On 22/02/12 13:31 PM, Kevin W. Wall wrote:
So, let's bring this back to cryptography. I'm going to assume that
virtually all of you are a somewhat altruistic and are not in this game just
to make a boatload of money by keeping all the crypto knowledge
within the secret priesthood thereby
wow deja vu:
http://www.mail-archive.com/fde@www.xml-dev.com/msg00623.html
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If the users of bitcoin are primarily criminals, that is pretty much
what the founders intended. Every middle class man of affairs and
business commits three felonies a day.
The paper presupposes that criminals are such horrible people that
everything they touch turns to shit.
My
On Sat, Feb 25, 2012 at 05:08:44AM +1000, James A. Donald wrote:
If the users of bitcoin are primarily criminals, that is pretty much
what the founders intended. Every middle class man of affairs and
business commits three felonies a day.
The paper presupposes that criminals are such
On Sat, 25 Feb 2012 05:30:57 +1000
James A. Donald jam...@echeque.com wrote:
So: Don't talk to police about the contents of your drive, or indeed
anything of which they might potentially disapprove.
I believe that you meant to say, Don't talk to the police at all,
which should be standard
On 02/24/2012 01:49 PM, Thor Lancelot Simon wrote:
Is the major purpose of this mailing list really the discussion of
political and social theory? I thought I had subscribed to
cryptography@randombit.net, not I already spent four years doing
political science, thanks.
It is apparently
On Feb 24, 2012, at 11:49 AM, Thor Lancelot Simon wrote:
Is the major purpose of this mailing list really the discussion of
political and social theory? I thought I had subscribed to
cryptography@randombit.net, not I already spent four years doing
political science, thanks.
+1. Although it
On Feb 24, 2012, at 2:30 57PM, James A. Donald wrote:
Bottom line is that the suspect was OK because kept his mouth zippered,
neither admitting nor denying any knowledge of the encrypted partition.
Had he admitted control of the partition, *then* they would have been able to
compel
Truecrypt supports an inner and outer encrypted volume, encryption
hidden inside encryption, the intended usage being that you reveal the
outer encrypted volume, and refuse to admit the existence of the inner
hidden volume.
To summarize the judgment: Plausibile deniability, or even not very
On 2012-02-25 7:28 AM, Steven Bellovin wrote:
The first point, not addressed in your note but quite important to the ruling,
is that the key has to be something you know, not something you have. If the
keying material is on a smart card, you have to turn that over and you're not
protected.
On 2012-02-25 12:53 PM, ianG wrote:
It is also a singular lesson in the emotive power of cryptography to
encourage large numbers of people to hash their intelligent thought
processes. What we are seeing is otherwise rational people invest much
time effort into what amounts to a ponzi or
Surely the core of the ruling is that no one except the
defendant knows for sure whether the key exists, knows
whether there is an inner truecrypt volume or not. The cross
examination of the forensics witness focused on that point.
On 2012-02-25 1:25 PM, d...@geer.org wrote:
Then you'll find out about Santayana's curse - those that don't study
history are doomed to repeat it. For reference, start with read John
MacKay, _Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds_.
MacKay turns out not to be all that accurate.
The definitive work on financial
From: John Levine jo...@iecc.com
The definitive work on financial bubbles is Kindleberger's Manias,
Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises. Get the 2005 5th
edition, which was edited by Robert Solow after Kindleberger died.
I really shouldn't continue this OT thread any longer, but
On Feb 24, 2012, at 5:43 PM, James A. Donald wrote:
Truecrypt supports an inner and outer encrypted volume, encryption hidden
inside encryption, the intended usage being that you reveal the outer
encrypted volume, and refuse to admit the existence of the inner hidden
volume.
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