Re: [cryptography] [cryptome] Re: [cryptome] Re: Cryptome’s searing critique of Snowden Inc.

2016-02-16 Thread Ryan Carboni
John Young remains a troll with occasional redeeming qualities. ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

[cryptography] Doesn't Simon look similar to MD5?

2015-08-29 Thread Ryan Carboni
Doesn't Simon look similar to MD5? Sure, it includes a few more rotates and less additions, but it looks pretty close to one of MD5's F-functions. Or maybe Ripemd. Interestingly, it wouldn't take much to convert Simon into a Type-1 feistel network of state size 256 bits (although I'd use Speck's

Re: [cryptography] Scrypt hardware optimized miner

2015-06-30 Thread Ryan Carboni
Yes, until this specific combination becomes widespread enough that there's sufficient incentive to produce ASICs for it. YesCrypt is more modern. Use that. ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net

Re: [cryptography] NIST Workshop on Elliptic Curve Cryptography Standards

2015-05-13 Thread Ryan Carboni
On Tue, May 12, 2015 at 5:00 PM, d...@deadhat.com wrote: There is a very simple way around this. Block XXTEA introduced a new method [snip] Although for the internet and smart cards, data packets are small enough for 64 bit blocks not to matter as long as you rekey between packets.

Re: [cryptography] NIST Workshop on Elliptic Curve Cryptography Standards

2015-05-12 Thread Ryan Carboni
Don't be ridiculous, NIST providing standards that people care to standardize? ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

Re: [cryptography] NIST Workshop on Elliptic Curve Cryptography Standards

2015-05-12 Thread Ryan Carboni
On Tue, May 12, 2015 at 1:19 AM, d...@deadhat.com wrote: On the lightweight side, I get the impression that block ciphers are also a big topic, but that there isn't a ton of work being done there... besides the NSA ciphers, SIMON and SPECK. John Kelsey mentioned these at RWC. The NSA

Re: [cryptography] Javascript scrypt performance comparison

2015-05-07 Thread Ryan Carboni
http://jsperf.com/ this is a good tool On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 2:48 AM, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) - lists li...@infosecurity.ch wrote: Hi all, does anyone ever made a performance comparison of existing JS scrypt implementation? Currently there are those three: - scrypt-async-js

Re: [cryptography] Shamir Reveals Sisyphus Algorithm

2015-04-23 Thread Ryan Carboni
not a totally unreasonable amount of money... just the size of the entire US IT budget. ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

Re: [cryptography] slide attack to lightweight algorithms

2015-04-06 Thread Ryan Carboni
Nope. Slide attack and reflection attacks are only possible if there's a certain symmetry in the key schedule. TEA has a lousy key schedule, but it is not symmetrical. Neither is PRESENT. Question: if I were to see the ciphertext being processed under a slide attack, what would it look like? A

Re: [cryptography] PGP word list

2015-02-23 Thread Ryan Carboni
On a minor note, technically the PGP word list is a nine-bit communications codebook, with one bit dedicated as an error detecting bit. ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated

2015-02-18 Thread Ryan Carboni
Can't trust anything, except the mail. Only solution: personally encrypt messages by hand, using computers and GPG only for transmitting master keys if the keys cannot be delivered in person. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PGP_word_list Oddly there isn't as much outcry over this as compared to

Re: [cryptography] How far are we from quantum cryptography?

2015-01-25 Thread Ryan Carboni
Actually D-wave supposedly managed 512-Qubits. 128-bit keys are still safe though. In order for it to be cost effective to brute force a 128-bit key, and given that 80-bit keys are vulnerable now, each quantum evaluation of a cryptographic algorithm must be no more expensive than 2^16 that of a

Re: [cryptography] QODE(quick offline data encryption)

2015-01-06 Thread Ryan Carboni
Just use XXTEA. It's the only good cipher that allows for blocks of size equal to that of a disk sector. Additionally, maybe use XXTEA in CTR mode to provide additional confidentiality so that blocks with all zeroes won't output to the same value. On Tue, Jan 6, 2015 at 1:12 PM, Kevin

Re: [cryptography] Snowden docs show none are originals of spies

2014-12-31 Thread Ryan Carboni
Makes it easier to launder documents stolen by other spies and given to Snowden. ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

Re: [cryptography] NSA Attacks on VPN, SSL, TLS, SSH, Tor

2014-12-28 Thread Ryan Carboni
On Sun, Dec 28, 2014 at 3:14 PM, John Young j...@pipeline.com wrote: Der Spiegel released largest single day number of Snowden docs today, 666 pages, on NSA Attacks on VPN, SSL, TLS, SSH, Tor.

