On Jan 14, 2014, at 1:53 PM, cryptography-requ...@randombit.net wrote:
Does anyone really believe RSA is alone in this betrayal?
And that making an example of RSA will stop the industry practice
of forked-tonguedness about working both sides of the imaginary
fence of dual-use, dual-hat,
On Wed, Jan 1, 2014 at 3:56 AM, Ralph Holz h...@net.in.tum.de wrote:
Hi Jake,
Ian Grigg just made a point on metzdowd that I think is true: if you
want to change the NSA, you need to address the many corporates that
profit from what they are doing. Because the chain goes like this:
For reflection: What percent of domestic and global communications are
protected from the collection of plaintext or session information by AES?
Who has the capability and the desire to avoid going dark on that portion of
data flows? Is this an example of a high-value target for corruption? If
The Snowden revelations describe several methods by which NSA committed
kleptography, caused compliance by hardware makers and influenced standards.
Why has AES escaped general suspicion? Are we to believe that NIST tested,
selected, endorsed and promulgated an algorithm that was immune to
Jeffrey Walton wrote:
* Scan IM messages for dangerous content from people you don't know.
This means company will read (and possibly retain) some of your
messages to determine if some (or all) of the message is dangerous.
….
Give an choice, it seems like selection two is a good
Yes, it can be compressed to zero bits, and the decompression process will
generate two alternative outputs.
On Jun 19, 2012, at 8:06 AM, cryptography-requ...@randombit.net wrote:
From: Ben Laurie b...@links.org
To: Jon Callas j...@callas.org
Cc: Crypto List cryptography@randombit.net
Possibly like NSA warrantless hoovering (ex: the San Francisco splitter), this
mailman feature is not used to evil ends and is no worry.
Alternatively, privacy may be more vulnerable to simple user oversights than
short keys.
On Nov 28, 2011, at 9:27 PM, cryptography-requ...@randombit.net
