Re: [cryptography] the Zcash Open Source Miner Challenge (and about Zcash in general)

On Tue, Oct 11, 2016 at 03:34:33PM -, sten...@nymphet.paranoici.org wrote: > Zooko Wilcox-OHearn writes: > > > https://z.cash ... There's a lot going on there. ... Jump in! > > I want to jump in but I can't because z.cash has no mailing list. A > mailing list is

[cryptography] Timelock: time-release encryption incentivised by Bitcoins

Timelock Create a secret key that can be decrypted in a known amount of time using parallel-serial hash chains. The creator can compute the timelock in parallel, taking advantage of the large amount of cheap parallelism available today, while others are forced to compute it serially,

Re: [cryptography] pie in sky suites - long lived public key pairs for persistent identity

On Fri, Jan 03, 2014 at 11:42:47AM -0800, coderman wrote: use case is long term (decade+) identity rather than privacy or session authorization. eternity key signs working keys tuned for speed with limited secret life span (month+). working keys are used for secret exchange and any other

Re: [cryptography] Can we move to a forum, please?

On Tue, Dec 24, 2013 at 10:33:08PM -0500, Bernie Cosell wrote: So that's not a handy archive. But the first archive you mention is great -- I didn't know it existed: it should be publicized or something. I don't know if the RFCs permit it, but could there be a list-archive: header?

Re: [cryptography] Can we move to a forum, please?

On Tue, Dec 24, 2013 at 07:43:12PM -0500, Greg wrote: I'm curious, is Aaron's response representative of the entire list's, or are there folks out there lurking who would actually appreciate a forum? Show of hands? I mostly lurk and I strongly prefer a mailing list solution. I'm in the

Re: [cryptography] Can we move to a forum, please?

On Tue, Dec 24, 2013 at 11:03:31PM -0500, Benjamin Kreuter wrote: I mostly lurk and I strongly prefer a mailing list solution. I'm in the Bitcoin community and we keep on talking about fully decentralized backends to mailing lists/usenet replacements, Out of curiosity, where do you see

Re: [cryptography] Can we move to a forum, please?

On Tue, Dec 24, 2013 at 09:39:22PM -0500, Bernie Cosell wrote: *even*? So it isnt' just like a mailing list at all. Since I replied to this post by hitting 'r' in my email client... and out it went. I know PHPbb has gotten a lot fancier, but I still think that it is not near as

Re: [cryptography] Can we move to a forum, please?

On Tue, Dec 24, 2013 at 09:34:57PM -0500, Greg wrote: On Dec 24, 2013, at 9:02 PM, StealthMonger stealthmon...@nym.mixmin.net wrote: Greg g...@kinostudios.com writes: Also, do you enjoy not being able to edit your comments? What kind of software do you suppose people are using,

Re: [cryptography] Bitcoin attack

On Mon, Nov 04, 2013 at 09:31:04AM -0430, Karn Kallio wrote: The paper Majority is not Enough Bitcoin Mining is Vulnerable may be of interest. http://arxiv.org/abs/1311.0243 Abstract. The Bitcoin cryptocurrency records its transactions in a pub- lic log called the blockchain. Its

Re: [cryptography] ciphersuite revocation model? (Re: the spell is broken)

On Sat, Oct 05, 2013 at 02:29:11PM +0200, Natanael wrote: Should we create some kind of CRL style protocol for algorithms? Then we'd have a bunch of servers run by various organizations specialized on crypto/computer security that can issue warnings against unsecure algorithms, as well as

Re: [cryptography] Authenticated Time Synchronization

On Tue, Sep 03, 2013 at 11:06:56AM +0200, Stephen Röttger wrote: Sorry, for the late reply, I was out of town. Specifically a client can generate a unique 128-bit nonce and have the trusted server timestamp it by signing a message including the nonce and the current time T. If the time

[cryptography] [Bitcoin-development] REWARD offered for hash collisions for SHA1, SHA256, RIPEMD160 and others

previously hidden away in some government lab to leak. - Forwarded message from Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org - Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2013 02:07:58 -0400 From: Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org To: Bitcoin Dev bitcoin-developm...@lists.sourceforge.net Subject: [Bitcoin-development] REWARD offered

Re: [cryptography] Authenticated Time Synchronization

Have you considered merkle trees for scalability? Specifically a client can generate a unique 128-bit nonce and have the trusted server timestamp it by signing a message including the nonce and the current time T. If the time between the request and the reply was dt, the actual time must be in

Re: [cryptography] What project would you finance? [WAS: Potential funding for crypto-related projects]

On Tue, Jul 02, 2013 at 12:25:50PM +0200, Adam Back wrote: I think it time to deprecate non-https (and non-forward secret ciphersuites.) Compute power has moved on, session cacheing works, symmetric crypto is cheap. A reasonable use for the $3k the OP is talking about would be to add

Re: [cryptography] [ipv6hackers] opportunistic encryption in IPv6

On Wed, Jun 12, 2013 at 05:59:38PM +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote: Here, I just don't understand the logic. To me, encrypting without authenticating buys you absolutely nothing, except to burn CPU cycles and contribute to global warming. In the *vast* majority of networking technology we use,

Re: [cryptography] Looking for earlier proof: no secure channel without previous secure channel

On Fri, Jun 07, 2013 at 10:02:51AM +0300, ianG wrote: The big example here is of SSL. In v1 it was vulnerable to MITM, which was theoretically claimed to make it 'insecure'. In practice there was no evidence of a threat, and still little real evidence of that precise threat. Fixing the MITM