Re: [cryptography] [cryptome] Re: NSA Attacks on VPN, SSL, TLS, SSH, Tor

2014-12-28 Thread Ryan Carboni
CRC failed in 'media-35515.pdf' file is broken 7zip says this. I guess this is why John never promised anonymity to his sources, he can't get zip files right. On Sun, Dec 28, 2014 at 4:43 PM, John Young j...@pipeline.com wrote: File size varies with programs. A screen shot of the RAR tally

Re: [cryptography] Is KeyWrap (RFC 3394) vulnerable to CCAs?

2014-12-24 Thread Ryan Carboni
yes, but if the NSA starts publishing things, people might realize the NSA exists. On Wed, Dec 24, 2014 at 4:48 PM, Matthew Green matthewdgr...@gmail.com wrote: The NIST Key Wrap is unauthored, which in practice means it's an NSA construction. That doesn't mean it's insecure. In fact if

Re: [cryptography] javascript random function

2014-12-18 Thread Ryan Carboni
It depends on the browser. Most (probably all) browsers do not use a cryptographically secure function for the random function. If you have to generate a large number of cryptographic random numbers, use XTEA or a WebGL implementation of XTEA. On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 7:53 PM, Givon Zirkind

Re: [cryptography] Misuses/abuses of Sony's compromised root certificate?

2014-12-17 Thread Ryan Carboni
Pretty sure it's an internal root certificate to the Sony corporation. On Wed, Dec 17, 2014 at 1:19 PM, Erwann Abalea eaba...@gmail.com wrote: 2014-12-17 21:41 GMT+01:00 Jeffrey Walton noloa...@gmail.com: Has anyone come across any reports of abuse due to Sony's compromised root? I believe

Re: [cryptography] random number generator

2014-11-20 Thread Ryan Carboni
http://burtleburtle.net/bob/rand/isaac.html Isaac works. On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 3:54 AM, Givon Zirkind givo...@gmx.com wrote: Plz excuse if inappropriate. Does anyone know of a decent (as in really random) open source random generator? Preferably in PHP or C/C++? Thanks.

Re: [cryptography] What's the point of using non-NIST ECC Curves?

2014-10-13 Thread Ryan Carboni
I forget, what was the original inputs to the hash? On Mon, Oct 13, 2014 at 8:14 AM, Krisztián Pintér pinte...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Oct 13, 2014 at 4:51 PM, Derek Miller dreemkil...@gmail.com wrote: However, considering one of the scenarios where these curves might be compromised (the

[cryptography] Just found about Even-Mansour

2014-09-23 Thread Ryan Carboni
Just found about Even-Mansour scheme. Simplest possible cryptosystem, xor-permute-xor, and for a single round it is roughly as secure as half the block size, while two rounds have brute force security. If one only desires confidentiality against attacks faster then brute force, can't one generate

Re: [cryptography] Email encryption for the wider public

2014-09-17 Thread Ryan Carboni
The majority of people are no more capable of GnuPG than understanding why RAM can't be solely used on a computer. GnuPG has some weird defaults that are difficult to change as well without some command line commands. Ultimately your system will have a major flaw: passwords are typically have

Re: [cryptography] Weak random data XOR good enough random data = better random data?

2014-09-03 Thread Ryan Carboni
isn't the simplest solution would be to concatenate or XOR a counter? Thus H[0] = Hash(input) H[N] = Hash(H[N-1]+CTR) considering that hashes from MD4 to SHA-2 all have block sizes of 512 bits, much larger than their outputs, one could simply concatenate a 128-bit counter.

Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] STARTTLS for HTTP

2014-08-22 Thread Ryan Carboni
Firefox users are probably going to keep using Firefox. Chrome users are probably going to keep using Chrome. Opera users use Opera because of it's nice little features. IE users are likely using a pirated version of Windows and live in China. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brand_loyalty The

[cryptography] Devised a Change to RC4

2014-08-20 Thread Ryan Carboni
Feed RC4 through a transposition cipher... essentially a single round 2048-bit block cipher. Table 1: 256 permuted bytes, serves as the PRGA Table 2: 256 permuted bytes, serves as the transposition cipher Table 3: 256 empty values, serves as the output array Table 4: 256 empty values, serves as

Re: [cryptography] STARTTLS for HTTP

2014-08-19 Thread Ryan Carboni
It would be secure against wifi eavesdropping. But worse it might instill a false sense of security. On Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 9:29 PM, Tony Arcieri basc...@gmail.com wrote: Anyone know why this hasn't gained adoption? http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2817 I've been watching various efforts at

Re: [cryptography] Question About Best Practices for Personal File Encryption

2014-08-17 Thread Ryan Carboni
Or in the case of OpenSSL, no one notices the backdoor as it is indistinguishable from an obscure programming error. On Sun, Aug 17, 2014 at 5:01 AM, ianG i...@iang.org wrote: On 17/08/2014 05:09 am, Jeffrey Goldberg wrote: On 2014-08-16, at 4:51 PM, David I. Emery d...@dieconsulting.com

Re: [cryptography] A post-spy world

2014-08-12 Thread Ryan Carboni
John Young, true masterspy. On Mon, Aug 11, 2014 at 1:52 PM, John Young j...@pipeline.com wrote: We are moving toward a post-spy world, according to the guy that runs the CIA’s venture capital arm.

Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] Steganography and bringing encryption to a piece of paper

2014-07-18 Thread Ryan Carboni
Rule of thumb: there's always someone smarter than you, if not today, then tomorrow. Linguists still exist, and they still try to decipher dead languages, although those dead languages are totally uncoupled from modern languages in meaning. Block ciphers are only procedurally generated

Re: [cryptography] Request - PKI/CA History Lesson

2014-04-29 Thread Ryan Carboni
, Ryan Carboni rya...@gmail.com wrote: One can always start with the difficult first step of uninstalling certificate authorities you do not trust. Opera will autorepair damage to the certificate repository, a missing Certificate Authority is considered damage. Opera ships with a list

Re: [cryptography] Request - PKI/CA History Lesson

2014-04-28 Thread Ryan Carboni
We happen to live on a planet where most users are ordinary users. given the extent of phishing, it's probably best we outsource trust to centralized authorities. Although it should be easier establishing your own certificate authority. ___

Re: [cryptography] Request - PKI/CA History Lesson

2014-04-28 Thread Ryan Carboni
trust is outsourced all the time in the non-cryptographic world unless you do not have a bank account On Mon, Apr 28, 2014 at 3:00 PM, James A. Donald jam...@echeque.com wrote: On 2014-04-29 05:58, Ryan Carboni wrote: We happen to live on a planet where most users are ordinary users

Re: [cryptography] Request - PKI/CA History Lesson

2014-04-28 Thread Ryan Carboni
One can always start with the difficult first step of uninstalling certificate authorities you do not trust. On Mon, Apr 28, 2014 at 4:42 PM, ianG i...@iang.org wrote: On 29/04/2014 00:12 am, Ryan Carboni wrote: trust is outsourced all the time in the non-cryptographic world trust is built

Re: [cryptography] Github Pages now supports SSL

2014-04-06 Thread Ryan Carboni
oh dear. He helped the government combat crime and nuisance style offenses. Clearly in collusion. On Sun, Apr 6, 2014 at 12:20 PM, tpb-cry...@laposte.net wrote: Message du 06/04/14 17:41 De : staticsafe On 4/6/2014 10:40, tpb-cry...@laposte.net wrote: Message du 04/04/14 20:09 De :