermediate and end-entity certificates from roots with RSA key sizes smaller than 2048 bits [0]. All CAs should stop issuing

Re: Formal notice given of rearrangement of deck chairs on RMS PKItanic

2010-10-06 Thread Matt Crawford
On Oct 6, 2010, at 10:48 AM, Victor Duchovni wrote: On Wed, Oct 06, 2010 at 04:52:46PM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote: From https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:MD5and1024: December 31, 2010 - CAs should stop issuing intermediate and end-entity certificates from roots with RSA key sizes smaller

Re: Formal notice given of rearrangement of deck chairs on RMS PKItanic

2010-10-06 Thread Simon Josefsson
Jack Lloyd ll...@randombit.net writes: On Wed, Oct 06, 2010 at 04:52:46PM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote: Right, because the problem with commercial PKI is all those attackers who are factoring 1024-bit moduli, and apart from that every other bit of it works perfectly. _If_ Mozilla and the

Re: Formal notice given of rearrangement of deck chairs on RMS PKItanic

2010-10-06 Thread Jonathan Thornburg
On Wed, 6 Oct 2010, Matt Crawford wrote: [[...]] I found it amusing that this message was accompanied by an S/MIME certificate which my mail client (alpine) was unable to verify, resulting in the error messages [Couldn't verify S/MIME signature: certificate verify error] [ This

Re: Formal notice given of rearrangement of deck chairs on RMS PKItanic

2010-10-06 Thread Thor Lancelot Simon
On Wed, Oct 06, 2010 at 01:32:00PM -0500, Matt Crawford wrote: That is, if your CA key size is smaller, stop signing with it. You may have missed the next sentence of Mozilla's statement: All CAs should stop issuing intermediate and end-entity certificates with RSA key size smaller than 2048