Re: [cryptography] NIST and other organisations that set up standards in information security cryptography. (was: Doubts over necessity of SHA-3 cryptography standard)

2012-04-22 Thread Marsh Ray
On 04/22/2012 12:37 PM, Steven Bellovin wrote: The question is not whether there should be a hash function significantly faster than SHA-3, it's whether or not anyone knows how to do it. NIST wanted to stick with that goal, but there weren't enough (possibly weren't any; I'm not sure)

Re: [cryptography] NIST and other organisations that set up standards in information security cryptography.

2012-04-22 Thread Marsh Ray
On 04/22/2012 02:55 PM, Jeffrey Walton wrote: This might sound crazy, but I would rather have a NIST approved hash that runs orders of magnitude slower to resist offline, brute forcing attacks. Well, that's what we have KDFs with a tunable work factor like PBKDF2 for. They're generally

Re: [cryptography] NIST and other organisations that set up standards in information security cryptography.

2012-04-22 Thread Jeffrey Walton
On Sun, Apr 22, 2012 at 4:54 AM, Marsh Ray ma...@extendedsubset.com wrote: On 04/22/2012 02:55 PM, Jeffrey Walton wrote: This might sound crazy, but I would rather have a NIST approved hash that runs orders of magnitude slower to resist offline, brute forcing attacks. Well, that's what we

Re: [cryptography] NIST and other organisations that set up standards in information security cryptography.

2012-04-22 Thread Marsh Ray
On 04/22/2012 05:07 PM, Jeffrey Walton wrote: Aren't programs generally written to be fast and take advantage of things like locality of reference? I'd like to see a design that complete violates the design principal. Iterations in a KDF would then be icing on the cake. STRONGER KEY DERIVATION

Re: [cryptography] NIST and other organisations that set up standards in information security cryptography.

2012-04-22 Thread Peter Maxwell
On Sun, Apr 22, 2012 at 4:54 AM, Marsh Ray ma...@extendedsubset.com wrote: On 04/22/2012 02:55 PM, Jeffrey Walton wrote: This might sound crazy, but I would rather have a NIST approved hash that runs orders of magnitude slower to resist offline, brute forcing attacks. Well,